ELECTION: CHAVEZ ENTERS FRAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 002718 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS PLEASE PASS ALSO TO USOAS AND USAID/LAC E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM EC SUBJECT: ELECTION: CHAVEZ ENTERS FRAY Classified By: PolChief Erik Hall for reasons 1.4 (B&D) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: President Hugo Chavez' criticism of presidential candidate Alvaro Noboa has caused a predictable nationalist reaction in Ecuador, rejecting outside interference in domestic affairs. The intervention will likely cost Chavez friend Rafael Correa, who continues to languish 15-20 points behind Noboa in the polls. Meanwhile, official congressional results are still partial, pending completion of the count in Manabi. Noboa has chosen to duck calls for another debate and to stick to his winning first round formula, emphasizing good works for the poor. Correa continues to mimic Noboa's formula, shying away from his own reform agenda to offer promises to the poor. End Summary. Chavez Enters Fray -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On November 7 Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez publicly accused Noboa of exploiting child labor on his plantations, implied that fraud accounted for Noboa's surprising first place finish in the first round, labeled Noboa's rejection of relations with Venezuela and Cuba as reflecting "extreme rightist fundamentalism," and pledging that "sooner or later we will be rid of this kind of government in Latin America." Chavez' statement drew immediate criticism from the GOE and commentators here for meddling in Ecuadorian affairs. President Palacio said, "No country has the right to intervene in our domestic political affairs." FM Carrion told the press he had communicated Ecuador's "displeasure" to the GOV. Noboa's Lead Holding Firm -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Pollsters have lost some credibility after surprising first round results. Press has only published polls once or twice and the Noboa campaign published in a paid advertisement four polls all putting him ahead. Latest poll results (all /- 3% margin of error): Cedatos (10/30) I. Conf. (11/6) Market (10/30) Consultar (10/29) Noboa 49% 48 49 50 Correa 34% 34 30 28 Null/Blank: 17% Valid Votes Only Noboa 59% Correa 41% The Cedatos numbers reflect a two point widening of Noboa's lead from the week before (Oct. 30 v. Oct. 22) while Informe Confidencial reflects a one point narrowing from the week before (Nov. 6 v. Oct. 29). Congress Results Nearly Final -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Only Manabi is still counting votes (97.63% counted so far; TSE officials granted Manabi authorities an extension of the counting period). After the votes are counted, the votes by slate and by individual undergo a mathematical formula to permit proportional representation. Manabi has a total of eight congressional seats. The PRIAN won 40% of Congressional the voting by slate, which should boost the PRIAN's congressional seat total to 27. However, individual candidates from the PRE, ID, PSC, the UDC and the MPD polled well, so final results are still not certain. Confirmed congressional seats, by party (without Manabi results or smallest parties): PRIAN: 24 PSP: 23 PSC: 11 (one more in alliance with UDC) ID: 11 (includes ID/RED alliance seats) Pachakutik: 7 PRE: 5 UDC: 3 (five with alliances) Engaging the Campaign Teams -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Since the Ambassador's meeting with Correa other Embassy officers have begun meeting with members of the Noboa and Correa campaign teams, to open dialogue, signal USG neutrality, and hopefully to develop inroads with key members of the new government. Both sides acknowledge that despite poll results, the election has not yet been won. That said, Noboa's advisors hope to widen his margin over Correa, while Correa's are predicting a close finish. Correa Team -------------- ¶6. (C) Correa's campaign manager Gustavo Larrea was disarmingly cordial in a November 7 meeting with PolChief and EconCouns. Larrea admitted that "this election has not been won yet--by Noboa or by us." Correa's polls show the gap between candidates closing from 15-20 points to 5-10 in the last week, he claimed. They hoped to organize 40,000 volunteers to observe at each voting table, and had requested the TSE permit Correa's PAIS access to the provincial electoral council offices. Larrea gave lip service to Correa's planned constituent assembly proposal, but also emphasized that Correa and his team see narco-trafficking as a threat. Progress under the current government was good and merited recognition. A Correa government would continue to look for ways to collaborate with the USG to prevent use of Ecuador for transit and to prevent Ecuador from becoming a coca-growing nation. He made no mention of the Manta FOL. He advocated that Colombia needed either to safeguard its border with Ecuador itself, which would be difficult; or to invite an international force to safeguard the Colombia-Ecuador border. ¶7. (C) Larrea's discussion of economics betrayed a strong statist bent. Correa's main economic platform involves "production, production, production" to create jobs. To do so, a Correa administration would encourage the banks to lower interest rates to a level where the productive sector can invest to create jobs; use extra oil revenue (Larrea cited the 50% revenue sharing requirement that we believe violates our BIT) to provide microcredit to certain sectors (agriculture, tourism, handicrafts),fund a new refinery and hydroelectric generation, and investment in health and education. He also welcomed administration support to extend ATPDEA, arguing Ecuador deserves it, but also pointing out that the flower and vegetable sectors that benefit from ATPDEA create valuable jobs for folks who might otherwise be drawn to narcotics. He said that in general, a Correa administration would look to broaden Ecuador's trade with the rest of the world (in contrast with the trade section of official Correa platform, which has a rather inward looking focus). Noboa Team Eager to Govern -------------- ¶8. (C) Newly-elected PRIAN deputy Frederico Perez was similarly welcoming to us in a November 6 meeting with PolChief and EconCouns. Noboa's decision not to meet with any foreign or national officials during the remainder of the campaign was strategic; Noboa would seek immediate contact with the Embassy and probably an early trip to Washington after November 26, Perez said. (Comment: It was not clear when Perez was speaking for himself and when for his presidential candidate. He initially stressed that these were his suggestions to Noboa, but later implied that the following overall approach had been decided within the campaign team. End comment.) ¶9. (C) Perez said that the following decisions on economic reform needed to be taken by Noboa by decree, shortly after he took office (first 15 days),or momentum would be lost: -- End general gas subsidies, replacing them with more focused subsidies for the poor. -- Raise gasoline prices to international levels. -- Enforce respect for contracts, and in that context explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement with Occidental Petroleum. -- Reconstitute Petroecuador as a mixed company, 51% state and 49% private. -- Open the national social security institute (IESS) to competition from the private sector. -- Sign a FTA with the U.S. shortly after taking office. Perez said that these steps are necessary to finance Noboa's social and housing agenda. To manage the political reaction to an end to popular subsidies, the government would need to focus on the cost of the subsidies and how the GOE is losing money on gas resold to Peru and Colombia, and also stress how the funds instead would be used to provide schools and hospitals. ¶10. (C) To govern effectively, Noboa would need to construct a majority in Congress with PSC, UDC, PRE, and others, according to Perez. Perez implied that Noboa has doubts about making any political alliance with former president Lucio Gutierrez' Patriotic Society Party (PSP),since Gutierrez is focused first and foremost on punishing Palacio. Agreeing to his agenda would generate fear and not help Noboa win the election or manage Congress. Perez believed it would be better to seek alliances elsewhere. Perez declined to confirm rumors that he might be nominated to become President of Congress. ¶11. (C) Perez claimed the PRIAN's polls show a 20 point advantage over Correa, heavier in the coastal region. He believed the Noboa lead could grow to 30 points on election day, thanks to undecided voters seeking to support the likely winner. To preserve and widen his lead, Noboa would not debate with Correa or respond to Correa's (or the media's) public jabs. People are tired of negative campaigning. Perez said the PRIAN had strong evidence that Chavez was supporting Correa financially and otherwise, and would reveal that evidence after the elections. Asked why not now, Perez said simply that "we are twenty points ahead." Comment -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Public attention to the campaign is at a lull, but insiders expect that to change as we get closer to November ¶26. Although Chavez' attacks on Noboa's alleged child labor exploitation may resonate with some, most Ecuadorians will probably be annoyed by the intervention. It also rekindles the Chavez-Correa links that had mostly dropped from focus and discussion, which should help Noboa. JEWELL