VERA-E SYSTEM: CZECH MOD HARDLINERS WANT TO TALK

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000095 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/NCE, PM/RSAT FOR FORTIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2016 TAGS: ETTC EZ KSTC PARM PREL PTER SUBJECT: VERA-E SYSTEM: CZECH MOD HARDLINERS WANT TO TALK REF: 2005 STATE 174893 Classified By: Acting DCM Michael Dodman for reasons 1.5 (b) & (d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request, please see paragraphs 13 and 14. ¶2. (S/NF) Summary. In a significant change from previous practice, the Armaments Division of the Czech Ministry of Defense has broken its silence towards the U.S. on its views about sales of the VERA-E passive surveillance detection system. Through contacts, we knew the Armaments Division has consistently supported increased exports of Czech passive surveillance technology. That office had been the only key player unwilling to discuss VERA-E with U.S. officials. The Armaments Division has now approached us with specific questions about the consistency of U.S. concerns over Czech arms sales to countries that have already purchased U.S. arms. In support of their position the Czechs are now citing China's efforts to develop its own passive surveillance technology. Seeking to end U.S. objections to VERA sales, the Armaments Division has also proposed a more positive step: greater U.S.- Czech technical collaboration in the field of passive surveillance. Embassy Prague seeks guidance on the proposal in para 13 and the appropriate response to the questions contained in para 14. End summary. ¶3. (U) DATT, ODC Deputy, and PolOff met January 27 with: Josef Taborsky, Senior Program Manager, MOD Armaments Division; and Richard Macha, Lt Col Lubor Koudleka, and Josef Stastny, of the MOD's International Relations Branch. --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ARE YOU AMERICANS CONSISTENT? SHOW US HOW YOU HANDLE YOUR OWN ARMS SALES --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ¶4. (S/NF) Leading the meeting for the Czech side, International Relations Branch Director Macha said that the Armaments Division (and the MOD generally) would like general information about the licensing scheme for U.S. military technology exports. He also said the MOD would like to consult with the United States on concrete examples of such transfers. Accordingly the MOD asked for the text of a real-world agreement covering a U.S. technology export that would prevent the misuse of sensitive U.S. technologies by third parties. As a suggested case, the Czechs gave the example of Pakistan's acquisition of the P-3 Orion, equipped with the AN/ALR66C electronic support measures system and the EP2060 pulse analyzer. The MOD would like to examine provisions within the agreement that prevent proliferation of the technology to China. ¶5. (S/NF) DATT acknowledged the already-close cooperation between the U.S. and the Czech Republic on selecting appropriate destinations for VERA, noting the United States placed great value on the Czechs' willingness to consult with us on our strategic interests before making a decision on a sale. In response to Macha's first question, DATT and PolOff outlined the work of the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, and the consultative role of the interagency community. Emboffs did not address the idea of providing a sample of an agreement covering a U.S. military-technology transfer. --- --- --- --- LETS COLLABORATE --- --- --- --- ¶6. (S/NF) Macha said the MOD would be interested in working closely with U.S. technical experts to establish the parameters for a downgraded version of the VERA-E system, one which would be appropriate for export to non-NATO countries: "Our main goal is to ask our more knowledgeable partner how to do it." The MOD would also like to invite a technical team to the Czech Republic to jointly address the adequacy of nonproliferation countermeasures in their passive surveillance systems. Macha said such a team could choose to PRAGUE 00000095 002 OF 003 demonstrate U.S. concerns about proliferation to third countries by breaking/overcoming the countermeasures currently present in the ASDD-01 system. In addition to technical meetings, the MOD would welcome agreement of a way forward at upcoming U.S. Czech Pol-Mil talks, notionally scheduled for the spring (Note: dates for these talks have not yet been finalized. End note.). ¶7. (S/NF) Taborsky spoke at length about the loss of Czech sales due to the Czechs voluntary desire to protect U.S. strategic interests. He said Ukraine had been quick to sell the Kolchuga system to countries that had sought the Czech ASDD-01 and been denied. Macha further mentioned that China was now developing its own passive surveillance detection system and wondered to us whether it would be better to allow China to arm itself with the VERA-E, a known system, rather than with a system with unknown operating characteristics and capabilities. DATT responded that the United States was interested in the Czechs maintaining their hi-tech defense industry, and the USG realized that the brains behind this cutting edge technology would best be kept gainfully employed at ERA, where they would be less vulnerable to financial offers from potentially-hostile countries seeking to buy their knowledge. ¶8. (S/NF) Taborsky presented a Czech idea for collaboration between the United States and the Czech Republic on developing future technology in this field. He suggested the creation of a joint U.S. DOD - Czech MOD research and development project, with funding from both governments. When the DATT and ODC Deputy clarified that the private sector takes the lead in developing military technology for the United States, the Czechs responded that they would also welcome a joint venture involving a U.S. firm. ¶9. (S/NF) DATT noted the United States would soon provide the MOD with a letter outlining the test results for the U.S-owned VERA-E system. Such information would assist the Czechs in their marketing efforts to countries that were the most appropriate destinations (understood by both sides to be NATO allies and other aligned countries such as Australia). While welcoming the idea of a letter as a positive step, Taborsky said there had been little interest in the VERA-E among NATO allies and it would be good to see the United States' high regard for the VERA-E system demonstrated by further U.S. orders. --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- WHO ARE THE POTENTIAL BUYERS THESE DAYS? --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 10 (S/NF) PolOff asked Macha which countries were currently considered potential customers for either the ASDD-01 or VERA-E systems. Macha responded that only one country, Pakistan, was considered a current case. (Note: ERA (the manufacturer) had applied to the MOD for a preliminary opinion on a sale of one downgraded system to Pakistan. ERA had previously been granted permission for a 6-month lease to Pakistan, but that license had been abandoned because Pakistan had chosen to buy the system instead and would need a new license (ref A)). Macha said the MOD would advise ERA that it would not render an opinion on the case until after further discussion with the U.S. in the Spring. PolOff asked about rumors that India and Malaysia were interested in new purchases. Macha indicated it would also be helpful to learn U.S. opinion about a transfer to Malaysia (Note: We do not/not consider this a formal request. See para 15). Macha also said there had been interest from Greece and Australia. ¶11. (S/NF) (Comment:) We are at a point of danger and opportunity. The MOD's Armaments Division, which has been deeply cynical about U.S. motives for blocking VERA exports, has decided to try to move beyond a status quo that does not allow for widespread sales. From their perspective, any change is good. If we cannot show them that the United States has deployed effective methods to prevent proliferation of our own technology, then the Armaments Division will argue within the GOCR that U.S. decision-making is driven more by economic concerns than strategic ones. Under such circumstances they would argue that the Czechs should be no more accommodating to U.S. strategic concerns than the U.S. PRAGUE 00000095 003 OF 003 is itself. That line of reasoning could win converts within the GOCR, even though it willfully makes incorrect assumptions about the equivalency of U.S. and Czech military systems in the field of passive surveillance. ¶12. (S/NF) (Comment continued) In terms of the proposed collaboration. VERA's supporters in the Czech Republic feel the U.S. could have no objection to the sale of a system with characteristics that were defined by a joint U.S.-Czech team. They do acknowledge the difficulty of downgrading a system to the extent that it eliminates U.S. strategic concerns without leaving the resulting platform so ineffective that there is no market interest. Any future U.S. collaboration with the Czechs in developing next-generation technology would do much to relieve the political pressure within the GOCR to authorize sales to countries that are of concern to the United States. ¶13. (S/NF) (Action request) Robust engagement with the Czechs on these topics will be crucial to preserving their political willingness to pre-clear VERA and ASDD-01 sales with the United States. This summer will likely see the arrival of new defense and foreign ministers and the departure for a new assignment of the head of the MFA's licensing department, who has been very supportive of U.S. positions. New incumbents in these positions, and in the GOCR generally, may need to be convinced that the Czech defense industry's jewel in the crown should continue to forgo tens of millions of dollars of business because of U.S. strategic interests. Post recommends acceptance of the Czech offer for collaboration of technical experts on counterproliferation measures mentioned in para 6. The U.S. has already confirmed it would "welcome further dialogue and cooperation with the Czech Republic on the specific capabilities and the licensing conditions or provisos of the ASDD-01 to be sold to Pakistan, as well as any other safeguard measures employed to protect the technology." (ref A) 14 (S/NF) (Action request continued) Post further requests: A) The Department provide a response to the Czech's question surrounding the P-3 Orion transfer to Pakistan mentioned in para 4. B) A statement of the U.S. position regarding the Czech's suggestion for collaboration on joint development of next-generation military technologies (para 8). (End action request) ¶15. (S/NF) (Comment continued) While the MOD is interested in learning U.S. opinion about a possible sale to Malaysia, we do not believe that our answer to this theoretical case would do more than arm our critics with more examples of U.S. opposition to a sale. The MOD is not the guardian of the consultative mechanism worked out between the GOCR and the United States. That function rests with the MFA, and Post will seek confirmation that the GOCR would like a formal opinion on a Malaysia sale. If such a request is made, the way in which we deliver our (likely negative) response must form part of our engagement on the issues raised above. Post recommends the Department solicit interagency opinion on a Malaysia case only when the Czech MFA formally requests such an opinion and only as part of an integrated response that will keep the consultative process alive. (End comment) DODMAN