KOSOVO: SERB LEADERS CLOSE THEIR EYES TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000726 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE NSC FOR BRAUN USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2015 TAGS: PREL KCRM PGOV PINR KDEM UNMIK YI SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SERB LEADERS CLOSE THEIR EYES TO POSSIBILITY OF INDEPENDENCE DECISION REF: A. PRISTINA 647 ¶B. PRISTINA 688 Classified By: COM Tina S. Kaidanow FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Kosovo Serb leaders, particularly in the north, are abundantly aware that the likeliest outcome of the status process is independence. Nevertheless, they continue to deny that a status decision will apply to them. Some express hard-line views on secession and violence if independence is declared, but more simply believe that the status decision will either be postponed indefinitely or that international backers -- meaning Belgrade and Moscow -- will successfully prevent, or possibly disavow, an independence outcome. There are some moderates who are at least contemplating future realities, though even they find it impossible to articulate those sentiments publicly. International officials in Mitrovica correctly advise that the best way to convince Serbs to stay, and to avoid violence, is to give them concrete information that indicates their life will not change appreciably after status. USOP plans to continue visits to the north and to the southern enclaves to underscore this message with Serb NGOs, civic leaders, and others. END SUMMARY. Kosovo Serb Leaders: See No Evil, Hear No Evil ¶2. (C) Kosovo Serb leaders, especially those in the north, are cognizant that the status process could well end in an independence decision, but they continue to close their eyes to the reality of what such an outcome would mean. Their individual perspectives differ somewhat, but they all share a common view that independence is both unacceptable and, more to the point, likely to be opposed and hopefully prevented by Belgrade and other international players, particularly Russia. In meetings with a selection of northern Serb opinion makers, the vehemence of their sentiment against independence varied, but not their refusal to contemplate the benefits of decentralization within an integral, independent Kosovo. ¶3. (C) Some Serbs warn darkly of the likelihood of a violent reaction to an independence decision, though their claims of an organized Serb resistance deserve ample skepticism. President of the northern Kosovo SNC (Serb National Council) �0A;executive board Tomica Zivkovic -- not a particularly reliable source, but one indicative of a brand of brash assertiveness common among northern Serb leaders -- maintained to poloff recently that Serbs have "constituent nation" status as founders of the state of Serbia, and thus must benefit from collective rights that go well beyond individual rights extended to minority communities. Zivkovic called the KFOR presence in northern Kosovo a military occupation, and the peacekeeping mission a "punishment" for Serbs. He claimed that if Kosovo becomes independent, Kosovo Serbs will declare their own independence and "will need just two days to mount their defense, with armed supporters coming from Serbia, Bosnia and around the world." More Thoughtful Serbs Aware of the Probabilities, But Unwilling/Unable to Speak ¶4. (C) These unsubstantiated assertions about violence aside, there are Serb leaders who have clearly given more rational thought to the prospect of an independence outcome and its probable consequences for the northern Serb community. Still, such leaders remain unwilling or unable to articulate this possibility out loud and to craft a political program that would promote Serb interests within the construct of an independent Kosovo. These "moderates" or semi-moderates understand and worry about the prospect of violence by more radical elements of the Serb minority (and the likely response by Albanian extremists),but the political taboo of even discussing independence means that any effort to plan for a post-status integration process is immediately stillborn. PRISTINA 00000726 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) President of the Mitrovica municipal branch of the hard-line Serbian National Council (SNC) Nebojsa Jovic -- a hardliner, though one who understands the value of cooperation with the international community -- told us recently that he expects trouble in northern Kosovo in October and November as a result of the impending status decision, and counseled that the best way to avoid this was through direct dialogue between Serbs and Albanians. He lamented that moderates on both sides were being pushed aside by extremists, that Kosovo Serbs who try to reach out to their Albanian neighbors are branded as traitors, and that Belgrade representatives continue to hint at the possibility of partition for Kosovo, an outcome he derided as detrimental to the Serb community overall. Tellingly, Jovic acknowledged that it is no longer up to Kosovo Serbs to decide their destiny -- the international community, he agreed, will play that role. Still, he asserted that independence was unacceptable, though any compromise short of that could be contemplated. ¶6. (C) The Hamlet-like uncertainty of moderate Serb leaders has left them caught -- unproductively -- between the "virtual reality" of the more extremist elements in the north and the increasingly visible outline of the status decision. Leader of the moderate Serb List for Kosovo and Metohija (SLKM) coalition and northern Mitrovica resident Oliver Ivanovic, who has agonized for months over whether to rejoin Kosovo's Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), tells us repeatedly that he understands the direction in which things are headed. Ivanovic recently applied to register the Kosovo branch of his Belgrade-based Social Democratic Party (SDP)(Ref A),a move that could provide him an opening post-status to engage in the political process. That said, a despondent Ivanovic underscored that Kosovo Serbs would never willingly participate in the creation of an independent state of Kosovo; after recent meetings with Prime Minister Agim Ceku (which, to Ivanovic's credit, he continues to hold),the SLKM leader has consistently refused to break step with northern Serb leaders and openly declare his understanding of the political realities. International Reps in the North Emphasize the Need for Information Flow ¶7. (C) There is little likelihood of reversing the tide of northern Serb feeling, but there is room to reach out to the Serb public and press home the message that the status decision need not dramatically affect their daily lives. The head of OSCE's Mitrovica Region, Alastair Livingston, emphasized this, telling us that Kosovo Serbs in the north will be reassured when they see concrete details of the status package. Kosovo Serbs need to know, he stressed, what will happen with their Serbian state pensions, their insurance, courts, health and school systems, and whether they will hold dual passports. Similarly, UNMIK Mitrovica regional representative Jerry Gallucci maintained that much of the uncertainty among Serbs in the north is driven by a lack of information about the decentralization debate going on in Vienna. Gallucci did not rule out, however, a move toward partition by the Serb leadership if such actions were not firmly reined in by the international community. Comment ¶8. (C) We second the notion that information is key to enlightening Serbs on the post-status framework and changing, if not their aversion to independence, at least their calculations about the advisability of remaining within Kosovo. To that end, we are embarking on an intensified outreach effort -- with media, assistance, and other elements -- to give Serbs in both north and south a sense that they have a future in Kosovo no matter what the status outcome. The launching point for this campaign was COM's August 31 signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with the three northern mayors as the precursor to USG construction of roads PRISTINA 00000726 003 OF 003 and other small-scale infrastructure in predominantly Serb areas. Guidance provided by UNOSEK or the Department to aid in this kind of outreach, especially containing further specifics on decentralization provisions and the possibility of dual citizenship/dual documentation for Serb citizens of Kosovo, would be welcome, and will be increasingly important as the status decision draws near. END COMMENT. ¶9. (U) Post clears this message in its entirety for release to Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. KAIDANOW