C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 001846

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2011
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM HA
SUBJECT: CEP AND MINUSTAH DISAGREE ON ELECTION DATE


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Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Thomas C. Tighe for reason 1.4(d).


1. (C) Summary: The GoH has issued the decree, dated August
31, establishing municipal, local, and the remainder of
legislative elections on December 3. MINUSTAH staff and
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) staff sharply disagreed,
however, on the state of elections preparations at a
September 22 meeting with elections donors hosted by the
Canadian Ambassador. Though MINUSTAH technicians argued that
December 3 was logistically impossible, CEP President Max
Mathurin insisted that with negotiation and diligence a
December 3 election was possible. CEP Director General
Jacques Bernard on September 25 assured Polcouns that the CEP
was fully prepared to hold elections, and that he had
deliberately excluded MINUSTAH elections chief Gerardo
Lechevallier from CEP planning. He admitted that electoral
logistics (transport of election materials and results) and
security were beyond his control, and he would accept
whatever final decision taken by the GoH. President Preval's
signature is on the August 31 decree, but SRSG Mulet,
responding to Preval's directive to focus on security in
Port-au-Prince will not commit necessary resources to the
elections unless Preval offers specific guidance on the
elections. Additionally, the EU, the other significant
electoral donor in addition to the U.S. and Canada, will
likely not fully commit its budget support until MINUSTAH and
the CEP resolve their differences. End Summary.

Logistics
--------------


2. (U) During the September 22 meeting, Carlos Currie, Chief
of Operations and Deputy of the MINUSTAH Electoral Assistance
Section (EAS), said that they would need 78 days from
September 25 to produce and disseminate the ballots properly.
Felix Ortega, the technical expert at OAS, agreed that a
December 3 election would make a very tight timeline.

Currently, OAS is working with the CEP on verifying the
candidates list and ballot layout. However, Mathurin,
during the meeting, stated that candidate list and ballot
layout would be completed over the weekend.

Money
--------------


3. (U) According to Currie, only $4 million of the promised
$12 million from the international community has been
received. He thought that the ballot process could begin
with these funds. However, Runn Skinnebach, economic officer
for the EU, said that the lack of consensus on the electoral
calendar sends a negative message to EU capitals and made it
difficult to justify disbursement of funds.


4. (U) UNDP electoral fund manager Mohamed Hassen explained
that the 2006-2007 electoral budget currently anticipates a
3-month cycle to recruit and pay the poll workers. This does
not include the departmental (BED) and local (BEC) employees
of the CEP. BED and BEC employees are currently paid from
the $3 million in savings from the first two elections.
However, UNDP needs donor authorization to continue paying
the BED and BEC employees if the election is to be held in
February 2007. Donors present requested a working plan and
chronogram from CEP justifying BED and BEC payment. Mathurin
replied that the workers must remain employed because they
are in the field working with the political parties,
identifying misplaced voters (verifying names and addresses),
and maintaining electoral equipment.

Security
--------------


6. (U) Canadian Ambassador Claude Boucher stated that SRSG
Edmond Mulet thought that security provisions in the
provinces by December 3 would be impossible. Given this, he
wondered if CEP wanted to maintain the December date. (Note:
Mulet on September 21 repeated his concerns to Polcouns at an
embassy reception: as a result of Preval's push for security
in Port-au-Prince, SRSG Mulet had redeployed several
contingents from the countryside. Mulet had told Preval that
MINUSTAH could "not guarantee either logistics or security

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for December 3." End Note.)

CEP insists on December 3 elections
--------------


7. (SBU) Mathurin insisted that elections should be held as
announced on December 3 because the "political implications
to suspending elections are too great." He reminded
attendees that MINUSTAH, the OAS, and the donors had agreed
to the December date with the GoH at an August 9 meeting with
Prime Minister Alexis. He admitted that there are some
technical and budgetary challenges. The CEP might, for
instance, need to find another printer if the price remains
at the current level. Through negotiation and diligence, he
claimed, this problem could be solved. Mathurin shrugged off
the need for correcting the candidates' list, as "a small
detail. A few names here and there must be changed."


8. (SBU) On security, he countered that SRSG Mulet was
involved in the August 9 meeting when the election date was
set and should be prepared to make good on his commitments.
Moreover, Mathurin complained that SRSG Mulet had not raised
his concerns with the CEP. (Note: Mulet was not present at
the August 9 meeting althought then PDSRSG Larry Rossin
attended. Mulet had, in fact, briefed Jacques Bernard on his
concerns before meeting with Preval on September 7 to
recommend postponing elections. End Note.) He chastised the
participants, stating that the international community would
not take the political backlash from postponement of the
elections, it would be the CEP. Mathurin took to the
airwaves the following day, proclaiming to journalists that
"the CEP is ready for the December 3 elections, but we are
not responsible for the funding that has not arrived.
Technically, we are prepared."

What the Director General Thinks
--------------


9. (C) Jacques Bernard also dismissed MINUSTAH's technical
objections during a private meeting with Polcouns on
September 25. Bernard stated that it had become impossible
to work with MINUSTAH elections chief Gerardo Lechevallier
because of his "political interference." and he had excluded
Lecheallier from the planning process. The CEP had resolved
all of the issues that Gerardo and his staff had raised: they
would complete the final verification of candidates the
following morning and they had already prepared sample
ballots. Bernard believed that Lechevallier continued to
raise "red herrings" because he wanted to reopen voter and
candidate registration and include constitutional referenda
in the elections. Bernard allowed that MINUSTAH would have
to provide logistical and security support. If the GoH
decided that MINUSTAH's security commitments in Cite Soleil
were a higher priority than the elections, and thus elections
must be postponed, he would accept the decision. The Preval
administration had not, however, announced any decision to
postpone elections.


10. (C) Comment. MINUSTAH has done a better job in recent
weeks advocating for a postponement than Bernard and the CEP
have in arguing in favor of December 3. Though Mathurin's
defense of December 3 was surprisingly vigorous (Mathurin has
hardly expressed a strong view on anything during his tenure
as president) he does not have sufficient command of the
issues to effectively counter MINUSTAH arguments. EU
representative Skinnebach stated to Polcouns during a later
conversation that he would not recommend disbursement without
clear agreement between the CEP and MINUSTAH. Bernard
indicated that he would soon launch his own campaign to
publicize the work done by the CEP to prepare for December 3.
Ultimately, however, President Preval's government will
have to give guidance to MINUSTAH on their role in supporting
logistics and security in order for all of the electoral
players to consider options and agree on and implement a
viable electoral timetable. End Comment.
TIGHE