MINUSTAH/HNP TO MOVE ON CITE SOLEIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 002424 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CAR DRL S/CRS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) TREASURY FOR JEFFREY LEVINE E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2011 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR ASEC KCRM KJUS HA SUBJECT: MINUSTAH/HNP TO MOVE ON CITE SOLEIL REF: PAUP 2409 Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reason 1 .4(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: MINUSTAH and the HNP are finalizing plans to move against specific gang leaders in Cite Soleil. Acting UNPol Commissioner Richard Warren and Haitian Police (HNP) Director General Andresol completed an operational plan on December 20 and hope to conduct an operation by December 21. Utilizing intelligence generated from MINUSTAH's Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC),the Formed Police Units (FPUs) and HNP SWAT members will target selected gang residences and buildings where they hold kidnapping victims. The combined forces will detain gang members and destroy the buildings. Warren expressed concern to Polcouns that MINUSTAH force commander General Jose Elito continued to withhold full cooperation, but that MINUSTAH and GoH leadership was adamant that operations proceed. Warren also outlined steps he had taken to improve UNPol/HNP/JMAC cooperation, which included the formation of a joint MINUSTAH/HNP Rapid Intervention group (RIG) had resulted in several arrests of kidnappers in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien in the previous week. End Summary. Cite Soleil a Go -------------- ¶2. (C) Warren on December 20 reported to Polcouns that with GoH approval he and DG Andresol had completed the operational plan for the first action targeted against the gang leaders in Cite Soleil (Note: Warren would not confirm but did not deny that the primary target was Evans Jeune. End Note) Warren submitted the plan to General Elito for coordination that same day, and cautioned that Elito's attitude had remained uncooperative over the past several days. In response to the GoH request for an operational plan for Cite Soleil, Elito had presented options that were clearly unworkable or unresponsive. Warren and Andresol had revised the least objectionable option, giving primary operational responsibility to an augmented RIG with MINUSTAH soldiers in a supporting role. With senior GoH officials, including Prime Minister Alexis, and SRSG Mulet pushing hard on General Elito, Warren expected implementation as early as Friday, December 21. 
 ¶3. (C) Warren's plan calls for the RIG, composed of an HNP SWAT unit and UNPol advisors, the Jordanian FPU, and augmented by the Chinese FPU, to enter Cite Soleil and establish a defensible base in an already identified building. From there, teams will move against specific gang residences identified by JMAC informants, arrest gang members, destroy the buildings, and, hopefully, liberate kidnapping victims. JMAC informants indicated that gangs were holding as many as 40 kidnapping victims in the targeted buildings. MINUSTAH troops, principally Brazilians, will clear a traffic obstruction, built by the gangs, to open access for the RIG and form a cordon with armored personnel carriers (APCs) blocking "the main escape route" (presumably along route national 9, running through the center of Cite Soleil)." Warren hoped that the operation to clear the obstruction and the arrival of the APCs would create a diversion that would flush out armed gang members and disperse their defenses. In any event, Warren predicted there would be "a major battle." ¶4. (C) Warren believed the GoH was resolved to "eliminate the gang problem" in Cite Soleil and expected to carry out a series of similar operations, even if significant casualties resulted. He noted that both Prime Minister Alexis and State Secretary for Public Security Eucher had consistently SIPDIS demanded more aggressive action against gang members in several meetings over the past two weeks: he blamed General Elito's uncooperative stance for the delay in following-through in Cite Soleil. MINUSTAH expected that gang leaders and anti-MINUSTAH militants would launch a propaganda offensive against the operations. In the worst case, Warren feared that gang members would kill hostages in other areas, bring the bodies to Cite Soilei and accuse PORT AU PR 00002424 002 OF 002 MINUSTAH of committing a massacre. (Note: During the "operation Baghdad" violence in the summer of 2004, gangs reportedly pulled bodies from morgues to stage them as props on the street as evidence of MINUSTAH's crimes. End Note.) HNP/UNPol Cooperation -------------- ¶5. (C) Since becoming acting UNPol commissioner in November, Warren has taken several steps to improve UNPol performance in support of the HNP. In forming the RIG in cooperation with Andresol, he noted that for the first time UNPol and the HNP were able to utilize information developed by JMAC informants. Actionable tips now went directly from the JMAC chief to Warren, who in turn directly contacted Andresol to jointly approve an operation. This could happen any hour of the day or night. The effort had resulted in arrests of over 20 suspected kidnappers in the Port-au-Prince area in the past several days. A sub-unit of the RIG had even traveled to Cap Haitien earlier in the week and arrested 18 members of a kidnapping gang. With JMAC intelligence finally linked to operations, the HNP and UNPol were also now able to test the reliability of JMAC sources, some of whom were proving untrustworthy. Warren has also imposed discipline on UNPol advisors working with other HNP units and required that they regularly report on their activity. For example, Warren found that the anti-kidnapping unit shared no information and has now insisted that they formally report on all of their activities and provide intelligence to JMAC. ¶6. (C) Comment: "Eliminating the gang problem" in Cite Soleil will not solve the crime problem in Port-au-Prince. Criminal activity is dispersed throughout the city and carried out by enterprising criminals of various stripes. Nevertheless, it is now imperative that the GoH and MINUSTAH demonstrate to the public that they have the will and the means to ensure a basic minimum of law and order on the streets and that they will no longer tolerate impunity. Decisive action against the gangs will also hopefully, three years after Aristide's departure, allow the international community and the GoH to make good on promises to deliver assistance to the most needy of Haiti's poor. SANDERSON