KOSOVO: UNMIK KPC COORDINATOR OFFERS THOUGHTS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000728

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, AND EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR
DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: UNMIK KPC COORDINATOR OFFERS THOUGHTS ON
FUTURE KOSOVO SECURITY FORCE


Classified By: COM TINA S. KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: UNMIK Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)
Coordinator Major General Chris Steirn (UK) offered COM his
thoughts on the future establishment of a Kosovo defense
force in a meeting September 1. Not surprisingly, Steirn
argued that a future Kosovo security force was needed, both
to avoid the political consequences of demobilizing the KPC
without a follow-on force and to provide a basis -- once the
new force was in place and fully trained to NATO standards --
for eventual KFOR departure. Steirn argued that the KPC
should be abolished in tandem with the standing up of a new
national security force, in order to forestall any
restiveness on the part of individual KPC members and to
focus them productively on their post-KPC lives. He said
that -- after much work on his part to redirect their
thinking over the past year -- the current leadership of the
KPC is adamant on the need for a defense force for Kosovo but
would not insist that it be the KPC re-hatted as a new
national army. Steirn envisioned a post-status force of
roughly 2500 members and said that two-thirds or more of
current KPC personnel (numbering 3000 active and 2000
reserve) would likely not qualify for the new force. He
worried that NATO and Contact Group planning for post-status
security arrangements and his own preliminary work with KPC
leaders on post-status issues might not be fully in sync,
though he said he had made every effort to coordinate his
direction of the KPC on the transition issue with NATO
international staff and NATO liaisons to the UNOSEK staff.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) British MG Chris Steirn (protect),UNMIK Coodinator
for the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC),met with COM September
1 to discuss the likely dismantling of the KPC post-status
and the possible stand up of a Kosovo defense force. Steirn
argued forcefully for the establishment of a small defense
capability, both as a bulwark against the formation of
para-military organizations and as a rational way of
facilitating the eventual departure of KFOR forces from
Kosovo, once the force was functional and trained to NATO
standards.


3. (C) Steirn was clear -- and said that KPC leaders, after
his persistent work with them over the past year, also
understood -- that the KPC would not form the basis of the
new force, and that only a relatively small number (perhaps
one third) of current KPC members would likely qualify for
the defense force. KPC numbers now total around 3,000 active
members, with 2,000 reservists; the defense force might be
comprised, Steirn observed, of up to 2500 troops, of whom
only 1000-1500 or so could come from the KPC via a vetting
and application process. There was good experience within
the KPC to draw from, he argued, including in emergency
preparedness and demining; this experience could not only be
utilized, Steirn said, but the defense force might even focus
exclusively on such civil-oriented tasks and training for the
first year of its existence while necessary organizational
issues were worked out. Deferring military-oriented training
for a year or so might also help to alleviate concerns among
some members of the Contact Group about the nature and
mandate of a Kosovo defense force, he pointed out.


4. (C) Steirn made the case that the KPC should not be
abolished immediately post-status, but phased out as the
follow-on security force was stood up. To do otherwise, he
said, would be to leave KPC members angry and unsure of
whether the ultimate objective of establishing a defense
force for Kosovo was really well in train. A simultaneous
KPC drawdown and defense force stand up would, he maintained,
allow rational planning time for those about to be returned
to civilian life and provide an operational focus for those
who might make the transition to the new force.


5. (C) Steirn was cognizant of the planning going on among
NATO International Staff and the Contact Group on security
arrangements for Kosovo post-status, and said he had made
every effort to maintain connectivity with NATO I.S. and NATO

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liaisons to the UNOSEK staff. Still, he worried that there
was insufficient contact to provide him with adequate
guidance and also to inform the NATO planning process with
his understanding of realities on the ground. He suggested
that NATO staff, and specifically Amb. Pardew, contemplate a
visit to Pristina to consult further on the timeline and
methodology of transition. Asked by COM whether any nation
had informally indicated an interest to him in taking the
lead role within NATO on training up a new force, Steirn
ruminated that the UK might be willing to do it, but said he
had not broached the idea with his military or political
masters in a serious way and was unsure that the British
would in fact be willing to take on the extra funding burden
involved -- even though the size of the new force would
probably be small in the extreme.


6. (C) COMMENT: Steirn has been a helpful interlocutor for
us, and his comments on KPC leadership views, we find, are
generally on target. We would take his vision of a
concurrent KPC drawdown and new security force stand up
seriously; KPC members will need time and strong guidance to
understand the new environment post-status and adjust to
their place in it. Steirn, like us, was unhappy about
repeated comments from Prime Minister Ceku and KPC Commander
Selimi about the need for a new Kosovo "army", noting the
unhelpfulness of such public assertions at a sensitive time
in the planning process. Both he and we will work to
suppress such statements in future. Finally, an early visit
by NATO planners to Pristina to review some of the concrete
operational issues Steirn raises would not be a bad idea;
UNMIK and Steirn will need as much input as possible to shape
the KPC's activity in a way that furthers our post-status
transition goals. END COMMENT.


7. (U) U.S. Office Pristina does not/not clear this cable for
release to U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW