SUPPORT FOR KOSOVO'S SOUTHERN SERBS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000881 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR DRL, INL, AND EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016 TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI SUBJECT: SUPPORT FOR KOSOVO'S SOUTHERN SERBS Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ensuring that the Serb community can remain and prosper in Kosovo is a key Mission goal and a vital test of Kosovo's commitment to multi-ethnic democracy. The Serb minority in Kosovo is not monolithic; those who live in the northern municipalities of Leposavic, Zubin Potok and Zvecan, plus north Mitrovica, have agendas that are distinct and often at odds with those who live in minority enclaves south of the Ibar River. Serbs in the south are at once the most vulnerable and the most willing to engage in productive discussion with the international community and Kosovar authorities. That attitude must be nourished, in part through active engagement via USAID and other USG resources, and in part through political support for southern Serb moderates who show any inclination to work with the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. End summary. Enclave Serbs: Expanding Support for the Most Vulnerable ¶2. (C) Kosovo Serbs who live in ethnic enclaves south of the Ibar river, some 55 percent of the Serb population here, face unique challenges. Surrounded by the Albanian majority, these Serbs are reliant on Belgrade for a part of their livelihood but totally dependent on Kosovo instititions and the international community for their security. A number of southern Serbs have openly told us they view the U.S. as their key protector; Slobodan Petrovic, founder of a new ethnic-Serb party based in southern Kosovo, made this explicit in a conversation with COM October 20 when he noted that the enclave Serbs had nowhere else to turn and were deeply grateful that the U.S. continued to keep the Serb cause front and center with Kosovar Albanian institutions. ¶3. (C) Recognizing this, USOP has consistently reached out to the southern Serbs in order to demonstrate our commitment to their well-being and encourage them to remain as part of a multi-ethnic Kosovo. (Note: The fact that the bulk of southern Serbs live in the U.S. KFOR area of operations, and that the current Texas National Guard-led contingent has worked diligently to expand outreach to the local Serb communities, has aided us tremendously in this effort.) Our approach has been along three primary lines: infrastructure, business, NGO and media assistance via USAID and public diplomacy resources; political advocacy and support; and an increased information flow on issues related to the Vienna process and its benefits to the Serb community. Visible Projects in Enclave Serb Communities ¶4. (SBU) U.S. support for Serb communities in the southern part of Kosovo is visible and widespread. Three and a half million dollars has been earmarked for Kosovo Serb infrastructure projects in the southern enclaves, building roads, schools, community centers, health clinics, and improving water supplies. Projects are currently active in Ferizaj/Urosevac, Vushtri/Vucitrn, Fushe Kosove/Kosovo Polje, Obliq/Obilic, Kline/Klina, Shtrpce/Strpce, and Peja/Pec, among other areas. (Note: An additional $1 million has been devoted to projects solely in Kosovo's north, in support of Serb communities in north Mitrovica and the three Serb-majority municipalities.) Hundreds of Serb families have benefited from this infrastructure improvement, as well as from business development programs designed in part to help Serb farmers market and export their produce, including to Serbia. ¶5. (SBU) USG projects are designed to serve several purposes: they are tangible proof of U.S. commitment to Serb welfare in Kosovo; they have the potential to significantly enhance the self-sufficiency of Serb communities through business and economic links with their Albanian neighbors; and they encourage daily interaction between ethnic communities. In one business-related project, 54 ethnic Serb accountants were trained in harmonizing record-keeping practices with Kosovo regulations; in another, ethnic-Serb construction companies were helped to obtain licenses to bid on PISG and international donor tenders. Similar programs PRISTINA 00000881 002 OF 003 exist in agricultural and other fields. Infrastructure assistance, as well, has been specifically targeted at improving practical links between municipal authorities and their Serb citizenry. ¶6. (SBU) NGO and media assistance to enclave Serbs is similarly oriented. Training in reporting, production skills and management has been provided to Kosovo Serb print and broadcast media -- which, though rudimentary, now that the power to reach most enclaves with news and information. USOP has also made incentive grants available to Serb production houses to develop topical content, for example documentaries on minority issues, and has linked Albanian and Serb TV stations to jointly produce and broadcast such material. On the civil society front, USAID recently launched a project with Freedom House International to provide grants to pairs of Kosovo Serb/Kosovo Albanian NGOs for cooperation on common initiatives. Other NGO grants, made through USAID and our Democracy Commission, have focused on Serb NGO activities in the enclaves, ranging from women's associations to youth groups. Public diplomacy resources have enabled us to support Serb libraries in the southern enclaves (as well as in the north),teach English to students, and bring Serbs and Albanians together for a variety of cultural events and educational programs. Political Advocacy and Support ¶7. (C) Moderate Serb political leaders, even in the southern enclaves, are few and far between; pressure from Belgrade and from the hardline northern Serb leadership to conform to an adversarial vision of daily politics has made Serbs in Kosovo's south wary of asserting their own prerogatives. Nor have Kosovar Albanian governing authorities in many cases done what they should to demonstrate a positive commitment to Serbs' future in Kosovo. Caught between a rock and a hard place, moderate Serb leaders consistently appeal to the U.S. government to intercede on their behalf with both Belgrade and Kosovar authorities. USOP maintains a regular weekly (sometimes more frequent) exchange with Serb Orthodox Bishop Teodosije and Father Sava Janjic, who reside in the enclave of Decani monastery; as a result of their keen advocacy and our responsiveness, we have together raised the pressure on the Kosovo government to stop development near the Serb monument to the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, fund repairs to vandalized Serbian churches in Urosevac/Ferizaj and elsewhere, and focus on small infrastructure needs in Serb areas. Agreeing to a USOP initiative, Bishop Teodosije will accompany Ambassador Wisner to Klina during his October 24-26 visit to Kosovo to raise attention to the needs of the Serb community there, and COM has offered to accompany the Bishop on other enclave visits in the future. ¶8. (C) Consistent public and private admonitions to the Kosovar authorities has also resulted in fulfillment of eight of the 13 Contact Group priority standards for Kosovo, many of which are directly related to minority issues. Other items are underway but have yet to be fully implemented, including those related to property return and creation of a rental scheme for Serb-owned (and Albanian occupied) apartments; we will be intensifying our work with the PISG and UNMIK in the next few weeks to see that these standards are successfully completed. We can do even more to advocate on behalf of the Serb community; as one example, there are linkages yet to be established between Serb media in the enclaves and KTV, the Kosovo public broadcaster, where USOP can be helpful in facilitating contacts and expanding ties. Other ideas may be brought forward by Slobodan Petrovic and other Serb moderate leaders, including SLKM officials Oliver Ivanovic and Randjel Nojkic, something COM has encouraged in recent contacts. Media Exposure/Access to Information ¶9. (C) Despite the assistance provided to Kosovo Serb media outlets, Serbs in Kosovo remain heavily reliant on Belgrade for their information flow. Knowledge about the Vienna final status negotiations, especially the decentralization PRISTINA 00000881 003 OF 003 provisions and its potential benefits to the Serb community, is scant. Internet use is practically non-existent among Serbs in a heavily rural environment where even phone lines are sometimes lacking. Our public diplomacy strategy has therefore taken two tacks. One, alluded to earlier, focuses on broadening receptivity to the U.S. role in Kosovo and our emphasis on multi-ethnicity, through the tools of English instruction, donations of library materials, and cultural and educational programs. ¶10. (C) The other half of the strategy is targeted more directly at getting the word out on decentralization, making clear the USG commitment to the decentralization provisions of the Vienna settlement and explaining those aspects of the deal that will protect and enhance Serb rights in Kosovo. COM has gone out to Gjilan/Gnilane within the past few weeks to underscore that the USG expects Kosovar Albanian municipal authorities to comply fully with the Ahtisaari plan once it is publicly articulated; her message received wide resonance in Kosovo media, as did EUR Assistant Secretary Fried's comments on the same subject (as well as his condemnation of violence against minorities) during his October visit to Kosovo. Ambassador Wisner's visit next week will offer another opportunity to make these points both to the Albanian and Serb audiences in Kosovo; Radio KIM, a station based in Serb-majority Caglavica but with network reach into all the main Serb enclaves, will interview Ambassador Wisner in Klina, and other media will cover his joint visit with Bishop Teodosije to the Serb villages in Klina municipality. ¶11. (C) We can and will find many more opportunities to deliver these messages, through the venue of high-level visits, through coordination with our Contact Group colleagues on the ground, and through statements and interviews made in Washington aimed at listeners in Kosovo. The latter will be particularly important as the outlines of the Ahtisaari plan are made public and both Serbs and Albanians respond with intense interest and, at least in some instances, real apprehension. Managing expectations regarding the status process (and outreach to the Serb community) is not solely the job of the U.S. government -- we continue to urge an often reluctant Kosovo government to take up its reponsibilities in this regard -- but we have an outsized voice in Kosovo and our message of reassurance will be critical on both sides. ¶12. (SBU) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable in its entirety for release to U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. KAIDANOW