HAITI ELECTIONS: PLANNERS APPLY LESSONS LEARNED

C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT AU PRINCE 000637 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CAR DRL S/CRS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) TREASURY FOR MAUREEN WAFER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2010 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MARR ASEC HA SUBJECT: HAITI ELECTIONS: PLANNERS APPLY LESSONS LEARNED REF: PAUP 2991 Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. UN Mission (MINUSTAH) officials are confident they will be much better prepared to conduct the second round of national elections and working to apply lessons learned from the first round. MINUSTAH has ordered its military planners to develop the overall security plan, taking over work done by the UN Police (UNPol) for the first round, and thereby forcing MINUSTAH commanders to integrate their resources with UNPol and the Haitian National Police (HNP). A team of senior MINUSTAH officials traveled to the regions the week of Monday, April 3, to evaluate each region's planning and recommendations. Elections advisors have refined their logistics planning, training for poll workers, and procedures at the national vote tabulation center (VTC). Post shares the assessment that preparations and logistics are likely to be much improved from the first round. We share the concern of many, however, that local rivalries emerging in the second round runoff format creates the potential for more disturbances. We are encouraged that MINUSTAH security planners are aware of this possibility and adjusting their plans accordingly, and do not expect that local disturbances will threaten the successful conclusion of the second round. SECURITY PREPARATIONS -------------- ¶2. (C) UNPol elections security chief Neil Warriner (a member of the U.S. UNPol contingent who enjoys the special confidence of UNPol Commissioner Muir) told Polcouns on April 2 that a team of MINUSTAH leaders were in the midst of a security review of in each of Haiti's departments to evaluate security planning. The team included electoral operations chief Barry Macleod, Muir, and additional UNPol and MINUSTAH military staff. Macleod and Muir have made MINUSTAH's civilian regional directors responsible for developing operational plans for security in each of their departments in coordination with their military, police, and civilian personnel. An integrated team from MINUSTAH headquarters, led by Warriner, will evaluate each plan and allocate resources accordingly. Warriner highlighted the potential for the increased possibility of disturbances as local rivalries come to the fore in the second round, and said that planners would focus on a political analysis of potential trouble spots in their assessments. ¶3. (C) Warriner stressed that in contrast to the first round, where UNPol and HNP developed the security and operational plan with no input from MINUSTAH's military leaders, SRSG Valdes and Macleod had ordered MINUSTAH commanders to take the lead in drawing up security requirements and coordinate their planning with UNPol and the HNP. Warriner said that military and UNPol had supported each other locally during the first round because of established working relationships. Because MINUSTAH's military leadership had failed to integrate their planning security cooperation at the national level, however, that cooperation had remained ad hoc and communications and joint actions had been less efficient. Warriner expected that as a result of the unified planning process, MINUSTAH would be much better able to respond to security threats during the second round. He noted that the abilities of each military contingent continued to vary: the Jordanians remained the weakest performers and the Uruguayans had exhibited a surprising to take command decisions. The Sri Lankans, Argentineans, and Peruvians had performed admirably. As a result of the withdrawal of the joint Moroccan/Spanish contingent, MINUSTAH would depend on Uruguayan forces, including newly arrived additional troops, to improve their performance and shoulder greater responsibilities. ELECTORAL PREPARATIONS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) MINUSTAH elections chief Gerardo LeChevallier and members of his staff told Polcouns on March 30 and in subsequent conversations that preparations were on schedule for the second round on April 21. They are focusing improvements in three areas: transport of sensitive material to and from voting centers, poll-worker training, and improved efficiency at the VTC in Port-au-Prince. With the first round complete, MINUSTAH now had a complete picture of transportation and requirements and would reallocate resources accordingly. Planners were also working to improve the procedures to account for "process verbaux" (tally sheets - PVs) from voting centers, through departmental electoral offices (BEDs) and on to the VTC. Unlike the first round, MINUSTAH and the CEP would now have the ability to track any individual PV back to its voting center (2.3% of completed PVs remained unaccounted for at the VTC after the first round.) ¶5. (SBU) MINUSTAH technicians and CEP officials are also concentrating on improved training for all poll workers, which has already begun. LeChevallier related that significant problems arose in the first round when BED and BEC presidents, who had in many cases not approved the lists of approved poll workers from the CEP, simply substituted personnel trained in advance of the first round with untrained workers on election day. MINUSTAH and CEP personnel had taken pains to identify suitable poll workers for the second round whom BED and BEC presidents also approved. MINUSTAH staff related that while they had refined training procedures, significant improvements in poll-worker performance should result simply from having everyone trained. ¶6. (C) MINUSTAH staff placed particular emphasis on improving procedures at the VTC. The majority of delays in the counting process after the first round resulted from irregularities with PVs that required adjudication by CEP legal staff in order to be counted . CEP legal staff for the most part failed to meet their responsibilities, delaying the count and requiring the intervention of CEP DG Bernard and CEP counselors who were present in the VTC only intermittently. Problems arose with PVs principally as a result of several last minute changes in the location of voting centers (PVs were pre-programmed in the system with a numerical and geographic indicator) and inconsistencies or problems in reading the hand-written PVs. MINUSTAH and CEP officials will work to have the locations of voting centers identified and programmed in the system well in advance -- the CEP still plans on moving a few voting centers and opening annexes. With the candidates list already determined, the CEP will also be able provide pre-printed PVs to voting centers. Finally, CEP Director Bernard is working to ensure the efficient and professional performance of CEP legal staff on hand at the VTC to deal quickly deal with any discrepancies. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) With the first round having served as a dress rehearsal, we are confident that preparations, logistics, and electoral staff performance will improve for the second round. In addition, with the presidential race decided, a likely smaller turnout should pose less strain on the system and lead to a quicker count of the result. We share the analysis of many MINUSTAH officials and Haitian observers that the potential threat of spoliers will be greater in the second round particularly in central and southern provinces, where local rivalries appear to be more heated. Fortunately, it does not appear that the races in Port-au-Prince will generate disorder among the supporters of the competing candidates. Disruptions are likely to remain localized, however, and should not endanger the overall completion of the second round and the installation of the parliament. SANDERSON