AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL WITH CZECH DEFENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 001306 SIPDIS SIPDIS EUR/NCE FOR FICHTE, PM FOR DOWLEY, OSD FOR SADOWSKA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL EZ NATO EAIR MARR MOPS SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL WITH CZECH DEFENSE MINISTER JIRI SEDIVY Classified By: Ambassador Richard Graber for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador made his introductory call on Czech Defense Minister Jiri Sedivy October 17. Topics discussed included missile defense, U.S. assistance for Czech defense reform, and Czech aircraft manufacturer AeroVodochody. Sedivy, just a month in the job, displayed an interest in an effective and productive political-military relationship with the United States. End summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador Graber made his introductory call on Defense Minister Jiri Sedivy October 17 to get acquainted and discuss a wide range of political-military issues. Czech Director for Defense and Security Policy Ivan Dvorak also attended. -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- STRATEGY, DEFENSE BUDGET SHORTFALLS, AND FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Sedviy, acknowledging the possible short-term nature of his stay in the job, outlined to the Ambassador his plans to steer the Ministry of Defense towards greater effectiveness. He said that short, medium, and long-term plans in the Ministry all suffered from the defect of spreading the activities of the Czech armed forces in too many directions. Sedivy said he wished to refocus efforts to ensure that key priorities received the resources they needed. As an example Sedivy said that he could not foresee a territorial threat (of invasion) to the Czech Republic or NATO countries in at least the next twenty years. Under such circumstances it would make sense to devote resources to expeditionary rapid reaction type forces. The Ambassador congratulated Sedivy on "Strong Campaigner," the Czechs' ongoing large-scale exercise. (Note: The exercise is in the process of certifying the first of two Czech brigades as NATO ready. End note.) ¶4. (C) Sedivy also said that he is working to ensure Czech military deployments in 2007 will not be affected despite cuts of about ten percent to the defense budget. Outlining his main priorities, Sedivy said he would work to ensure that NATO and EU defense commitments were met in addition to ensuring that the Czech military provided the quality of life and career path opportunities that would keep personnel from leaving the armed forces. He said he was working with key members of Parliament to propose a law that would guarantee a minimum level of defense expenditure over the next five years. -------------- -------------- --- MISSILE DEFENSE -------------- -------------- --- ¶5. (C) Turning to missile defense (MD) Sedivy portrayed recent U.S.-Czech consultations on MD as merely a step on a long road of such cooperation that had begun in 2002. He acknowledged the current Czech Government had not taken a formal position on MD. Sedivy said that both he and PM Topolanek were very much in favor of hosting "an element" of missile defense. Building a MD capability was consistent with the printed strategies of both NATO and the Czech Republic. According to Sedivy the key for Czech public acceptance of the system was the portrayal of the bilateral MD project as part of a "multilayered and multilateral system of defenses." He believed that a paragraph or sentence in the final communique at the Riga summit could be very helpful. Such wording would ideally say that missile defense is feasible and that NATO supports it. Depoliticization of the debate would be crucial, as unscrupulous politicians would seek to manipulate the issue for short-term domestic political gain. Ambassador Graber noted that recent statements by some Czech leaders on missile defense had been unfortunate because they had claimed the U.S. would not make a decision before the beginning of 2007 on which country to approach. The Ambassador emphasized that a decision could come earlier. DM Sedivy agreed that such statements had not been helpful and highlighted the efforts he is making to educate Czech politicians on the facts surrounding missile defense. -------------- MANPADS -------------- ¶6. (C) Sedivy formally presented the Ambassador with a letter of request for U.S. assistance in the destruction of 1400 SA-7 MANPADS (Note: A U.S. MANPADS survey team is already scheduled to visit the Czech Republic in mid-November). -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- FUNDING FOR DEFENSE REFORM ADVISORS -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Sedivy asked the Ambassador if the U.S. would be open to revisiting or reviewing a November 2005 agreement that the Czech Republic would reduce its reliance on U.S. Foreign Military Financing to pay for the services of defense reform advisors CUBIC Defense Applications Group (Note: That agreement would see FMF funding for CUBIC incrementally falling from USD 1.3 million to zero over a period of three years. End note). Sedivy said he knew the company from personal experience and was convinced that they could have a significant impact. The Ambassador responded that the United States still believed the November 2005 agreement was the best way forward, but said that Sedivy's concerns could be discussed further at the staff level if so requested. -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- MILITARY AIRLIFT OPTIONS -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Acknowledging the Czech Republic's shortage of military air transport options, Sedivy said he had signed a letter of intent for the Czech Republic to sign-up for one hundred flight hours in NATO's C-17 initiative. The challenge, he said, would be for the Czech Republic to find a use for all hundred hours of flight time. He mentioned that some elements of the program were unclear and that the Czechs would explore the possibility of "selling" some of their hours if they could not use them. Sedivy viewed the Czech participation in the project as an investment in NATO that had benefits beyond the airlift hours that the Czechs would receive. ¶9. (C) When prompted by the Ambassador to discuss a possible Czech acquisition of C-130 aircraft, Sedivy appeared less well briefed. He said that financial uncertainty was having an impact. Security and Defense Policy Director Dvorak added that there was not a positive outlook for a C-130 purchase, and that some confusion remained (presumably in Parliament) about why the Czech Republic would require both access to C-17 aircraft and acquisition of C-130s. Sedivy commented that his current focus was on "finding solutions to focus resources" at this time. -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- L-159 - PLEASE HELP US SELL OUR PLANE -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Sedivy asked the Ambassador for assistance in marketing the L-159 subsonic fighter jet, citing the excess inventory currently in the possession of the Czech Air Force (Note: this aircraft was originally produced in a cooperative venture between Boeing and Czech manufacturer AeroVodochody. Boeing has since withdrawn. End note.). The Ambassador responded that the Embassy would be happy to assist the Czechs consult with Washington to see if such assistance could be provided. (Note: In 2005 a Czech private military marketing firm approached the Embassy with a similar request; however, they appeared to lose interest when briefed on the 50 percent U.S. content rule for USG advocacy. End note). -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Sedivy has been in the job for just over a month, and is clearly still familiarizing himself with some of the issues. He displayed an interest in an effective and productive political-military relationship with the United States, and ensuring that the Czech Republic meets its international commitments. His positions on missile defense and on NATO C-17 initiative were encouraging, while his lack of knowledge on C-130 acquisition indicates that this is not a high priority within his ministry at this time. GRABER