KOSOVO: UNMIK KPC COORDINATOR OFFERS THOUGHTS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000728 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR DRL, INL, AND EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM UNMIK YI SUBJECT: KOSOVO: UNMIK KPC COORDINATOR OFFERS THOUGHTS ON FUTURE KOSOVO SECURITY FORCE Classified By: COM TINA S. KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: UNMIK Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) Coordinator Major General Chris Steirn (UK) offered COM his thoughts on the future establishment of a Kosovo defense force in a meeting September 1. Not surprisingly, Steirn argued that a future Kosovo security force was needed, both to avoid the political consequences of demobilizing the KPC without a follow-on force and to provide a basis -- once the new force was in place and fully trained to NATO standards -- for eventual KFOR departure. Steirn argued that the KPC should be abolished in tandem with the standing up of a new national security force, in order to forestall any restiveness on the part of individual KPC members and to focus them productively on their post-KPC lives. He said that -- after much work on his part to redirect their thinking over the past year -- the current leadership of the KPC is adamant on the need for a defense force for Kosovo but would not insist that it be the KPC re-hatted as a new national army. Steirn envisioned a post-status force of roughly 2500 members and said that two-thirds or more of current KPC personnel (numbering 3000 active and 2000 reserve) would likely not qualify for the new force. He worried that NATO and Contact Group planning for post-status security arrangements and his own preliminary work with KPC leaders on post-status issues might not be fully in sync, though he said he had made every effort to coordinate his direction of the KPC on the transition issue with NATO international staff and NATO liaisons to the UNOSEK staff. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) British MG Chris Steirn (protect),UNMIK Coodinator for the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC),met with COM September 1 to discuss the likely dismantling of the KPC post-status and the possible stand up of a Kosovo defense force. Steirn argued forcefully for the establishment of a small defense capability, both as a bulwark against the formation of para-military organizations and as a rational way of facilitating the eventual departure of KFOR forces from Kosovo, once the force was functional and trained to NATO standards. ¶3. (C) Steirn was clear -- and said that KPC leaders, after his persistent work with them over the past year, also understood -- that the KPC would not form the basis of the new force, and that only a relatively small number (perhaps one third) of current KPC members would likely qualify for the defense force. KPC numbers now total around 3,000 active members, with 2,000 reservists; the defense force might be comprised, Steirn observed, of up to 2500 troops, of whom only 1000-1500 or so could come from the KPC via a vetting and application process. There was good experience within the KPC to draw from, he argued, including in emergency preparedness and demining; this experience could not only be utilized, Steirn said, but the defense force might even focus exclusively on such civil-oriented tasks and training for the first year of its existence while necessary organizational issues were worked out. Deferring military-oriented training for a year or so might also help to alleviate concerns among some members of the Contact Group about the nature and mandate of a Kosovo defense force, he pointed out. ¶4. (C) Steirn made the case that the KPC should not be abolished immediately post-status, but phased out as the follow-on security force was stood up. To do otherwise, he said, would be to leave KPC members angry and unsure of whether the ultimate objective of establishing a defense force for Kosovo was really well in train. A simultaneous KPC drawdown and defense force stand up would, he maintained, allow rational planning time for those about to be returned to civilian life and provide an operational focus for those who might make the transition to the new force. ¶5. (C) Steirn was cognizant of the planning going on among NATO International Staff and the Contact Group on security arrangements for Kosovo post-status, and said he had made every effort to maintain connectivity with NATO I.S. and NATO PRISTINA 00000728 002 OF 002 liaisons to the UNOSEK staff. Still, he worried that there was insufficient contact to provide him with adequate guidance and also to inform the NATO planning process with his understanding of realities on the ground. He suggested that NATO staff, and specifically Amb. Pardew, contemplate a visit to Pristina to consult further on the timeline and methodology of transition. Asked by COM whether any nation had informally indicated an interest to him in taking the lead role within NATO on training up a new force, Steirn ruminated that the UK might be willing to do it, but said he had not broached the idea with his military or political masters in a serious way and was unsure that the British would in fact be willing to take on the extra funding burden involved -- even though the size of the new force would probably be small in the extreme. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: Steirn has been a helpful interlocutor for us, and his comments on KPC leadership views, we find, are generally on target. We would take his vision of a concurrent KPC drawdown and new security force stand up seriously; KPC members will need time and strong guidance to understand the new environment post-status and adjust to their place in it. Steirn, like us, was unhappy about repeated comments from Prime Minister Ceku and KPC Commander Selimi about the need for a new Kosovo "army", noting the unhelpfulness of such public assertions at a sensitive time in the planning process. Both he and we will work to suppress such statements in future. Finally, an early visit by NATO planners to Pristina to review some of the concrete operational issues Steirn raises would not be a bad idea; UNMIK and Steirn will need as much input as possible to shape the KPC's activity in a way that furthers our post-status transition goals. END COMMENT. ¶7. (U) U.S. Office Pristina does not/not clear this cable for release to U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari. KAIDANOW