KOSOVO: WHY A SPEEDY RESOLUTION OF STATUS MATTERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000788 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK YI SUBJECT: KOSOVO: WHY A SPEEDY RESOLUTION OF STATUS MATTERS REF: BELGRADE 1484 Classified By: COM Tina S. Kaidanow for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Having read Embassy Belgrade's excellent cable (reftel) on the compelling reasons to stick to the planned timetable for resolution of Kosovo's status, we wanted to offer a few thoughts from the Pristina perspective on why a status decision this year remains critical to our objectives of stability and progress in the region. ¶2. (C) We have maintained steady momentum over the past months in directing the energies of Kosovo's fractious political parties towards fulfillment of key standards agreed by the international community, standards that help demonstrate Kosovo's political will to protect ethnic minorities and enshrine basic democratic rights for all citizens. The multi-party "Unity Team" (UT) of Kosovar Albanian negotiators has also put on a more than credible showing in Vienna, responding to President Ahtissari's repeated requests for more concessions on decentralization and community rights with flexibility and seriousness of purpose. For this, each member of the team has taken a direct political hit -- President Sejdiu and his LDK compatriots have been accused of "selling out" to the Kosovo Serbs without any corresponding concessions from Belgrade, while opposition UT members Surroi and Thaci have seen their parties grow restive in an enforced and unnatural (though necessary) alliance with the governing coalition. Further, though the political atmosphere is highly charged in this pre-status timeframe, inter-ethnic violence has not been part of the landscape, with ethnically-instigated incidents both south and north of the Ibar River at an all-time low. ¶3. (C) That any of this is the case is not by accident. Progress on standards, continued unity among political rivals, and restraint among the even the most radical factions of Kosovar society has been predicated on the prospect of a clear resolution this year to the status question. Using the leverage of the status process, we have kept this house in order and -- more to the point -- we have empowered Kosovo's moderate leadership to seize the initiative and propel Kosovo firmly in the direction of inter-ethnic cooperation and democratic institution-building. We obviously have a long way to go, but status has been and remains the engine for positive change. ¶4. (C) Take away the prospect for a settlement of status by the end of 2006, and we open the door for divisive and dangerous forces to seize the political stage in Kosovo. Delay will almost certainly fracture the Unity Team itself beyond repair. What tenous control members of the Team have over voices within their own parties arguing against decentralization (and indeed any concessions to the Serbs) will also diminish precipitously. Most worrying, small but significant extremist Albanian elements -- whose activities have thus far been kept in check -- will find fertile ground for an expanded base of support. Even random acts of violence, if they build in intensity during a hiatus in the status process, could derail our carefully honed plans and lead to a downward spiral of conflict and destruction. What chance we have now to navigate through an admittedly difficult patch and find a productive modus operandi with Serbia post-status, as Embassy Belgrade so rightly points out, could be lost for many years in a cycle of escalating violence and mutual recrimination. ¶5. (C) The imperative of moving resolutely towards a status decision is further underscored by the economic difficulties facing Kosovo this winter and beyond. Credible reports from the World Bank and our own assessments point to the possibility of a far bleaker winter season -- with regular power outages and energy infrastructure failures -- than even those of the last few years; combined with growing unemployment as a consequence of UNMIK's departure and any delay in the status determination, we could see a "perfect storm" of events leading to social unrest, inevitably exploited by irresponsible elements of Kosovo's political PRISTINA 00000788 002 OF 002 spectrum. Nor would Kosovo's long term prospects for stability be served by its continuing inability to attract private investment or financial support from the IFIs under current legal arrangements. ¶6. (C) The immediate period ahead of us will be difficult all around, in Serbia and most certainly here in Kosovo, where increasing fire is being levelled at Kosovar negotiators and where even parliamentary members from Kosovo's governing parties have taken potshots at their political leaders for appearing too "generous" to the Serbs. With our unceasing support, and armed with the clear prospect of a status decision by year's end, Kosovo's mainstream leadership can and will weather the storm and emerge stronger at the other end. Under any other circumstances, however, we cannot be sure what the future will hold here. We would urge that the status determination timeline proceed forward as planned, and we echo Embassy Belgrade's assurance that we will do everything possible to bring the process to a positive conclusion. ¶7. (U) U.S. Office Pristina does not/not clear this cable for release to U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari. KAIDANOW