Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06QUITO2531
2006-10-13 21:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Quito
Cable title:  

UNSC: GOE STILL UNDECIDED, WORRIED ABOUT CORREA

Tags:  PREL EC GT IO VE UNSC 
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DE RUEHQT #2531 2862133
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
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FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK NIACT IMMEDIATE 0090
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5476
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 6080
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 2092
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA PRIORITY 0808
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ OCT 0150
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 1053
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 1293
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 002531 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR P: KARA MCDONALD, IO/UNP: BRIAN HARRIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016
TAGS: PREL EC GT IO PREL VE UNSC
SUBJECT: UNSC: GOE STILL UNDECIDED, WORRIED ABOUT CORREA

REF: A. STATE 171921

B. QUITO 2262

C. QUITO 2252

Classified By: Ambassador Linda Jewell for reasons 1.4 (B&D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 002531 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR P: KARA MCDONALD, IO/UNP: BRIAN HARRIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016 TAGS: PREL EC GT IO PREL VE UNSC SUBJECT: UNSC: GOE STILL UNDECIDED, WORRIED ABOUT CORREA REF: A. STATE 171921 ¶B. QUITO 2262 ¶C. QUITO 2252 Classified By: Ambassador Linda Jewell for reasons 1.4 (B&D) ¶1. (C) Per instruction in Ref A, the Ambassador discussed the UNSC race with Foreign Minister Francisco Carrion at length on October 13. Carrion said Ecuador is still studying the issue and President Palacio will make the decision sometime before Monday's vote. MFA sources tell us Carrion will discuss the UNSC race with his Chilean counterpart before making a final recommendation to Palacio. ¶2. (C) Carrion told the Ambassador he was aware of the arguments in favor of Guatemala and against Venezuela, and was personally very concerned about how Venezuela's possible membership in the UNSC could affect its functioning. However, he admitted privately that domestic political developments will play a part in the decision. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador stressed the importance of a fully functioning UNSC. If Ecuador truly cares about the UN, it must show it. Carrion said he did not think either country had the votes to win; the Ambassador countered that Ecuador should not kid itself that a vote for Venezuela would not matter--it could mean the difference. Carrion agreed about the risk, and gave the impression he favored abstention. ¶4. (C) Carrion mentioned that some recent interactions with the GOV had not been positive. At the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Havana, Chavez and Palacio were scheduled to talk about petroleum projects, but Chavez kept Palacio waiting; Palacio became annoyed and left. During a visit to Quito this week by the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, Maduro raised the UNSC race only shortly before his departure. Carrion claims he told Maduro that the GOE was considering the issue, but had not decided on its vote. ¶5. (C) Carrion said he would talk to the President again about this issue today but does not expect an immediate decision. Carrion also expects a number of rounds of voting and said he was willing to be in close touch with the Embassy on Monday. He was not sure whether Palacio would give UN PermRep Cordova general instructions and let him proceed, or discuss each round of voting with him. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador told Carrion that the U.S. Administration would work for ATPDEA extension. Carrion was delighted, saying a statement to that effect would be welcomed here. ¶7. (C) Comment: The Ambassador's conversation with Carrion tracks previous dialogues with GOE officials on the issue (Refs B and C). Carrion's professed discomfort with the prospect of a Venezuelan presence on the UNSC is not new either. What is new here is the growing prospect of election victory by radical leftist Rafael Correa, which clearly gives the current GOE pause before taking positions relating to Venezuela. ¶8. (C) Recommendation: Our impression is that Carrion would recommend abstention until a viable third candidate emerges. However, it is clear the decision rests with Palacio, and the best opportunity to influence it lies in the Secretary's planned call to him. In addition to the arguments on this issue, it might be useful also to note that a vote for Venezuela would make it harder for the administration to convince Congress to extend ATPDEA preferences for Ecuador. JEWELL

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