KOSOVO: KPC DEMINING CAPACITY IS IMPROVING,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000923 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE AND PRM/WRA NSC FOR BRAUN USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016 TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI SUBJECT: KOSOVO: KPC DEMINING CAPACITY IS IMPROVING, LANDMINES NO LONGER IMPEDE MOVEMENT OR DEVELOPMENT Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: There is room for optimism as the 2006 demining season draws to a close. Despite earlier criticism by the international de-mining NGO, HALO Trust, of the demining capabilities of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), an August 2006 study by the International Centre for Humanitarian Demining determined that landmines and unexploded ordnance do not impede movement or socioeconomic development in Kosovo, and that by 2007 the KPC will have sufficient capacity to manage the residual future threat. According to UNMIK's Office of the KPC Coordinator (OKPCC), there are only 15 dangerous areas remaining in Kosovo (the same number as at the beginning of 2006) and 45 low-priority explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks to be completed. On November 21, COM will participate in the hand-over of replacement demining equipment that PM/WRA donated through the International Trust Fund (ITF) in Slovenia. END SUMMARY. Key Demining Actors in Post-conflict Kosovo ¶2. (SBU) Following the 1999 conflict, the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Center (UNMACC) coordinated most mine survey and clearance work in Kosovo. In 2002, UNMACC ceased operations in Kosovo and the UNMIK Office of the KPC Coordinator (OKPCC) became the focal point for clearance of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). It established an EOD Management Section, which coordinates removal of landmines and UXO, and does quality assurance, mine risk education (MRE),public information and victim assistance work. It also manages the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, which contains information on existing and cleared areas. ¶3. (C) OKPCC relies on KPC EOD teams, KFOR, HALO and the Mine Awareness Trust (MAT) for demining and EOD-related work, and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) provides reach-back support. In June 2005, KFOR turned over EOD response to KPC for items reported during their normal working hours (0800 to 1600),but there are a number of caveats to this agreement. For example, KFOR responds to calls if 1) criminal activity is suspected, 2) the UXO is over 100 mm, 3) the device is too technically sophisticated to be removed using the KPC's equipment, or 4) the UXO is located very close to KFOR installations. The KPC has seven demining teams, but one is always devoted to EOD response. They have a rotating schedule, so each team does one week of EOD response every seven weeks. UNMIK OKPCC EOD Section Head Ahmet Sallova told poloff that EOD calls go to the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) or UNMIK Police, and they refer them to KFOR. KFOR decides whether to send KPC demining teams, and Sallova estimates that KFOR handles about 50 percent of the calls themselves. Poloff spoke to American Lt. Col. Danny Hansen of the KFOR Inspectorate for the KPC and asked why KFOR takes so many EOD calls between 0800 and 1600. He said it has nothing to do with a lack of confidence in the KPC's demining teams, and is more a result of KFOR already being in the communities where the items are found and of the aforementioned caveats. HALO Questions KPC's Capabilities ¶4. (SBU) Assessing demining efforts in 2005, OKPCC determined that by 2007 the KPC could develop sufficient capacity to manage the residual threat in Kosovo and develop and plan accordingly. In May 2006, UNMIK invited UNMAS to conduct a short threat and capability study to confirm OKPCC's assessment. Their findings matched OKPCC's, but an international de-mining NGO, HALO Trust, disputed them. As a result, OKPCC commissioned another independent study by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD),which was conducted in August 2006. ¶5. (SBU) GICHD upheld the findings of the OKPCC and UNMAS, but suggested some improvements in processes and to the IMSMA PRISTINA 00000923 002 OF 003 database, as well as better liaison between OKPCC, the KPC, KFOR and OSCE. They also reported that "mines/UXO generally do not impede movement or socioeconomic development in Kosovo," but that in some rural areas "the perceived or real threat of mines/UXO may affect the population." The Remaining Threat ¶6. (SBU) Despite the fact that landmines and UXO no longer impede movement or development, they still pose a threat in Kosovo. Since the end of 1999, they have killed 111 and injured 418. So far in 2006, they have killed one person and injured nine. According to OKPCC estimates, 15 dangerous areas still remain, compared with 4,520 when the conflict ended in 1999. There are also 45 low-priority EOD tasks to be completed. Demining teams have cleared 2,438,659 square meters of land in 2006 alone, and removed 548 landmines, 776 cluster munitions and 1,040 items of UXO. ¶7. (C) Unfortunately, demining teams have cleared much less land in 2006 than they did a year ago. In 2005, they cleared a total of 4,318,966 square meters of land, and removed 749 landmines, 977 cluster munitions and 1,378 pieces of UXO. When the figures are broken down by KPC, NGOs and KFOR, there is a noticeable drop in the KPC demining teams' productivity. Last year, they cleared 1,706,670 square meters of land, 209 landmines, 126 cluster munitions, and 203 pieces of UXO, while to date in 2006, they have only cleared 639,973 square meters of land, 84 landmines, 307 cluster munitions, and 149 items of UXO. ¶8. (C) Sallova attributes the decline in productivity primarily to the KPC demining teams' inadequate equipment, which he said caused them not only to work at about half of their capacity, but to scrap plans for expanding their teams. He said having one of the teams pulled off of regular demining work for EOD response had also been a factor, as had the fact that each of the demining teams spent three weeks in an MAT technical survey training course funded by the UK's Ministry of Defence. He also noted that the KPC demined the Pristina Airport last year, which contributed to the higher clearance figures in 2005. Lt. Col. Hansen concurred with Sallova's assessment that the KPC were less productive largely because of the old equipment. Despite this year's setbacks, Sallova said he was optimistic that the clearance figures would improve in 2007 thanks to the USG's donation of replacement demining equipment. The Road Ahead ¶9. (SBU) OKPCC plans to develop an action plan to address GICHD's recommendations and better serve the Kosovar people. It will also continue to rely more heavily on KPC EOD teams. As a result of increased KPC demining capacity, HALO will cease operations in Kosovo by the end of 2006 and the MAT Trust will leave in 2007. OKPCC says KFOR will also gradually reduce its work. This is consistent with what Lt. Col. Hansen told Poloff. He said current thinking is to plus up the KPC demining teams with experienced deminers recruited from the NGOs that are ceasing operations, redefine the Memorandum of Understanding between KFOR and the KPC on EOD response, expand the KPC's responsibilities, and improve lines of communication between local municipal and police officials and the KPC demining unit. ¶10. (C) The future of humanitarian demining will need to be addressed before status is decided, and it will inevitably be linked to the future of the KPC. If the KPC's EOD section becomes part of any post-status Kosovo defense force, the general consensus is that its demining work will shift to supporting NATO missions abroad. In that case, a Mine Action Center or some other civilian organization would need to be created to coordinate domestic humanitarian demining work. When asked about the future of the OKPCC EOD Section post status, Sallova told poloff that no one had discussed with PRISTINA 00000923 003 OF 003 OKPCC exactly what will happen. Lt. Col. Hansen speculated that post status the civil protection brigade would continue to perform humanitarian demining work. (NOTE: HALO Trust will donate its demining equipment to the KPC before leaving Kosovo, and the KPC is procuring additional demining equipment. The HALO donation and new procurement will equip the new deminers. END NOTE) ¶11. (SBU) COMMENT: Increased scrutiny of the KPC's demining capabilities is a positive development. It has resulted in an in-depth study that not only confirmed the KPC EOD teams' capacity to handle the residual threat in Kosovo by next year, but also highlighted ways to improve current processes. We will continue to support demining capacity-building in Kosovo: PRM/WRA recently donated USD 180,000 worth of replacement demining equipment to the KPC to help improve efficiency, and an official hand-over ceremony will take place on November 21, attended by COM. END COMMENT. ¶12. (SBU) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable in its entirety for release to U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. KAIDANOW