KOSOVO: A/S FRIED PRESSES KOSOVO LEADERS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000833

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, AND EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR
DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: A/S FRIED PRESSES KOSOVO LEADERS TO
DEMONSTRATE READINESS FOR STATUS OUTCOME


Classified By: COM TINA S. KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In Pristina September 26-28, EUR A/S Fried
met separately with PM Ceku, President Sejdiu and the Unity
Team and assured them of the USG's seriousness in pursuing
the status process to its logical end, but stressed that the
Kosovar Albanian leadership must show itself worthy of
independence. Kosovars, he said, will have to accept Special
Envoy Ahtisaari's negotiated settlement and explain the
reasons and benefits of decentralization clearly to their
public. At a joint press conference with visiting German MFA
PolDir Schaeffer, Fried strongly condemned violence against
Serbs, saying such attacks were not acts of patriotism but of
cowardice, and that nationalism of all varieties had only
brought misery to the Balkans. At a lunch with local Contact
Group reps, Fried discussed the security situation in the
divided city of Mitrovica, especially in the post-status
period, and all agreed that a more visible KFOR presence in
the north would help. KFOR Commander LTG Kather told Fried
he could manage the situation in the Serb north, but dealing
with any widespread violence in the status aftermath would be
difficult. SRSG Ruecker welcomed Fried's message of keeping
the status timeline on track, but observed that Serbian
elections, if definitely scheduled for December, could cause
this timeline to slip. Fried acknowledged this, but
cautioned against the "slippery slope" of timing the
independence issue around the Serbian electoral calendar.
Ruecker strongly agreed.


2. (C) SUMMARY (cont'd). Moderate Kosovo Serb leaders
appreciated Fried's candor that independence was coming,
though SLKM leader Ivanovic argued the process should be
delayed, and criticized Serbian PM Kostunica directly for not
caring about the everyday problems of Kosovo Serbs. Fried
promised USG commitment to see decentralization provisions
implemented and the Kosovo Serb heritage protected. Fried
also met with an impressive group of young Albanian, Serb and
non-Serb minority professionals, who chose to speak to him in
Serbian and who expressed their strong support for a
multi-ethnic Kosovo. End Summary.

Message to Kosovo Albanians Leaders: Show That You Are Worthy
of Independence


3. (C) EUR A/S Daniel Fried, in Pristina September 26-28,
told PM Ceku and President Sejdiu separately that the U.S.
"is serious" about the final status outcome being
independence, but that these leaders need to be equally
serious in demonstrating Kosovo's worthiness. At a
subsequent meeting with the Unity Team, he urged the Kosovo
Albanian leadership to embrace whatever package UN Special
Envoy Ahtisaari presents, to educate their public on the key
decentralization issue, to reject violence against Serbs
(specifically to arrest and prosecute offenders),and not to
respond to provocations, especially in the post-status
period.


4. (C) All leaders claimed to understand the message and
all were grateful for U.S. support. PM Ceku assessed that
Serbs in the north would most likely respond to independence
by declaring secession and commiting acts of political
defiance, but said he was working with KFOR and UNMIK to
address this potential scenario. He and President Sejdiu,
like other members of the Unity Team, were seized with the
timing of the status process and argued that any delay would
only play into Belgrade's hands. Opposition leader Thaci,
the only Unity Team member aside from Sejdiu to speak at the
joint meeting, said he was committed to working with
Ahtisaari and the Contact Group and that his party would
secure implementation of the agreement, but accused the
Kosovo government of corruption and involvement in organized
crime, and faulted UNMIK for tolerating it. Fried asked
these leaders not to fixate on a timeline and not to play
politics with final status, but to focus instead on the work
still to be done. He conveyed that the end of 2006 would see
"greater clarity" on the status issue and that the U.S. would
not leave Kosovar leaders without support.

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Internationals: Status Timing, Reaction of Serb North
Dominate Discussion


5. (C) SRSG Ruecker welcomed Fried's tough message to
Belgrade on independence and the Contact Group's
reaffirmation via its recent ministerial statement that it
would continue to seek a negotiated solution by the end of

2006. He observed, however, that if Serbian elections were
held in December the CG would likely have to delay action by
a matter of weeks or possibly months. (German MFA PolDir
Schaeffer, also in Pristina, made this same point at a
private breakfast with Fried.) Fried underscored to Ruecker
(as well as Schaeffer) that until Belgrade made a firm
announcement, there was no basis on which to alter the CG's
timeline; even after any Serb announcement, Fried said, there
would have to be careful evaluation of the implications of
delay and the "slippery slope" of waiting yet again for
government formation in Serbia. Asked about what the Serb
north, especially north Mitrovica, would do after the
declaration of final status, Ruecker said the Serbs there
could declare secession or take other political action, but
the international community would reject such a move. The
enhanced KFOR presence and continuation of the dialogue with
the Serb community, he maintained, would help keep this
reaction in check. Deputy SRSG Schook noted the solution to
the problem was essentially in Belgrade; all UNMIK and KFOR
could do was prevent an escalation of violence. Schook
feared that if any Albanian in north Mitrovica was displaced
due to violence, Albanians could exact revenge on the
vulnerable Serb enclaves in the south -- a fear also
articulated by UNMIK Mitrovica rep Jerry Gallucci at a later
meeting.


6. (C) Discussion of Mitrovica dominated a lunch with local
Contact Group reps and dinner with COMKFOR LTG Kather. CG
reps thought an increased KFOR presence would improve the
security situation and that moderate Kosovo Serb leaders
should be urged not to do anything precipitous, since life as
refugees in Serbia would be decidedly worse than any other
alternative. All agreed that Belgrade, the main factor
influencing Kosovo Serbs, still had not decided how to react
in the post-status environment, but that its desire to avoid
an exodus of Serb refugees into Serbia would be an incentive
not to employ a "burn the house down" strategy in northern
Kosovo. LTG Kather was confident he could manage threats in
Mitrovica and the Serb north and noted that Germany had just
approved an extension of the German ORF troops at Camp
Nothing Hill (in northern Kosovo) until the end of October,
and might push that even further into late December. Kather
admitted, however, that he was unsure of KFOR's ability to
address multiple threats throughout Kosovo should there be
widespread violence. Kather also said that his coordination
with UNMIK civpol had "improved immeasurably" in recent weeks
with the arrival of a new civpol commander, UK national Steve
Curtis (whom A/S Fried also met during his trip).

Moderate Serbs Appreciate Candor, Criticize Belgrade


7. (C) Meeting with three moderate Kosovo Serb leaders at
UNMIK Mitrovica HQ, Fried delivered a frank message that
independence was coming. At the same time, he affirmed U.S.
resolve to protect the Kosovo Serb heritage, to press for
implementation of decentralization provisions, and to remain
engaged. These leaders -- Oliver Ivanovic, Randjel Nojkic
and Slobodan Petrovic -- said they appreciated Fried's
candor, though Ivanovic maintained that the status decision
should be delayed. Fried countered that delay would bring no
benefit to anyone, and especially not to the Serbs; there was
no return to the past and no guarantee for Serb rights
outside a status settlement. Ivanovic complained that PM
Ceku and other Albanian leaders could not be trusted; they
say the right things, he noted, but were uninterested in
providing concrete assistance in Serb areas or punishing
those who attack Serbs, citing the recent grenade attack in
Klina that injured four elderly returnees. Interestingly,
all three Serbs focused on Belgrade (not Pristina) as their

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biggest problem: Nojkic pointed an accusatory finger at "Mr.
Kostunica and his politics" which he said focused only on the
north (not the larger Serb community in the south) and
created divisions among Kosovo Serbs. Petrovic, the
liberal-minded leader of a small new Kosovo Serb party,
differed from his colleagues in asking Fried to find a
solution "as soon as possible," agreeing that a delay would
bring nothing good. Ivanovic concluded that Belgrade's
"theoretical" Kosovo was divorced from the reality of Kosovo
Serbs: it wants them to stay, but doesn't allow
participation in Kosovar institutions.

Hope for a Multiethnic Future


8. (SBU) At a USOP-sponsored roundtable, Fried met ten
young Kosovo Albanian, Serb and non-Serb minority
professionals, who all chose to speak to him in Serbian (or
English) and who all professed their hope for a multi-ethnic
Kosovo. Each had a story to tell, whether in the business,
NGO or international sphere, that related to this hope. Some
recounted how the poor state of the economy made the
situation all the more difficult and argued for greater
economic aid from the U.S. and other donors. Fried
acknowledged these obstacles, but argued that foreign
investment was a far greater contributor to prosperity than
assistance. Resolution of final status, he went on, would
create conditions that would allow for greater investment and
IFI involvement. He saluted the participants for their
initiative to work toward a better Kosovo.

Press with German MFA PolDir


9. (SBU) Fried and visiting German MFA PolDir Schaeffer
gave a joint press conference at UNMIK HQ at which they
condemned nationalism of all kinds and insisted that violence
must have no part in a multi-ethnic Kosovo. Fried said
nationalism had created only destruction and misery for the
Balkans, while Schaeffer spoke of German nationalism wreaking
havoc upon Europe during World War II. Violence against
Serbs, Fried said, was not an act of patriotism, but one of
cowardice. Both Fried and Schaeffer reaffirmed the Contact
Group's intent to seek a negotiated settlement by the end of
the year. Schaeffer said outright that all the countries of
the Balkans would one day be members of the EU.


10. (C) COMMENT: A/S Fried's visit afforded a high-level
opportunity not only to reassure the Kosovar Albanian leaders
of U.S. commitment to see the final status process to its
end, but to urge them to follow through on their work and
present a serious face to the international community. This
is a message we will work to amplify in the next few weeks in
our engagement with the Unity Team and the political parties.



11. (U) A/S Fried has cleared this message.


12. (U) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable for release
in its entirety to U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti
Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW