Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PRAGUE1100
2006-09-11 05:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Prague
Cable title:  

CZECHS REQUEST CLARIFICATION OF U.S. POSITION ON

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR ICTY SR YI EZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6294
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPG #1100 2540505
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 110505Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7939
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1771
C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 001100 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR/NCE FOR FICHTE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ICTY SR YI EZ
SUBJECT: CZECHS REQUEST CLARIFICATION OF U.S. POSITION ON
SERBIAN ICTY COMPLIANCE

REF: STATE 146343

Classified By: Political Economic Counselor Michael Dodman for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 001100 SIPDIS SIPDIS EUR/NCE FOR FICHTE E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ICTY SR YI EZ SUBJECT: CZECHS REQUEST CLARIFICATION OF U.S. POSITION ON SERBIAN ICTY COMPLIANCE REF: STATE 146343 Classified By: Political Economic Counselor Michael Dodman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request for the Department. Please see paragraph 9. ¶2. (C) Summary: The Czech Government is hesitant to use its upcoming meetings with Serbia to deliver a tough message on ICTY compliance because it is hearing mixed messages on how significant ICTY compliance will be in the near future. They have heard that NATO PFP status is under consideration without emphasis on ICTY compliance. The Czechs have requested clarification about U.S. attitudes towards near-term outreach towards the Serbs and the degree to which ICTY compliance will play a role. End summary. ¶3. (C) Poloff delivered reftel talking points on Serbia's ICTY cooperation to MFA Director for South Eastern and Eastern Europe Thomas Szunyog on September 8. Other topics included the September 7 signing of a status of forces agreement (SOFA) between the U.S. and Serbia. ¶4. (C) Szunyog responded that he was having difficulty in determining how hard to push the Serbs on ICTY compliance. He said he had received mixed messages from American interlocutors in the region and also at NATO, who had indicated a breakthrough could soon be announced. Szunyog outlined his fear that the Czech Republic would use a planned September 14th meeting with FM Vuk Draskovic to push the Serbs hard on cooperating with ICTY, only to see the Serbs win major concessions from the international community without achieving the level of ICTY compliance that was being demanded. ¶5. (C) Elaborating, Szunyog said he had heard that there was a possibility of a NATO announcement during September that would be a step towards PFP status for Serbia. Such an announcement would not be contingent on the concrete results mentioned in the reftel demarche and the handover of Mladic to ICTY would not be a precondition. ¶6. (C) Moving to the EU, Szunyog commented that any disunity between the EU and NATO on the appropriate level of engagement with Serbia undermined the message. He said that the position of the EU Troika could move towards restarting the Stabilization and Association Agreement talks in October if ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte were to make an announcement endorsing the Serbian "Action Plan for ICTY cooperation." However, Szunyog said his contacts indicated that a Del Ponte statement would not be forthcoming without effective implementation steps from the Serbs. Such a statement would also have to come quickly if it were to affect the outcome of the upcoming September 29 EU Troika-Serbia meeting. The Czechs and the EU itself would require at a minimum a clear political statement from PM Kostunice calling for the immediate arrest of Mladic, followed by concrete acts to bring this about. ¶7. (C) Szunyog said a Regional Partnership consisting of Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia would meet with FM Draskovic in Vienna on September ¶14. The preparatory work for that meeting indicated that this group would not drastically diverge from the EU line, and would examine practical steps such as waivers on visa fees for young Serbs. ¶8. (C) Szunyog also reiterated the Czech objective of becoming the NATO contact point Embassy in Belgrade, promising they would bring appropriate expertise won during the process of the Czechs' own military reforms. ¶9. (C) Comment and action request: In addition to the Regional Partnership session, the Czechs are considering a bilateral meeting with the Serbs on September 14, and could deliver a reinforcing message on the need for concrete action on ICTY. However, Szunyog said the Czechs could not do this if they would be running the risk of being embarrassed by the announcement of major concessions to Serbia without the prerequisite compliance with ICTY. Post requests clarification to pass to the Czech Government on the envisaged degree of cooperation with Serbia in the coming weeks and months, including any planned NATO outreach to Belgrade. End comment and action request. CABANISS

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -