RADIO FARDA DISPUTE AT CENTER STAGE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000754 SIPDIS SIPDIS EUR/NCE FOR FICHTE, PM/RSAT FOR DOWLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016 TAGS: PREL ETRD ETTC ENRG PGOV PINR CVIS EZ IR SUBJECT: RADIO FARDA DISPUTE AT CENTER STAGE IN CZECH-IRANIAN RELATIONS Classified By: ADCM Mike Dodman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) INTRODUCTION and SUMMARY: This is the first of three cables on Czech-Iranian relations. This message looks at several aspects of current ties, notably the impact of Prague-based broadcasting to Iran. The other two cables will focus more directly on non-proliferation. Czech-Iranian relations have not been particularly close since 1989, but they chilled noticeably with the 1998 launch of Farsi-language Radio Farda. The Radio Farda controversy prompted a de facto trade embargo. Despite this, the GOCR strongly supports Radio Farda, as well as USG and IAEA efforts to prevent acquisition of a nuclear weapon; despite the uncertainty surrounding the recent election deadlock, these policies are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- -------------- Radio Farda Draws Iran's Ire...and a Boycott -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Radio Farda, RFE/RL's Prague-based, pop-heavy Farsi-language broadcasts directed toward Iran, is the most significant bilateral challenge between the Czech Republic and Iran. It seriously impacts all aspects of their relationship, including the nuclear issue. The Farda broadcasts began in 1998, and were an irritant in Czech-Iran relations from the outset. This discord, however, became far more pronounced in 2003, when format changes and increased airtime for Radio Farda precipitated a significant downturn in Czech-Iranian relations. Former MFA Iran Desk officer Jaroslav Mrazek described the Iranian reaction as one that turned "correct, if not friendly, relations" into a relationship that is "low-key, low-level, and cold". ¶3. (C) The 2003 intensification of Radio Farda's broadcast schedule quickly triggered a political and economic backlash from Iran. Aside from strong condemnation of the Czech Republic in diplomatic and political channels, Radio Farda prompted an unannounced and selective Iranian economic boycott of Czech goods and services. According to numerous government and media sources, bilateral Czech trade with Iran dropped over 40% in 2004 from 2003. Although reliable 2005 statistics are not yet available, there was no significant recovery last year. According to the Czech MFA, Iranian officials, while publicly denying the existence of a boycott, have admitted to Czech diplomats that such a policy is in effect and that it will remain in place as long as Radio Farda continues its broadcasts. ¶4. (C) The de facto Iranian boycott is, however, not an ironclad one. Much of the Czech Republic's pre-2003 trade with Iran took the form of relatively large-scale contracts rather then consumer goods, with much of this trade required approval from the MFA and a bewildering array of other Iranian government agencies. According to Mrazek, today these contracts are often either disapproved or simply never clear the licensing process. Programs that the Iranian Government views as promoting their strategic interests or as otherwise advantageous, however, are licensed without problem. The Czech MFA also expressed little doubt that corruption plays no small role in the completion of the licensing process. -------------- -------------- -------------- Relations in Context: Bushehr and Czech-Iranian Trade -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The Czechs and Iranians have long-standing cultural and trade ties that date back to before the Second World War. Interestingly, ideological differences did little to prevent trade and student exchanges between Communist Czechoslovakia and Imperial Iran, and even at the height of the Cold War there were significant numbers of Czech engineers living and working on various projects in Iran, as well as many Iranian students studying at Czech Universities. According to noted Arabist and current MEP Jana Hybaskova, this relationship deteriorated soon after the Velvet Revolution. The new democratic Czechoslovak government dramatically revised previously-contracted construction projects for an Iranian (non-nuclear) power plant whose previous terms (agreed to for political reasons by the Communist Government) were not economically viable. The Czechs completed only about half of the facilities for which they had contracted and the fallout of the project considerably strained commercial relations, which continued to deteriorate during the 1990s. PRAGUE 00000754 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) Even as the market for large-scale engineering sputtered and concern over Iran's nuclear program grew, some Czech political figures, particularly former Social Democrat Foreign Minster Jan Kavan, remained attracted to the "holy grail" of engineering partnerships and participation in the Iranian energy sector. In 2000, the GOCR implemented (under USG pressure) a restrictive law that proscribed any form of Czech participation in Iran,s Bushehr nuclear plant, a measure that, according to the Deputy Director of the MFA's UN Department Pavel Klucky (whose office oversees UN sanctions and IAEA-related issues),earned the Czechs considerable ire among fellow NSG members. According to Klucky, this law applies exclusively to the Bushehr plant; assistance to all other Iranian nuclear facilities is subject to compliance with EU Regulation 1334 covering dual-use technologies. Any potential contracts are further examined against relevant export control regimes (including ours; septel). ¶7. (SBU) The desire to move past the problematic recent trade history between the Czechs and the Iranians has, on at least one occasion, prompted ill-advised remarks from Czech leaders. In December 2005, Iranian state press outlets stated that Minister of Trade and Industry Milan Urban suggested during trade talks that the Czech Republic could be prepared to assist the Iranian nuclear program, but other GOCR elements moved quickly to dismiss the idea. Trade Ministry spokesmen later explained that this would occur only within the context of a more general improvement in trade relations, and asserted that Urban had meant that such cooperation would only be possible if Iran were back in full compliance with appropriate IAEA requirements and supervision. -------------- -------------- Radio Farda's Impact on the Nuclear Issue -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) The Radio Farda controversy has been important even in the nuclear issue, with Czech support for RFE/RL having virtually eliminated much of the Czech participation in an Iranian energy sector where Czech engineers had once figured prominently. Iranian officials have frequently told both private Czech citizens and public officials that there would considerable financial trade rewards for the Czechs if they would end Radio Farda broadcasts. These benefits, moreover, would not apply only to the nuclear industry. Septel will consider Czech-Iran proliferation concerns and issues. -------------- -------------- -------------- Radio Farda Keeps Diplomatic Ties "Low and Very Cool" -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) If Radio Farda has provoked a strongly negative economic reaction from Iran, its diplomatic fallout has been, to most observers, also disproportionate. Both sides withdrew their ambassadors soon after the initiation of broadcasts in ¶1998. Since then, the post of Iranian Charge in Prague has been occupied by diplomats of incrementally lesser rank and reputation. According to Mr. Mrazek of the MFA, the last Iranian Charge, Hussain Rezvani, departed Prague nearly six months ago and will not be replaced until later this summer. The acting Charge is a Third Secretary; the new Charge is also supposedly a relatively low-ranking diplomat. The MFA has had virtually no contact with the Embassy since last winter. ¶10. (C) According to numerous MFA officials, before Mr. Rezvani's departure from Prague, the Farda controversy dominated nearly all discussions and discourse with the Iranians. Rezvani made numerous entreaties to GOCR to cut off Farda broadcasts and, explicitly acknowledging an embargo that his government has denied imposing, also dangled before the Czechs the prospect of contracts, improved trade terms, and more cordial relationship if only the Radio Farda broadcasts would stop and the Czech President "apologize to the Iranian people." The GOCR was not interested. ¶11. (C) The frost in Czech-Iranian diplomatic relations extends to travel and visa regimes as well. According to MOI statistics, only 69 Iranian citizens enjoy permanent residency in the Czech Republic, including asylum cases. MFA Consular Department Director Ivo Svoboda told Poloff that travel ties between the two countries are nearly non-existent and that there are no direct flights between Tehran and Prague. Iranian travelers are subject the strictest and most onerous visa conditions permitted by Czech law. They must, among other requirements, obtain a visa even to transit the PRAGUE 00000754 003 OF 003 passenger terminal en route to other countries (a requirement imposed on only a dozen other countries in the world),and they must present the adjudicating Czech Consular officials an official letter of invitation, show financial resources within Iran, and pay a substantial deposit (similar to a bond) that they forfeit to the Czech Government if they fail to return to Iran. Applicants are screened against an Interior Ministry database for security risks or other issues. According to Svoboda, Iranian travelers are considered a very high risk for both illegal migration and security purposes. CABANISS