SOLOMON ISLANDS: PRIME MINISTER SOGAVARE VS RAMSI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT MORESBY 000460 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/ANP E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV BP SUBJECT: SOLOMON ISLANDS: PRIME MINISTER SOGAVARE VS RAMSI CLASSIFIED BY: Leslie Rowe, Ambassador, AMB, State. REASON: 1.4 (d) CLASSIFIED BY: Leslie Rowe, Ambassador, AMB, State. REASON: 1.4 (d) ¶1. (U ) SUMMARY: Ambassador traveled to the Solomon Islands to present her credentials and met with Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare. Discussion centered on Sogavare's continued dissatisfaction over RAMSI presence and in particular the ongoing row between the Solomon Islands Government (SIG) and Australia. Sogavare is looking forward to the Pacific Islands Forum Task Force (PIF) review and Fiji Prime Minister Qarase's planned visit in early December. He also plans to propose changes when the RAMSI Facilitation Act is reviewed in July ¶2007. During the visit, Ambassador met with a wide variety of politicians, business leaders and civil society who do not share Sogavare's views and are nervous that the SIG may move toward reducing RAMSI's presence. The Prime Minister also called for renewed U.S. engagement through the return of Peace Corps and SI participation in the Millennium Challenge Account. Throughout the visit, dozens of individuals expressed their high regard for the United States, dating back to World War II, and made similar requests for renewed bilateral engagement. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) RAMSI: Ambassador met with Prime Minister Sogavare on November 15 after presenting her credentials to the Governor-General earlier in the day. Ambassador asked Sogavare for his views on the current situation in the country, and he led off expressing his dissatisfaction with Australia's dominant role of RAMSI. ' RAMSI has drifted away from its original approach to be a regional entity, 'he said. 'There is a need to localize positions and take Australia out of the equation because it has created two regimes - RAMSI and the government. There are 230 RAMSI officials in 'line officer' positions actually running operations when they should only act as advisers to the SIG. RAMSI officials are not interested in an exit strategy. There is also no clear distinction between RAMSI and AusAID. Ninety percent of Australian assistance goes back to Canberra in salaries for their officials. RAMSI has also missed the whole reason for the 2000 coup. It has not addressed the causes surrounding the coup -economic issues and disrespect for custom and culture. RAMSI is too heavy handed -- it is not necessary to have trucks with armed soldiers driving around Honiara.' ¶4. (C) REVIEW PROCESS: Sogavare said that he is looking forward to the review of RAMSI by the Pacific Island Forum Task Force, but made it clear that the SIG - not the PIF - will take the lead in the review. PIF officials, including Fiji Prime Minister Qarase, are expected to visit the SI to begin the review December 5-7. He outlined the SIG's six point plan for the review: respect for SI territorial sovereignty and integrity; restoration of the regional character of RAMSI; establishment of a Forum Ministerial Standing Committee to oversee the operations of RAMSI; exit strategy for RAMSI; independent review of RAMSI operations; a clear demarcation between RAMSI and AusAID programs. He said that the annual review of the Facilitation Act which created RAMSI will be conducted by Parliament in July, and that he would move to remove the immunities of RAMSI officials. (NOTE: an MP made an unsuccessful attempt to do this in the past. If immunities were removed, it would probably lead to the departure of RAMSI and other expatriate officials. Sogavare may have taken this page from the PNG playbook, where Australia's Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP) fell victim to a decision by the country's highest court that immunity for Australian police officers in PNG was unconstitutional. More than 200 police officers were immediately withdrawn. END NOTE). ¶5. (C) AUSTRALIA: Sogavare was clearly incensed by what he perceives as Australia's encroachment on his authority as Prime Minister. He said that former Australian High Commissioner, Patrick Cole, was declared persona non grata in September because he was interfering in SI political affairs. He recounted that after Cole's expulsion, Prime Minister Howard called and told him ' I will make things very difficult for you and your government.' ¶6. (C) POLICE RAID: Sogavare also said that Australian officials are very heavy handed. They do not abide by SI law and report instead to Canberra. He cited as an example the incident in which Shane Castles, the Australian Police Commissioner in SI, ordered police officials to raid Sogavare's office while he attended the October Pacific Island Forum meeting in Fiji. ' They kicked in the door to my office and took a fax machine. - the wrong fax machine!' he laughed. (NOTE: In the raid, police searched for evidence that the Prime Minister's office had been involved in facilitating the October PORT MORES 00000460 002 OF 003 transfer of his attorney general candidate, Australian Julian Moti, from Papua New Guinea. Moti is wanted in Australia to face charges of sex offenses against a minor in Vanuatu. END NOTE). Castles is due to leave in April, 2007. However, Sogavare said that he asked the Governor General to relieve Castles of his duties earlier. When asked who might replace Castles, Sogavare said that he would look first for a Solomon Islander. He said that Prime Minister Michael Somare has also offered a Papua New Guinean. Additional candidates might come from other Pacific islands, the United Kingdom or New Zealand. ' Australia is not to call the shots' he said. ¶7. (C) REGIME CHANGE? Sogavare appeared to calm down and reduce his anti-RAMSI/Australia rhetoric after he returned from the PIF meeting in October. Some contacts speculated that other PIF leaders, in particular PNG Prime Minister Somare, had a moderating effect on Sogavare. Unfortunately, over the last week, Sogavare has returned to his attacks on Australia. He and Foreign Minister Oti are playing the sovereignty card on a daily basis in the press and appear to be looking for ways to reduce Australia's role in RAMSI. On November 13, the Prime Minister's office issued a press release statement saying he was disappointed with the Australian government's refusal to accept his conditions to transfer Julian Moti to Australia to face charges. (The conditions include guarantees that Moti can travel freely and that he will not be mistreated). The statement reported that the SIG ' cannot continue to tolerate Australia's ignorant and bullying attitude. Some ignorant Australians have influenced Solomon Islanders including the media to join them in a ruthless campaign to oust him (Sogavare) from office in the last two months. The majority of Solomon Islanders supports the SIG and the Prime minister and wants to stop Australia from using RAMSI to destabilize the government. ' He asked Solomon Islanders to ' watch out for Australian agents in the country; to watch out for dirty manipulative words to oust the current government.' A number of people expressed concern to the Ambassador that Sogavare's provocative statements could incite violence toward Australians. There is also concern that Sogavare is intent on Moti becoming his Attorney General. He reportedly attended a cabinet meeting last week, despite the fact that he is facing charges of immigration violations in the SI and potential extradition to Australia. ¶8. (C) CIVIL SOCIETY AND RAMSI: Although Sogavare maintains that ' 90% of Solomon Islanders support me on RAMSI,' this was not borne out in Ambassador's meetings with a variety of leaders in civil society, other branches of government and the media. There is clearly widespread support for RAMSI and genuine concern that should RAMSI leave, the SI may return to the instability and violence of the post 2000 coup period. There was no public outcry when the Prime Minister's office was raided, because in the words of the Speaker of Parliament ' No one is above the law. ' When Sogavare advocated in Parliament for the removal of RAMSI, seven of nine provincial premiers spoke out in support of RAMSI. Opposition leaders asked for a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister which ultimately did not succeed. ¶9. (C) COMMENT: Despite general support by the public and many community leaders, there is sentiment that some RAMSI officials/contractors have been heavy handed, not sensitive to cultural issues and at times patronizing in their treatment of Solomon Islanders. One diplomat related that a RAMSI official told him ' I've worked in the Northern Territory (of Australia) and I know how to deal with these people.' Another key issue is the lack of discussion between the SIG and RAMSI on a general exit strategy. One high level RAMSI official estimated that it could take 10-15 years for SIG officials to assume functions now performed by RAMSI. It is highly doubtful that the SIG or the majority of Solomon Islanders envision RAMSI's presence for that long. The review of RAMSI by the PIF task force should address some of these issues. Hopefully, Prime Minister Sogavare will again listen to the advice of PIF elder statesmen and adopt the recommendations of the PIF review. END COMMENT. ¶10. (C) BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT: Sogavare and Ambassador also discussed ways to enhance the bilateral relationship. He and dozens of other Solomon Islanders sounded the familiar requests for bilateral engagement: the return of Peace Corps, the Fulbright program, increased development assistance, participation in the Millennium Challenge Account. In her credentials presentation speech, the Ambassador stated that the U.S. supported RAMSI and the peace and security it had brought to the SI. This was prominently featured in the press. Several leaders mentioned that the US visit was important at this time to help defuse the situation. The overwhelmingly positive view that Solomon Islanders hold of Americans, still vibrant so many decades after World War II, was impressive. The Embassy will follow up to explore several possibilities to strengthen PORT MORES 00000460 003 OF 003 bilateral engagement. ROWE