ROCKY START FOR DDR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 001881 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CAR DRL S/CRS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) TREASURY FOR JEFFREY LEVINE E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2011 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR ASEC KCRM KJUS HA SUBJECT: ROCKY START FOR DDR Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) Summary. Forty-seven gang members from Cite Soleil on September 26 finished a week-long orientation program for the revamped Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program (ref A),though follow-on activities remain in doubt as MINUSTAH DDR staff attempt to ensure with the GoH the standards for the program as they proceed. President Preval reportedly directed the negotiations resulting in the surrender of 29 weapons during the week of September 11 in exchange for the acceptance of 55 Cite Soleil gang members into the DDR program. Though Preval assured SRSG Mulet that the Haitian police (HNP) would make surrendered weapons available for registration and ballistics testing, UN police were unsuccessful in following-up with HNP Director Andresol as of September 28. Alix Fils-Aime, the president of The GoH's National Committee for DDR (CNDDR),informed MINUSTAH DDR chief Desmond Molloy that the GoH has taken possession of another 30 weapons and identified 52 additional participants to START the next round of DDR ON October 2. Fils-Aime ON September 27 asked emboffs to directly coordinate USAID community development efforts with the CNDDR while underlining that the GoH, rather than MINUSTAH, was the final authority ON disarmament policy. Emboffs pledged to explore possibilities for cooperation with the disarmament committee, but stressed that any cooperation with the DDR committee was contingent ON transparent standards for participation in the program, including proper registration and disposition of surrendered weapons. DDR policy is the most visible among a variety of issues where the GoH exerting "ownership" of key issues. Despite some resulting friction, Molloy supports Fils-Aime and remains committed to the CNDDR. Post does as well, but we will join with MINUSTAH in insisting that the GoH adhere to transparent and acceptable standards, especially regarding surrendered weapons. End Summary. DDR Begins -------------- ¶2. (C) MINUSTAH DDR staff ON September 18 initiated the orientation program for 47 participants at Camp Santo, a MINUSTAH facility located two kilometers northeast of the Port-au-Prince airport. MINUSTAH and GoH contacts report that President Preval had directed the negotiations leading to the weapons hand over ON September 13 and entry of 55 gang members into the DDR program. Fils-Aime informed Molloy that the GoH brokered the arrangement only ON Saturday, September 16, giving DDR staff just the weekend to prepare to accept the participants at the orientation camp the following Monday. Molloy related to polcouns that Fils-Aime made clear in informing Molloy that the CNDDR would exercise control over the DDR process and expected MINUSTAH to implement their decisions. Fils-Aime himself went to Cite Soleil ON September 13 and took possession of the weapons in the presence of Cite Soleil gang leaders. (Note: Radio Megastar, the favored media outlet of the Cite Soleil gangs, accurately reported the weapons surrender the day it occurred, but the event otherwise garnered no press. The GoH never formally acknowledged its initiation of DDR. End Note.) ¶3. (C) Gang leaders identified 53 DDR participants, divided by neighborhood: 10 from the Simon Pele neighborhood, (controlled by William "Ti Blan" Baptiste); 30 individuals from Bellecourt (Amaral Duclonat); 4 from Boston (Evans Jeune),and 9 from Brooklin (affiliation unknown). Ministry of interior official and disarmament committee member Emnual Gouttier related to Polcouns that he went to Cite Soliel ON September 18, the first day of the orientation program, to oversee transport arrangements for the participants and that the gang leaders had come out to observe the proceedings. Coincidentally, a Brazilian patrol had passed close by at the same time, causing everyone to disappear within seconds, "like a power-point slide disappearing from a screen." It took him several minutes to reassemble everyone and convince them that the GoH had not arranged a trap. ¶4. (C) Molloy told polcouns ON September 26 that 47 gang PORT AU PR 00001881 002 OF 003 members from the original list successfully completed the one-week program (Note: The GoH provided bus transport to and from Camp Santo and Cite Soleil each day. End Note) Of those, MINUSTAH could confirm the identities of only 38; the others had provided either false identification or no identification. The orientation program included a medical evaluation, presentations promoting non-violent behavior, and assessments of the participants suitability for follow-on vocational training or inclusion in a micro-enterprise. Of most interest to the participants, according to DDR staff, was the chance to eat three regular meals a day. ¶5. (C) Molloy dubbed the first orientation a success, noting that participants willingly participated and completed the program, but raised several concerns. Participants told DDR staff that their gang leaders worked out the arrangement with the GoH; they themselves did not disarm. Every participant indicated that they wanted to receive training as mechanics and become truck drivers, apparently because they understood that President Preval promised they would go to work as truck drivers for the parastatal heavy equipment agency (CNE, "Centre National de Equipment"). The GoH also delivered to each participant a payment of roughly US$100 (4000 Haitian Gourdes) in Cite Soleil in addition to the support that DDR staff agreed to with the disarmament committee (DDR staff also made a $100 payment to each participant at the successful conclusion of the program). Molloy also suspected, based ON information provided by UNPol colleagues, that three of the DDR participants were Ti Blan's "top lieutenants," sent to spy ON the DDR process. Most troubling, gang leader Beloney Pierre over the weekend beginning September 24 reportedly re-instigated kidnapping and attacks against MINUSTAH forces in the northern Cite Soleil neighborhood of Bois Neuf, presumably breaking any pledge he made to the GoH. What Weapons? -------------- ¶6. (C) As of September 28, the GoH had failed to make available to MINUSTAH the surrendered weapons for examination, entry into the joint MINUSTAH/HNP weapons database, and ballistics testing. A very agitated Molloy told polcouns that though Preval and Fils-Aime assured SRSG Mulet that HNP Director General Andresol would provide UNPol officers access to the weapons, Andresol had been out of touch for the past two days. As a result, Molloy recommended to Mulet that MINUSTAH suspend all further DDR activities until MINUSTAH registered the weapons and Fils-Aime clarified issues of transparency and standards the GoH would uphold in identifying future DDR participants. Fils-Aime had already earlier that day informed Molloy that the Cite Coleil gang leaders had turned and additional 30 weapons, and that as a result the CNDDR accepted an additional 52 DDR participants. ¶7. (C) Polcouns stressed to Fils-Aime during a meeting ON September 27 (see para 8) that any cooperation between the embassy and the CNDDR was contingent ON the proper disposition of surrendered weapons. Fils-Aime offered his personal assurances that he had taken care of the matter and that it would no longer be a problem ("If I was lackadaisical, I apologize, but it won't be a problem again.") Fils-Aime showed polcouns the list of the 30 surrendered weapons, but declined to provide a copy, saying the list would be distributed "in due time." The weapons, listed with their serial numbers, included M-14s M-4s, T-65s, two Kalishnikovs, one Uzi, and two 38 caliber pistols. Fils-Aime claimed that all were in working order. U.S. Cooperation -------------- ¶8. (C) At Fils-Aime's request, polcouns and USAID's technical officer for community development accompanied the chief of party for the embassy's principle implementing partner for social projects, the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) chief of party ON September 27 to discuss areas of potential cooperation between the CNDDR and PORT AU PR 00001881 003 OF 003 the embassy. Fils-Aime explained that the CNDDR wanted to jump START community projects in Cite Soleil and the slums of Port-au-Prince, notably in the areas of drainage and water supply, school renovation, job creation, and micro-credit. He proposed that IOM meet with the committee's community partners in these neighborhoods to better coordinate ze IOM programs with the committee's. Fils-Aime took some exception to IOM's suggestion that the CNDDR, through MINUSTAH, initiate a wider consultative process with other NGOs. Fils-Aime declared at several points during the conversation that "the Government of Haiti is in charge of disarmament policy, not MINUSTAH," and that he preferred the flexibility of dealing directly with individual partners as he worked to get initial projects off the ground. After further clarifying that the CNDDR should expand its consultations and coordinate with all relevant donors and NGO's as soon as possible, Emboffs agreed to a meeting with CNDDR partners with USAID and IOM ON September 30. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) We are not overly concerned with Fils-Aime's desire to exert control over the DDR process and the resulting tensions with MINUSTAH. Fils-Aime, who is a strong personality in his own right, is also responding to direct pressure from Preval to quickly pacify Cite Soleil and resist perceived international efforts to limit Preval's ability to devise "Haitian solutions" to Haiti's problems. Molloy confided that he felt "exposed" as he tried to support the work of the CNDDR and ensure the program's standards at the same time. He maintains, however, that Fils-Aime is doing an admirable job under difficult circumstances: Molloy remains committed to preserving a supportive relationship between MINUSTAH and the CNDDR. Based ON preliminary conversations, we believe there is potential for useful collaboration with the CNDDR.. We will make the point with Fils-Aime and other GoH officials, however, that adherence to acceptable standards, particularly the completely transparent and proper disposition of surrendered weapons, is a minimum condition for continued cooperation ON DDR and other security-related areas. SANDERSON