KOSOVO: CONSTITUTION DRAFTING AND ELECTIONS TIMING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000729 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR DRL, INL, AND EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM UNMIK YI SUBJECT: KOSOVO: CONSTITUTION DRAFTING AND ELECTIONS TIMING POST-STATUS Classified By: COM TINA S. KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Discussion has begun, both locally and in UNOSEK and Contact Group venues, on the important post-status issues of constitution drafting and timing of elections. UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari expressed to COM and EU reps in Pristina his view that the constitution must be drafted with the status settlement as its core, a belief we share, precluding any pre-status effort to begin a drafting process. UNOSEK has also indicated informally to Kosovar contacts that it may stipulate within the settlement a procedural framework for drafting the constitution; that framework could involve convening a "constitutional assembly" composed of members of the current Kosovo Assembly, which would be empowered to consult extensively with civil society and then vote on the new draft. We are dubious of the wisdom of allowing the process to be led by parliamentarians, who have more often than not proven fractious and politically-driven; if the constitution is to be agreed and ratified in short order, it will take a highly controlled process with strong U.S. and EU/Council of Europe engagement. There has also been debate over when to hold municipal and national elections; both for logistical and political reasons, we think an optimal scenario would be to hold both simultaneously in the October-November 2007 timeframe, a view shared by the EU liaison office here, UNMIK, and key Kosovar interlocutors. Logistically, however, earlier municipal elections could be possible. An important consideration relates to the judgement of whether immediate or delayed elections post-status improve the likelihood of Kosovo Serb participation. End Summary. The Constitution: How and When to Draft ¶2. (C) The process of drafting a constitution for the new, post-status Kosovo will undoubtedly become the most neuralgic and politically sensitive issue facing Kosovo's politicians after the status decision is announced. There have been previous efforts, largely sponsored by internationally-based NGOs, to foster the drafting of a coherent constitutional framework, but though several documents have been produced, none have had significant Serb buy-in, and none contain what will inevitably become the core of the new constitution: the provisions for minority rights and decentralization that will be outlined in UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari's eventual settlement package. Ahtisaari made it clear to COM and EU reps in Pristina during his August 24-28 visit that in his view, constitution drafting cannot begin in earnest until after the settlement is finalized; COM and EU head of office Torbjorn Sohlstrom agreed and urged Ahtisaari to be as prescriptive as possible in shaping the outlines of the constitution within his settlement papers, pointing out that without strong guidelines from UNOSEK, the EU/COE and the U.S., Kosovars could easily fall into a vicious -- and lengthy -- internecine battle over the shape and relative strength of governing institutions. ¶3. (C) Ahtisaari is unlikely to draft a wholesale constitutional framework within the body of his settlement document. The gaps left open for the Kosovars to decide will be wide, and correspondingly troublesome, as Kosovars themselves acknowledge. Blerim Shala, Unity Team Coordinator and an astute observer of the Kosovo political scene, has drafted his own two-page document outlining the roles and responsibilities of the Kosovars and the international community in the immediate post-UNSCR transition period. Shala notes bluntly in his paper that "very few" issues should be left for the Kosovars to determine in the constitutional drafting process because of the potential for extreme political polarization at the very outset of the all-important transition process. Shala (protect) told COM he was disturbed by a recent phone conversation he had with Albert Rohan, Ahtisaari's deputy, in which Rohan ruminated on the possibility of UNOSEK stipluating an Assembly-led process of drafting after "ample consultation" with civil society (an idea inspired, as Rohan admitted to Shala, by recent criticism of the U.S.-led constitutional reform effort in PRISTINA 00000729 002 OF 003 Bosnia). Shala fretted to COM that this approach would be nothing short of a disaster and would considerably lengthen the time involved in drafting a constitution, if a product could be agreed at all. ¶4. (C) Our local EU colleagues also concur that a tightly-held process, perhaps an extension of the current Unity Team structure, with ample Council of Europe and U.S. guidance, would be better suited to pushing through a constitution in short order. Even with strong international engagement, estimates on how long the drafting might take vary from three to six months (or more). The length of the drafting period is important, because many other processes will depend on the establishment of a constitutional framework, including the passage of laws on a whole host of transition-related items -- most critically, the laws governing elections and the competencies of local governments. Elections Timing ¶5. (C) Opinion among international actors in Kosovo and key Kosovars has also begun to coalesce around the idea of simultaneous municipal and national elections in the October-November 2007 timeframe, though again informal soundings suggest that UNOSEK might push for a considerably earlier set of national elections. Logistics would make this latter idea difficult, especially if the constitution drafting process drags on and the shape of Kosovo's new institutions remains unclear for some months. Assuming a June 2007 finish date for the constitution, elections could take place within 90-100 days after completion, a timeframe supported by UNMIK in its recent transition "Roadmap" and one which OSCE agrees is doable within the scope of logistical preparations. Kosovo's current assembly has a mandate that will continue throughout 2007, making its protracted existence legitimate if less than fully desirable. Simultaneous elections would offer cost benefits and would avoid the need to prepare twice, in a busy political year, for all-consuming elections. ¶6. (C) There is, however, the possibility of holding municipal elections sooner if deemed important for political reasons. Local elections in Kosovo, after much heated debate among local political parties and to the disgruntlement of the opposition, were postponed in June 2006 by former UNMIK SRSG Jessen-Petersen. (Note: Jessen-Petersen ordered that elections be held no earlier than three months and no later than six months after the date of any UNSC decision on Kosovo's final status, but stipulated expressly that the delay not exceed twelve months (elections were due in October 2006).) If the political imperative dictates an early demonstration to Kosovo Serbs that the provisions of Ahtisaari's settlement are being implemented as quickly as possible, an election law and a law on local self-government could be passed even without a constitutional framework in place, allowing for municipal elections as soon as June 2007. Such laws would eventually have to be reharmonized with the new constitution, not an ideal way to proceed. Even more problematic, however, is the question of Kosovo Serb participation in elections during the immediate post-settlement period; much will depend on their readiness, and Belgrade's encouragement, to take part in the redrawing of Kosovo's municipal boundaries via legislation and the subsequent registration and election process. ¶7. (C) In one key logistical note, Kosovo's municipal and general elections are currently conducted in a closed-list, proportional representation system in which political parties determine lists of candidates and the number of votes for each party determines how many members of a list enter the general and municipal assemblies. Kosovo's largest ethnic Albanian political parties have called for a change to an open list system, particularly the direct election of mayors. While this change would complicate logistics, the OSCE has told us that an open-list, direct election system could be implemented within a 90-day window. Experts from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) agree PRISTINA 00000729 003 OF 003 that local authorities could probably meet this window so long as work on a new voter registration list was undertaken immediately post-status. Comment ¶8. (C) There are no easy or perfect answers to the question of timing for constitution drafting and elections in the post-status period. In our view, two goals remain paramount: ratifying a new constitution as speedily as possible, and preparing for elections in a way that places the emphasis on sound planning and full participation. There is some flexibility for alternative scenarios, but they would have to be decided on early in the planning process and implementation could be complex. We will continue to advise on local thinking regarding these issues and provide input from a practical standpoint on how to achieve Washington objectives. ¶9. (U) U.S. Office Pristina does not/not clear this cable for release to U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari. KAIDANOW