ZUMA CAMP REMAINS OPTIMISTIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRETORIA 005018 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2016 TAGS: PGOV KJUS SF SUBJECT: ZUMA CAMP REMAINS OPTIMISTIC REF: A. PRETORIA 4593 ¶B. PRETORIA 3969 Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Bost. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). (U) The following message is being transmitted on behalf of Consulate General Durban, which does not have classified communications capabilities. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On November 28, the Durban Consul General met with Rieaz "Mo" Shaik, a former South African diplomat, long-time ANC member, and brother of Durban businessman Schabir Shaik who was convicted of fraud and corruption charges stemming from his relationship with ANC Deputy President Jacob Zuma. Shaik, who is firmly in the Zuma camp and describes himself as a friend and advisor to Zuma since before 1994, remains optimistic Zuma will be the next ANC President and the next President of South Africa. However, he does not rule out the possibility of a compromise candidate to emerge before the ANC conference in December ¶2007. Shaik insists a Zuma presidency would bring very little change in government policy, only a change in the way policy is implemented. Shaik recounted a purported threat against Zuma involving American citizens, although he did not believe the threat was credible. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- CONSTITUTIONAL COURT APPEAL LIKELY FOR SHAIK AND ZUMA -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Mo Shaik told ConGen that his brother would soon be filing a case with the Constitutional Court, but did not specify on what grounds. (Note: Schabir Shaik entered prison on November 9 after his appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Appeals. He is currently hospitalized for high blood pressure and stress-related conditions. Since the meeting, Mo Shaik has confirmed in press reports that his brother suffered a mild stroke on November 25.) Shaik's intentions to appeal have since been reported in the press, but the NPA has not yet received notification, according to the US Department of Justice Intermittent Legal Advisor (ILA) (protect). Further, ILA added that though appeals should be filed within 15 days, Shaik maintains his right to appeal provided he has a valid reason for filing late. Shaik's health conditions would probably meet such criteria. ¶3. (C) Mo Shaik also expects Zuma to file a case with the Constitutional Court if the the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) decides to refile corruption charges against him. Zuma will argue that he is incapable of receiving a free and fair trial. In separate meetings, both KZN Judge President Vuka Tshabalala and Acting Supreme Court of Appeals Judge Leona Theron told ConGen that they believe Zuma could present a legitimate argument given the convoluted history of the case. The Constitutional Court case would need to be resolved before the corruption case could continue, which would likely run into 2008 and would not be resolved before the December 2007 ANC Conference where the next ANC President will be elected. ¶4. (C) Mo believes that if the NPA were to refile the corruption case, it would "trigger a groundswell of support for Zuma." Zuma supporters, many of whom at the grassroots level have little understanding of the judicial process and believe Zuma has already been found innocent, would point to the charges as further proof of a conspiracy against Zuma. According to Shaik, another trial would also create a national platform for Zuma, much like his two previous trials, and would be a "rallying point" for Zuma supporters. -------------- MBEKI THE DIVIDER; ZUMA THE UNITER -------------- ¶5. (C) Shaik is confident Zuma has enough support to become ANC President in 2007. According to Shaik, a Zuma presidency is the only option to heal the current divide within the ANC. (COMMENT: Shaik did not clarify how this would appease the pro-Mbeki camp. END COMMENT) If President Mbeki attempted to retain leadership of the party -- either personally or through a close ally -- divisions would continue, threatening a split within the ANC itself. At a previous meeting with Shaik on August 3, Shaik complained that Mbeki was leading the party and the state in a way that was not in keeping with ANC principles. He said Zuma supporters felt sidelined by Mbeki's lack of consultation and felt his top-down approach was squashing initiative within the party and the government. Shaik expects the results of the ANC Policy Conference in mid-2007 to show that there is very little support for Mbeki's policies, which will give the Zuma camp a clear upper hand going into the ANC national conference in December 2007. -------------- SUCCESSION BATTLE: EXPECT A DEAL -------------- ¶6. (C) Shaik said that though the Zuma camp would insist on Zuma becoming ANC President in 2007, they might allow room for a compromise candidate to become President of South Africa in 2009. In the prelude to the December 2007 ANC conference, Shaik expects the Zuma and Mbeki camps to negotiate some sort of deal. Zuma supporters would reject outright any proposal that includes Mbeki or one of his close associates. For example, they would oppose Tokyo Sexwale's candidacy because he is too close to Mbeki, he said. On the other hand, Shaik believes that Mbeki is afraid that Zuma would mistreat Mbeki as he has mistreated Zuma if Zuma were to become President. Therefore, any agreement would be a "package deal" that included promises on both sides not to mistreat one another. In the unlikely event, said Shaik, that Zuma has been convicted before December 2009, "Plan B" would find Zuma suppporters throwing their weight behind current ANC Secretary General Kgalema Motlanthe as an alternative candidate. -------------- ZUMA PRESIDENCY: STATUS QUO FOR ANC -------------- ¶7. (C) Shaik insisted there would be very little change in government policy if Zuma were to become President. "Zuma would continue current ANC policy," he said. However, Zuma would "govern differently" and implement policy differently. He would have a more consultative approach, which included civil society more actively and public-private partnerships more effectively than Mbeki. Shaik is confident many Cabinet ministers including the Minister of Finance, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Trade and Industry would keep their positions, as they have been performing well. Shaik expected Zuma's top three priorities as President would be education, HIV/AIDS, and crime. (Note: Noticeably absent is Mbeki's focus on foreign policy, especially on African security and renaissance.) -------------- THREATS AGAINST ZUMA -------------- ¶8. (C) Shaik told ConGen that Zuma recently received information from intelligence sources outside South Africa of a possible assassination plot, possibly through poisoning. These undisclosed sources told Zuma that American citizens (not connected with the U.S. Government) were involved. This in part, coincides with another Embassy contact, Charles Tawil (protect),who told our Economic Counselor on November 29 that Zuma had received information from the mother of the King of Swaziland about CIA attempts to kill Zuma using poisoned clothes from the FBI. Shaik revealed that Zuma, who maintains contacts with foreign intelligence networks from his time as head of ANC intelligence prior to 1994, shared this information with the South African police, who told him that they were also aware of the plot and the possible involvement of Americans. The police have assured Zuma that they would investigate and provide protection accordingly, according to Shaik. Shaik, however, did not believe that the threat was credible and said that any potential threat would likely come from the ANC. However, he pointed out that elements of the party opposed to Zuma knew an assassination would likely backfire because of the strong reaction it would provoke from Zuma supporters. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Shaik underscores the high level of Zuma support within KZN, which could be easily contrasted to other regions like the Eastern Cape, which encouraged Mbeki on December 3 to run for a third term as ANC President (SEPTEL). A Constitutional Court appeal on Zuma's behalf is likely to be a tactic to keep his candidacy for ANC President alive through the December 2007 conference. Moreover, the media attention of a Zuma appeal is likely to give his more zealous supporters a rallying point as his past two trials have done. Despite Shaik's optimism, his camp's forethought and willingness to consider a compromise may be seen as a sign of fear that Zuma will in fact be prosecuted or will not have sufficient support to win the ANC Presidency. In the meantime, both the Zuma and Mbeki camps are standing firm so as to best position themselves if and when a compromise becomes inevitable. ¶10. (C) As for the alleged threat against Zuma's life, while Shaik may not find it credible, it is possible that Zuma takes it seriously, given the lingering level of distrust of the United States within certain ANC circles. BOST