KOSOVO: EU RULE OF LAW PLANNING PROGRESSING, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000727

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE AND INL, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR
DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER, DEPT FOR S/WCI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2016
TAGS: EAID ETTC KCRM PREL YI UNMIK DPKO
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: EU RULE OF LAW PLANNING PROGRESSING, BUT
MISSION SCOPE STILL IN FLUX


Classified By: COM TINA S. KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Casper Klynge, head of the EU Planning Team
(EUPT),told us recently he is grappling with mixed messages
from Brussels and EU capitals on his follow-on rule of law
mission's size and scope. Brussels favors a limited
footprint, while capitals increasingly argue for a more
operational approach to combating organized crime and the
potential flashpoint of the Serb north (but, significantly,
without promising more resources to support such an enhanced
role). That unhelpful context aside, Klynge said that that
the EU Rule of Law mission will focus on building the
capacity of judges and prosecutors; that the transition team
has found the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS) to be in
relatively good shape but that another school may be needed
to train customs officials and other law enforcement agents;
that a civilian force for border security, based on the
German model of specialized police, is the model the EU will
likely pursue; and that EU operational control will be
retained in key areas, such as war crimes, ethnically
motivated crimes and organized crime. Klynge expressed his
strong desire to work closely with us and acknowledged that
the EU Rule of Law mission scope should be defined as quickly
as possible to avoid retaking any UNMIK competencies
currently being transferred to the PISG. END SUMMARY.

EUPT's Scope and Mission in the EU/Kosovo Political Context


2. (C) In recent conversations with USOP, Casper Klynge, head
of the EU Planning Team (EUPT),expressed enthusiasm for
working with us and said his team was already up to its
planned strength of 25. He expected the eventual EU Rule of
Law mission to range from 500-1,000 people, including police
and administrative staff. A key challenge he noted was
determining the EU Rule of Law mission's scope and focus.
Brussels favored a limited presence, he said, with limited
executive powers, while EU capitals increasingly wanted a
more "robust" footprint with a strong operational element to
get tough on organized crime and the potential flashpoint of
northern Kosovo. Klynge (protect) emphasized the difficulty
he and his EU liaison office colleague faced in dealing with
these demands -- especially given the lack of personnel and
resources being offered by EU capitals to establish and
maintain such a robust mission. (He noted the same in a
joint meeting with UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari, EU liaison
office head in Kosovo Torbjorn Sohlstrom, and COM during
Ahtisaari's visit to Pristina the week of August 24.) A
related problem Klynge mentioned was the ongoing transfer of
UNMIK competencies to the PISG; he noted that the EU might
wish to retake some in which the Kosovars fall short of EU
standards. He acknowledged this was not an ideal way to
proceed.

Specific Areas of Activity


3. (C) Klynge indicated that EU planners had found some
Rule of Law sectors in better shape than others, and that, as
a consequence, the degree of EU
monitoring/mentoring/oversight would vary by sector. Police,
he said, were less of a problem than the judicial and
prosecutorial side. He judged the Kosovo Police Service
School (KPSS) to be sound, but added that another school to
train customs officials and others with law
enforcement-related duties would make sense. He noted the
Ministry of Interior wants the KPSS to fall under its
control, but this could be problematic since the school would
train other organizations that fall under the Ministry of
Justice. While not getting overly involved in the debate
over the school, the EUPT wants to study the effectiveness of
KPSS training, present its findings and make corrections in
curricula, if necessary. Klynge thought that the initial
training program might be too short and follow-up courses
might be necessary.


4. (C) The judiciary, Klynge noted, needed considerably more
work. The EU would focus attention heavily on the judicial
sector, with the overriding goal to build the capacity of

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Kosovar judges and prosecutors. The end result, he argued,
should be to move from a 2 1 (2 internationals for every
local judicial actor) to 1 2 format.


5. (C) On border issues, Klynge said he would like to see a
stronger presence in the north and that he favored a civilian
force, with the KPS in charge. He dismissed the possibility
of paramilitary border guards and said what emerges will
likely be based on the German model of specialized police
because it meshes well with the European Integrated Border
Security Initiative. The EC would furnish equipment for
policing the border, while EU member states would contribute
human resources. He envisions close cooperation between
customs and border police and the creation of a customs
compliance unit that allows EU monitors to intervene and
correct problems. Klynge was enthusiastic about the upcoming
visit of a USG Export Control and Related Border Security
(EXBS) program assessment team to Kosovo.


6. (C) Klynge assured us that the EU follow-on mission will
be very engaged in war crimes issues. He said that the
police commissioner position will in all likelihood be
transferred to the Kosovo Police Service, but that an EU
"shadow police commissioner" would be able to intervene and
overturn decisions when necessary. There will be a special
"executive policy unit" for sensitive areas, including war
crimes, ethnically-motivated crimes and organized crime.
(Note: S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson will visit Kosovo
September 16 and will discuss war crimes issues in detail
with Klynge. End Note.) When asked specifically about
Belgrade's influence, he said he was not permitted to engage
on these issues now, but would seek to integrate the parallel
structures into Kosovo institutions as quickly as possible
after the settlement.


7. (C) COMMENT: EUPT head Klynge has a tough job ahead of
him reconciling the mixed signals from Brussels and EU
capitals on the size and scope of his mission -- and having
to do so as UNMIK competencies continue to be transferred to
the PISG. We have advised him that it will be difficult to
retake these competencies, so the EUPT needs to get its house
in order now. We will continue to work closely with the EUPT
to assist them in defining their follow-on rule of law
mission, and will look for ways to fill any gaps. END
COMMENT.


8. (U) US Office Pristina does not/not approve release of
this cable to Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW