CZECH REPUBLIC: IMPLICATIONS OF NEW GOVERNMENT FOR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000737 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/FO, P STAFF E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL EZ SUBJECT: CZECH REPUBLIC: IMPLICATIONS OF NEW GOVERNMENT FOR U.S. INTERESTS REF: PRAGUE 719 Classified By: Acting DCM Michael Dodman for reasons 1.4 B & D ¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: The center-right coalition that will take office perhaps as early as next week, pending resolution of Lower House leadership negotiations, will be generally positive for U.S. interests in the Czech Republic. Although the date of a vote of confidence in the Topolanek government is unknown, and there is no assurance the coalition will win this vote, the new coalition is expected to serve for at least several months. Particularly on foreign policy, the new team promises continuity in our current positive relationship. Foreign Minister-designate Vondra is a close friend of the U.S., but we should expect that, at least publicly, he will make efforts to paint himself as tough on the U.S. to counter any suspicion that he is a "trojan horse." He is likely to take a particularly tough line on visas. While the designated Defense Minister does not have particularly strong credentials for the job, her party has been generally supportive of the U.S. on security issues, and we expect no change in policy. However, Christian Democrats in the MOD have been the source of repeated concerns on procurement, and we can expect a tough battle if any major procurements come up under this team. On economic policy and investment climate, the new government will be overall an improvement. But here in particular results will depend on how successful Topolanek will be in keeping his coalition together and working with the opposition. Any decisions requiring parliamentary vote will be difficult. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) STILL A LONG ROAD AHEAD: The coalition agreed to June 26 by the center-right ODS, Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) and Greens (reftel) will not take office immediately. PM Paroubek made a surprising announcement on June 28 that he would resign on July 3. It is unclear what impact Paroubek's announcement will have on the election of the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, which is currently being negotiated between ODS and Paroubek's CSSD. Agreement on the Speaker is a prerequisite for any government resignation to take effect and the President to appoint a new team (i.e., even if Paroubek does resign on Monday, the President still wouldn't be able to appoint the new 
government without decision on a Speaker). Agreement on the Speaker could come as early as July 29, but this is more likely to be delayed for further negotiations. Once the President actually appoints Topolanek and team (Klaus has already stated that he approves of the coalition members), they immediately take office and a 30-day clock starts ticking, during which the new government must "ask for" a vote of confidence -- the Constitution does not state when the vote must actually take place. If that vote fails, as many observers expect, Topolanek and team remain in office while a second coalition is negotiated, which could take months. We therefore expect to be working with a Topolanek government from July and into the fall, if not longer. ¶3. (C/NF) KEY PERSONALITIES AND CONTINUITY IN FOREIGN POLICY: Whether this new coalition government proves to be just a "summer government" or successfully secures a vote of confidence, the key personalities affecting Czech foreign policy and relations with the U.S. include proposed Foreign Minister Aleksandr (Sasha) Vondra (independent but ODS nominated) and proposed EU Affairs Minister Petr Gandalovic (ODS). Both are pro-U.S., with Vondra having served as Ambassador in Washington and Gandalovic as Czech CG in New York. Both have supported outgoing FM Svoboda's policies, including democracy promotion. Both are also close friends with current Czech Ambassador in Washington Petr Kolar. At his farewell to the diplomatic corps earlier this week, Svoboda stressed continuity in foreign policy, and all observers concur that no significant changes are likely. One important dynamic will be the relationship between Vondra and Gandalovic, since the latter's position is new and will mean the removal of EU coordination functions from the MFA. While the Ministry will retain the lead on all CFSP and ESDP issues, it is possible that rivalry between the two will have an impact on Czech support for transatlantic positions within the EU. However, given the personal friendship between the two, their mutual pro-U.S. orientation, and Vondra's more extensive history in the MFA and on the international stage, we do not anticipate problems. ¶4. (SBU) VISAS: Vondra has long been a critic of U.S. visa policy and our inability to find a way to bring the Czech Republic and other Central European allies into the visa PRAGUE 00000737 002 OF 003 waiver program. In this area in particular we expect him to be quite outspoken. In part this will be a way for him to prove to detractors that he is not an American "trojan horse." ¶5. (SBU) DEMOCRACY PROMOTION: Czech leadership in democracy promotion and transformational diplomacy around the world, including in Cuba, Iraq, Burma and the Balkans, will continue full force. As a former dissident and human rights activist, Vondra is expected to carry on the work of current FM Svoboda in maintaining the Czech Republic's leadership position within the EU and even outside the EU on these areas. Therefore, this is a logical area where the USG and the GOCR will want to continue to coordinate our efforts. ¶6. (C/NF) SECURITY POLICY: Designated Defense Minister Vlasta Parkanova (KDU-CSL) was a surprise choice. While she has served as Chair of the Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee (2002-2006) and as Deputy Chair of the Defense and Security Committee (1998-1002),she is not known as an expert on defense policy. She served previously as Justice Minister. She is a relative newcomer to KDU-CSL, having joined the party only in 2001. The embassy has not had close contacts with her in recent years, and she is not remembered as having taken strong stands (either for or against) on issues of importance to the U.S. Despite a strong endorsement from outgoing DefMin Kuehnl, most observers believe Parkanova will be a relatively weak minister with KDU-CSL Chairman Miroslav Kalousek (a former Deputy DefMin) calling the shots -- although Kalousek himself will be busy with his position as Deputy PM and Minister in charge of the combined Agriculture and Regional Development Ministries (i.e., in charge of the bulk of EU funding). In terms of policy this is not a problem (with the possible exception of Missile Defense, see below) as KDU-CSL has been a strong supporter of NATO and transatlantic relations, including deployments in support of the GWOT. Procurement is a potential problem, as KDU-CSL appointees in the MOD have a reputation for being non-transparent and often not supportive of American firms, although we have won many contracts with these appointees in place. ¶7. (S/NF) MISSILE DEFENSE (MD): With the elections now over, Czech politicians have recently begun to take public positions on the possible basing of a U.S. MD site in the Czech Republic. President Klaus appears to be skeptical, as does outgoing PM Jiri Paroubek. However, Topolanek is generally in favor of hosting such a site, and his ministerial nominees include several supporters of the MD idea. Several members of coalition partner Christian Democrats and the Greens are skeptical. MOD officials briefed embassy officers June 28 that they believe authorization will soon be forthcoming for a visit of a U.S. technical team to conduct surveys of Czech candidate sites for missile defense. They indicated that they had prepared decision-making documents for action "at the political level" and believed that by July 7 the Czechs would be able to propose a date for the arrival of a U.S. team (Comment: While this is an encouraging sign, the level of short-term political uncertainty means this should not be treated as the guarantee the Czechs will have an answer by July 7th. End comment). ¶8. (C) MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS: The Czech political process for authorizing military deployments for 2007 is unlikely to be affected unless a stable government fails to emerge before the last few months of the year. Although the Cabinet decision on the 2006 deployment package was taken in August of 2005, the final bill was not approved in Parliament until December. The 2006 deployments enjoyed widespread approval in Parliament. Without perspective-changing circumstances, such as combat casualties, the 2007 deployments should enjoy similar support. ¶9. (SBU) ECONOMIC REFORM AND BUSINESS CLIMATE: Both proposed Finance Minister Vlastilmil Tlusty (ODS) and proposed Industry and Trade Minister Martin Riman (ODS) are well-regarded by the business community as competent authorities. The coalition agreement to implement the ODS flag-ship flat tax policy and commitment to lower the overall tax burden for private citizens and businesses is good for the overall business climate. However, in a clear concession to the Greens, the coalition agreement does include introducing an energy and ecology tax in 2008. The coalition agreement to limit coal mining and prevent building additional nuclear power plants could have significant implications for future Czech energy security, with dependence on Russian oil and gas likely to increase. PRAGUE 00000737 003 OF 003 Clearly a concession to the ideological bent of the Green Party in the coalition, this kind of energy policy, while typical of the rest of Europe, is not/not in the interest of the USG nor the EU in terms of enhancing Czech/EU energy security. ¶10. (C/NF) COMMENT: ODS-LED COALITION VS MINORITY ODS GOVERNMENT: If the new government is unable to win a Parliamentary vote of confidence, the second ODS-led attempt to form a government is expected to be a minority ODS government with informal or explicit support of CSSD. While under either scenario Czech foreign policy and relations with the U.S. would remain strong and pragmatic, an ODS minority government would have more leeway in terms of pursuing its own traditionally pro-U.S. policies that are not/not subject to internal coalition negotiations and buy-in. Given little substantive difference in foreign policy between the ODS and the CSSD, this might mean even better legislative prospects and effectiveness for the new government. Therefore, a protracted or an unsuccessful attempt by the center-right coalition to form a government is not/not necessarily detrimental for the USG. CABANISS