Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PORTAUPRINCE1798
2006-09-22 13:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Port Au Prince
Cable title:
PM ON COOPERATION/SECURITY/ELECTIONS
VZCZCXRO7325 OO RUEHQU DE RUEHPU #1798/01 2651349 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 221349Z SEP 06 FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4137 INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 1233 RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1075 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL//OLE/OI//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 001798
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CAR
DRL
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
TREASURY FOR JEFFREY LEVINE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2011
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNGA ASEC KCRM KJUS HA
SUBJECT: PM ON COOPERATION/SECURITY/ELECTIONS
REF: A. PAP 1668
B. PAP 1775
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons
1.4(b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 001798
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CAR
DRL
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
TREASURY FOR JEFFREY LEVINE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2011
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNGA ASEC KCRM KJUS HA
SUBJECT: PM ON COOPERATION/SECURITY/ELECTIONS
REF: A. PAP 1668
B. PAP 1775
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons
1.4(b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary. Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis on
September 19 reviewed with the Ambassador recent developments
in the bilateral agenda. The Ambassador congratulated the PM
on the previous day's signing of the bilateral aid agreement
and pledged to coordinate our assistance with the GoH. The
PM summarized GoH policy regarding security, explaining that
President Preval had opened a dialogue with gang leaders when
he saw that MINUSTAH and the Haitian police (HNP) were unable
to immediately cope with the gangs. That policy had allowed
MINUSTAH time to implement a security strategy, and gang
members were now eager to join the disarmament program (DDR)
because they were afraid of the government. Alexis
acknowledged that MINUSTAH had recommended delaying the next
round of elections from December 3 to February 7, but
insisted that the government had taken "no official
position." (ref A) (The Provisional Electoral Commission
(CEP) announced on September 20, however, that they would
hold to the December date, after CEP President met with the
PM immediately after the Ambassador.) On the issue of
deportees, Alexis asked the Ambassador to dedicate a separate
meeting to the topic (ref B). The Ambassador highlighted our
ongoing security cooperation and complementary community
development projects, and assured the PM the embassy would
continue to coordinate closely with the GoH. The Ambassador
stressed the importance the USG attached to th upcoming vote
at the UN for Security Council mebership. Alexis, as usual,
demonstrated a comman of the issues, but we judge that
President Prevl's approach to governance may be inhibiting
Aleis' performance. End Summary.
Assistance Coopeation
--------------
2. (U) The Ambassador, accomanied by Polcouns (notetaker),
on September 19 me with the Prime Minister and his Chief of
Staff ntoine Dubois to review bilateral issues coveredduring her recent consultations in Washington. Th
Ambassador again congratulated the PM on ther joint signing
of the bilateral assistance agreement the previous day and
noted that she would sign the police assistance Letter of
Agreement the following day with the minister of justice.
The embassy would also focus efforts to recruit
Haitian-Americans able to provide expertise to the GoH. The
Ambassador re-emphasized the embassy's desire to coordinate
closely with the GoH to ensure the most effective impact of
our assistance programs, an issue that Alexis and President
Preval have separately raised in previous meetings. The PM
highlighted the role of Minister for Social Affairs Gerald
Germain as a point of contact for coordination, particularly
as DDR progresses. The Ambassador responded that the embassy
had already established a good relationship with him.
Security
--------------
3. (C) Moving directly to the subject of security, the PM
reviewed the GoH strategy of dealing with gang-violence.
Both he and President Preval, he stressed, felt a personal
responsibility to end gang violence and relieve the suffering
of the poor who lived under the rule of the gangs as soon as
possible. It had become clear to both of them that neither
the Haitian National Police (HNP) nor MINUSTAH had the
capacity to immediately control the problem. The HNP lacked
equipment, administration, and reliable manpower. MINUSTAH
had a problem with the language and its forces could not
communicate with the people whom they were trying to help.
For this reason, President Preval had offered a "dialogue"
to gang leaders to mitigate the violence, while at the same
time asking the HNP and MINUSTAH to formulate a plan to
pressure the gangs. The strategy had worked: the gangs were
scared. They had just turned in 30 weapons and another hand
over was pending. (Note: Alexis referenced a September 13
surrender of weapons in Cite Soleil. In exchange, the GoH
PORT AU PR 00001798 002 OF 003
agreed to accept into their newly established disarmament
program 55 gang members, who began their orientation at a
MINUSTAH base on September 18. The GoH has not, to date,
formally acknowledged this agreement initiating the new DDR
program. Post will report the details of this arrangement
septel. End Note.) The PM stressed that the GoH would not
compromise with gang leaders wanted for crimes. Evans Jeune
for example, had a warrant outstanding for his involvement in
the recent murder of the French honorary consul, and was not
eligible to enter the DDR program.
Elections
--------------
4. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's query, the Prime
Minister pointed out that the GoH had by decree established
December 3 as the date for the completion of parliamentary
and local/municipal elections. MINUSTAH had recommended
postponing elections until February 7 (ref B),because of
concerns regarding their ability to provide logistical and
security support in light of their re-deployments to
Port-au-Prince to deal with the gangs. Alexis did not,
however, believe that was the real reason SRSG Mulet
recommended delay, but rather because MINUSTAH favored
including constitutional referenda in the elections. The
GoH, Alexis declared, had still to consider the
recommendation and taken "no official position." CEP
President Mathurin had asked for an appointment to discuss
the matter immediately after the conclusion of his meeting
with the Ambassador. (Note: The Ambassador did greet
Mathurin and his chief of staff, Paul Duchetalier, exiting
the PM's office. Pol Specialist called Duchetalier the
following morning to obtain a read-out of their discussion
with the PM. Duchetalier stated that the PM had said the GoH
was firmly behind holding election on December 3. The CEP on
September 20 publicly reconfirmed its intention to hold to
the December 3. End Note.)
UNSC
--------------
5. (C) The Ambassador raised the upcoming vote in New York
for Security Council Membership, stressing the importance of
the vote to the USG as well as to the international community
as a whole. Haiti, she understood, would balance its
interests in receiving aid from Venezuela, but she emphasized
that the future of the Security Council warranted equally
serious consideration. The PM assured the Ambassador that
the GoH understood the U.S. position and appreciated previous
conversations on the matter with WHA Assistant Secretary
Shannon as well as with the Ambassador, but did not follow-up
the discussion.
Deportees
--------------
6. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the PM wished to
discuss the issue of criminal deportees from the U.S. to
Haiti. Alexis replied that he would like to arrange a
separate meeting to discuss the subject in detail. (Note:
The same day, Poloff concluded negotiations with the GoH to
ensure the arrival of the next scheduled flight of 25
deportees on September 25. As requested by the GoH, DHS has
arranged to have flights arrive at 1000, rather than the late
afternoon, as previously had been the case.)
Comment.
7. (C) Alexis continues to impress us with his command of a
broad agenda and businesslike approach. We notice that the
follow-up is not always as efficient. That is probably due
in part to the limits and demands imposed on Alexis by
President Preval and in part to the uneven capacity at his
disposal within his cabinet.
8. (C) Comment Continued. We are at a loss to explain
Alexis' comments to the Ambassador on elections dates and the
subsequent report and announcement from the CEP. The
Ambassador has meetings with CEP President Mathurin and
PORT AU PR 00001798 003 OF 003
Director General Jacques Bernard pending, and will seek to
clarify where elections preparations stand.
SANDERSON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CAR
DRL
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
TREASURY FOR JEFFREY LEVINE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2011
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNGA ASEC KCRM KJUS HA
SUBJECT: PM ON COOPERATION/SECURITY/ELECTIONS
REF: A. PAP 1668
B. PAP 1775
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons
1.4(b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary. Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis on
September 19 reviewed with the Ambassador recent developments
in the bilateral agenda. The Ambassador congratulated the PM
on the previous day's signing of the bilateral aid agreement
and pledged to coordinate our assistance with the GoH. The
PM summarized GoH policy regarding security, explaining that
President Preval had opened a dialogue with gang leaders when
he saw that MINUSTAH and the Haitian police (HNP) were unable
to immediately cope with the gangs. That policy had allowed
MINUSTAH time to implement a security strategy, and gang
members were now eager to join the disarmament program (DDR)
because they were afraid of the government. Alexis
acknowledged that MINUSTAH had recommended delaying the next
round of elections from December 3 to February 7, but
insisted that the government had taken "no official
position." (ref A) (The Provisional Electoral Commission
(CEP) announced on September 20, however, that they would
hold to the December date, after CEP President met with the
PM immediately after the Ambassador.) On the issue of
deportees, Alexis asked the Ambassador to dedicate a separate
meeting to the topic (ref B). The Ambassador highlighted our
ongoing security cooperation and complementary community
development projects, and assured the PM the embassy would
continue to coordinate closely with the GoH. The Ambassador
stressed the importance the USG attached to th upcoming vote
at the UN for Security Council mebership. Alexis, as usual,
demonstrated a comman of the issues, but we judge that
President Prevl's approach to governance may be inhibiting
Aleis' performance. End Summary.
Assistance Coopeation
--------------
2. (U) The Ambassador, accomanied by Polcouns (notetaker),
on September 19 me with the Prime Minister and his Chief of
Staff ntoine Dubois to review bilateral issues coveredduring her recent consultations in Washington. Th
Ambassador again congratulated the PM on ther joint signing
of the bilateral assistance agreement the previous day and
noted that she would sign the police assistance Letter of
Agreement the following day with the minister of justice.
The embassy would also focus efforts to recruit
Haitian-Americans able to provide expertise to the GoH. The
Ambassador re-emphasized the embassy's desire to coordinate
closely with the GoH to ensure the most effective impact of
our assistance programs, an issue that Alexis and President
Preval have separately raised in previous meetings. The PM
highlighted the role of Minister for Social Affairs Gerald
Germain as a point of contact for coordination, particularly
as DDR progresses. The Ambassador responded that the embassy
had already established a good relationship with him.
Security
--------------
3. (C) Moving directly to the subject of security, the PM
reviewed the GoH strategy of dealing with gang-violence.
Both he and President Preval, he stressed, felt a personal
responsibility to end gang violence and relieve the suffering
of the poor who lived under the rule of the gangs as soon as
possible. It had become clear to both of them that neither
the Haitian National Police (HNP) nor MINUSTAH had the
capacity to immediately control the problem. The HNP lacked
equipment, administration, and reliable manpower. MINUSTAH
had a problem with the language and its forces could not
communicate with the people whom they were trying to help.
For this reason, President Preval had offered a "dialogue"
to gang leaders to mitigate the violence, while at the same
time asking the HNP and MINUSTAH to formulate a plan to
pressure the gangs. The strategy had worked: the gangs were
scared. They had just turned in 30 weapons and another hand
over was pending. (Note: Alexis referenced a September 13
surrender of weapons in Cite Soleil. In exchange, the GoH
PORT AU PR 00001798 002 OF 003
agreed to accept into their newly established disarmament
program 55 gang members, who began their orientation at a
MINUSTAH base on September 18. The GoH has not, to date,
formally acknowledged this agreement initiating the new DDR
program. Post will report the details of this arrangement
septel. End Note.) The PM stressed that the GoH would not
compromise with gang leaders wanted for crimes. Evans Jeune
for example, had a warrant outstanding for his involvement in
the recent murder of the French honorary consul, and was not
eligible to enter the DDR program.
Elections
--------------
4. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's query, the Prime
Minister pointed out that the GoH had by decree established
December 3 as the date for the completion of parliamentary
and local/municipal elections. MINUSTAH had recommended
postponing elections until February 7 (ref B),because of
concerns regarding their ability to provide logistical and
security support in light of their re-deployments to
Port-au-Prince to deal with the gangs. Alexis did not,
however, believe that was the real reason SRSG Mulet
recommended delay, but rather because MINUSTAH favored
including constitutional referenda in the elections. The
GoH, Alexis declared, had still to consider the
recommendation and taken "no official position." CEP
President Mathurin had asked for an appointment to discuss
the matter immediately after the conclusion of his meeting
with the Ambassador. (Note: The Ambassador did greet
Mathurin and his chief of staff, Paul Duchetalier, exiting
the PM's office. Pol Specialist called Duchetalier the
following morning to obtain a read-out of their discussion
with the PM. Duchetalier stated that the PM had said the GoH
was firmly behind holding election on December 3. The CEP on
September 20 publicly reconfirmed its intention to hold to
the December 3. End Note.)
UNSC
--------------
5. (C) The Ambassador raised the upcoming vote in New York
for Security Council Membership, stressing the importance of
the vote to the USG as well as to the international community
as a whole. Haiti, she understood, would balance its
interests in receiving aid from Venezuela, but she emphasized
that the future of the Security Council warranted equally
serious consideration. The PM assured the Ambassador that
the GoH understood the U.S. position and appreciated previous
conversations on the matter with WHA Assistant Secretary
Shannon as well as with the Ambassador, but did not follow-up
the discussion.
Deportees
--------------
6. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the PM wished to
discuss the issue of criminal deportees from the U.S. to
Haiti. Alexis replied that he would like to arrange a
separate meeting to discuss the subject in detail. (Note:
The same day, Poloff concluded negotiations with the GoH to
ensure the arrival of the next scheduled flight of 25
deportees on September 25. As requested by the GoH, DHS has
arranged to have flights arrive at 1000, rather than the late
afternoon, as previously had been the case.)
Comment.
7. (C) Alexis continues to impress us with his command of a
broad agenda and businesslike approach. We notice that the
follow-up is not always as efficient. That is probably due
in part to the limits and demands imposed on Alexis by
President Preval and in part to the uneven capacity at his
disposal within his cabinet.
8. (C) Comment Continued. We are at a loss to explain
Alexis' comments to the Ambassador on elections dates and the
subsequent report and announcement from the CEP. The
Ambassador has meetings with CEP President Mathurin and
PORT AU PR 00001798 003 OF 003
Director General Jacques Bernard pending, and will seek to
clarify where elections preparations stand.
SANDERSON