CZECHS COMMENT ON CURRENT CRISIS IN LEBANON

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 001417

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR/NCE FOR ERIC FICHTE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM MOPS LE EZ
SUBJECT: CZECHS COMMENT ON CURRENT CRISIS IN LEBANON

REF: STATE 664065

Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Mike Dodman
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Czech Ambassador to Lebanon Jan Cisek fears
violence could erupt as early as November 18 if Hizballah and
PM Fouad Siniora's government fail to reach a compromise. In
addition to Syrian meddling, the Ambassador noted additional
factors contributing to the current instability: Israeli
overflights, pro-Syrian opposition to the Hariri tribunal,
and the influx of reconstruction funds (which may motivate
some Siniora supporters to change their allegiance out of
greed). End summary.


2. (C) POLOFF met Czech MFA Acting Director of the Middle
East and Africa Department Pavel Rezac and Czech Ambassador
to Lebanon Jan Cisek on November 9 to discuss the
Syrian-Hizballah plot to unseat the Siniora government
(reftel). Both agreed without reservation that Syria is
fomenting instability in Lebanon.


3. (C) Ambassador Cisek said the tension in Lebanon is
"palpable": the diplomatic community and the population alike
are nervous about the possibility of violent "eruptions" in
coming weeks. Cisek and Rezac expressed fears that violence
in Lebanon could quickly spread to neighboring countries.
Ambassador Cisek predicted street demonstrations as soon as
November 18, and observed that 20,000 Lebanese troops have
already been deployed in anticipation.


4. (C) Ambassador Cisek thought Parliament Speaker Nahib
Berri's recent call for national consultations was a
"disappointment" and that the mood in the country following
his announcement was one of "disillusionment." Nevertheless
(speaking before the November 11 resignation of the Shia
ministers),Ambassador Cisek said he could envision a
workable compromise between Hizbollah and pro-Syrian forces
on the one hand, and the Siniora government on the other. He
was guardedly optimistic that Hizballah may be persuaded to
accept an agreement that would expand the government but fall
short of granting Hizballah the coveted blocking minority.


5. (C) On the question of the presidency, Ambassador Cisek
was certain that Syria will play a behind-the-scenes role in
the selection process. He seemed to accept as inevitable the
possibility that General Aoun will be the next Lebanese
president. He also thought Aoun's obvious passion to become
president could provide useful leverage for negotiating a
compromise on the current government crisis that would be
acceptable to all.


6. (C) Ambassador Cisek noted additional irritants
contributing to the current crisis facing the Siniora
government: (1) Israeli overflights, which undermine popular
support for the government, (2) strong opposition of
pro-Syrian forces to the Hariri Tribunal, and (3) the massive
influx of reconstruction funds. Ironically, according to
Ambassador Cisek, the very funds needed to rebuild the
country are undermining its stability because some
(unspecified) members of the government may be tempted to
change their political allegiance to gain control of the
money. The Ambassador predicted that these members, who
previously supported Siniora, may send "signals" that they
are willing to "cooperate with others" at the expense of the
current government.
GRABER