MINUSTAH CLOSES IN ON CITE SOLEIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PORT AU PRINCE 001755 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CAR DRL S/CRS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) TREASURY FOR JEFFREY LEVINE E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR ASEC KCRM KJUS HA SUBJECT: MINUSTAH CLOSES IN ON CITE SOLEIL REF: A. PAP 1622 ¶B. PAP 1481 ¶C. PAP 832 Classified By: Classified by Deputy Chief of Mission Thomas C. Tighe fo r reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Under continued prodding from President Preval (ref A),MINUSTAH and the HNP over the past week have taken significant steps to secure the access routes areas immediately adjacent to Cite Soleil and the major north-south artery within the district, route 9. According to MINUSTAH's intelligence department, the Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC),Cite Soleil's four principal gang leaders continue to act in concert and are coordinating plans to resist the advance of MINUSTAH and the HNP. JMAC estimates that the gangs have roughly 300 active members and roughly 150-200 long barrel/high caliber weapons at their disposal. Disarmament Committee President Alix Fils-Aime on September 14, two days after his formal installation, outlined for the Ambassador a strategy of both gang disarmament and broader efforts to promote development and social peace. Fils-Aime stated that individuals with outstanding warrants against them, including General "Bibi," would not be eligible to participate. (At roughly the same time as Fils-Aime's meeting with the Ambassador, MINUSTAH troops transferred Bibi into the custody of the HNP.) Presidential representative "Samba Boukman," a Lavalas activist who has replaced Rene Momplaisir as Preval's liaison with "popular organizations" joins Fils-Aime on the disarmament committee. GoH and MINUSTAH officials insist that Preval is committed to break the power of the gangs, and recent developments toward restoring security in Cite Soleil are the most promising since MINUSTAH arrived in June 2004. Though MINUSTAH and the GoH must prove they can sustain this level of effort, MINUSTAH leadership is finally coordinating within its own mission and with the GoH in support of a resolute policy formulated under President Preval's direction. End Summary. MINUSTAH Closes In -------------- ¶2. (SBU) SRSG Edmond Mulet on September 11 briefed Core Group Ambassadors on the most recent developments to secure the areas immediately adjacent to Cite Soleil in preparation for an effort to gain control of Cite Soleil itself. MINUSTAH continued to redeploy troops from the provinces to Port-au-Prince. Beginning on September 10, MINUSTAH was transferring 300-400 Chilean and Uruguayan troops to concentrate on securing route national 1, demarcating the eastern border of Cite Soleil. These troops will have an additional 30 armored personnel carriers and other vehicles at their disposal. Brazilian troops had expanded their patrols and checkpoints to include the periphery of the northern Cite Soleil gang strongholds of Druillard and Bois Neuf and increased patrols along route 9, the major road bisecting Cite Soleil from north to south immediately west of route national 1. Brazilian troops had also established an important stronghold (an abandoned hotel) in the Solino neighborhood of Cite Militaire, immediately adjacent to an important access route into Cite Soleil. MINUSTAH and the HNP had now established a total of 32 checkpoints, 22 of which the HNP operated independently. A MINUSTAH political official informed emboffs that she had toured route national 1 with Mulet on September 12, and that he had been ecstatic to see the entire stretch bordering Cite Soleil (roughly 1 km),tightly controlled by a variety of MINUSTAH troops, police, and HNP. Gang Intel -------------- ¶3. (C) JMAC Director Michael Center (strictly protect) on September 7 briefed Polcouns on MINUSTAH's intelligence assessment of the situation in Cite Soleil Center related that the four principal gang leaders in the area, Evans Jeune, Amaral Duclonet, William "Ti Blan" Baptiste, and "Beloney" continued to coordinate their activities, including kidnappings outside of Cite Soleil, and prepare for a common PORT AU PR 00001755 002 OF 004 defense of their turf. He estimated that the four controlled a total of roughly 300 gang members who would actively engage MINUSTAH and the HNP. Gang leaders have large numbers of pistols, some of which they rent to lower-level criminals, but Center estimated that they have only 150-200 long barrel shot guns and semi- or fully-automatic weapons at their disposal. Nevertheless, he cautioned, the gang leaders exercised efficient command and control and maximized the force of their arms. Leaders "issued" guns to various gang members on any given day accordingto spcific needs. They do not keep arms caches,but rather keep arms pre-positioned in strategicpositions throughout their neighborhoods in orde to respond to incursions. Local residents dared ot touch these weapons or otherwise interfere. ¶4. (SBU) Gangs had recently incrased construction of "tank traps" or other traffic obstacles to impede MINUSTAH and HNP vehicles, and were also fortifying defensive positions. Gang leaders have organized wider networks of hangers-on, including women and children, to act as spotters and look-outs. Among other resources, gangs use DVD's such as "Black Hawk Down" as manuals to train their followers. Center allowed that increased pressure from MINUSTAH around Cite Soleil had had some impact on gang members, but that signals were mixed. Evans lieutenant "Ti Henri" recently turned himself in (without handing over any weapons) to the Brazilian contingent and offered up some limited information about gang organization. MINUSTAH turned him over the to the GoH, who released him shortly afterward. Within days, Ti Henri had reportedly made up with Evans and participated in kidnappings and attacks on MINUSTAH troops. ¶5. (C) MINUSTAH established the JMAC roughly one year ago to provide intelligence in support of the mission's mandate. Staffed by personnel from various MINUSTAH departments, the JMAC is modeled roughly on the lines of an U.S. military's J-2, with additional police and civilian personnel. JMAC operates a network of paid informants, who have provided extensive and detailed information regarding the specific gang members. Center indicated that in order to protect its sources, the JMAC did not disseminate information unless it supported a specific operation. Thus, he had not yet utilized most of the information he had gathered about specific gang leaders. Additionally, the JMAC seeks to gather information to use in legal criminal cases, not only military operations. Shortly after Polcoun's meeting with center, two political activists from Cite Soleil sought out contact with the Embassy. In a meeting with Polcouns, they corroborated much of Center's conclusions regarding the organization of the gangs. The activists stressed that the majority of the population would support government moves to re-establish law and order and disarm the gangs. DDR President Goes to Work -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Prime Minister Alexis on September 11 formerly installed the GoH's re-constituted disarmament committee -- the existence of a disarmament committee under the former interim government was news to emboffs and Haitian observers -- under Committee President Alix Fils-Aime. The committee comprises four other officials from the ministries of interior, justice, social affairs, and women's affairs, the newly installed inspector general of the HNP (number two in the organization) Fritz Jean, and the president's representative, musician and activist Jean-Baptiste Jean Philippe, aka "Samba Boukman." Fils-Aime on September 14 told the Ambassador during a courtesy call that he was pleased with the qualifications of his committee colleagues and had already assigned them tasks. He stressed that participation in DDR would be limited to those who were not currently wanted by the police. Fils-Aime had asked Port-au-Prince's chief prosecutor Claudy Gassant to provide him a list of all outstanding warrants. Thus General Bibi, a gang leader from the Solino neighborhood of Cite Militaire who had several warrants against him outstanding, was not eligible to enter the program. Bibi, whom Fils-Aime described as wanted for kidnapping and rape, among other charges, on September 5 unexpectedly announced his entrance PORT AU PR 00001755 003 OF 004 into the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program and turned himself along with two cohorts to MINUSTAH troops while surrendering small arms. (Note: According to press reports, at roughly the same time as the Ambassador's meeting with Fils-Aime MINUSTAH turned Bibi over to the HNP, and Gassant planned to arraign him on September ¶15. Fils-Aime noted that the associates who had accompanied Bibi' did not have warrants pending, and thus could formally enter the DDR program if they still wished. End Note). ¶7. (SBU) Fils-Aime would not require the surrender of specific classes or numbers of weapons per individual as a condition of participation in the program. He expected that groups of participants would come in conjunction with the surrender of "lots" (groups) of weapons. MINUSTAH experts had told him that in any case that DDR programs did not generally recapture more than 25% of illegal weapons. His goal was to create "momentum" for social peace by publicizing the surrender of weapons from various groups from throughout the country. Promisingly, several groups from different departments, including Guy Philipe in the South, had already contacted him. ¶8. (SBU) Fils-Aime stressed that his program encompassed broader goals than weapons collection and job training. He hopes to coordinate the integration of development projects immediately into neighborhoods where people had joined the DDR program. In line with MINUSTAH's broader goals to reach-out to community residents on the margins of gang activity (ref B),he wants the women's and youth's ministries to cooperate in implementing those projects. He plans to coordinate with the media and the ministry of information to publicize progress and promote a general atmosphere of social peace. He also wants to recruit civil society organizations to help in these efforts to reduce the divide between the social classes. The Ambassador expressed full support for these goals and suggested that Fils-Aime consider approaching professional unions, such as the doctor's association, to help provide services in disarmed neighborhoods. The Ambassador also highlighted work that the USAID mission had carried out though its partners, principally the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and pledged to provide Fils-Aime a briefing on IOM activities and to coordinate future efforts. Who is Samba Boukman? -------------- ¶9. (C) President Preval's appointment of Samba Boukman to the disarmament committee elicited protests from anti-Lavalas quarters. Per Ref C, Boukman is a self-described Lavalas activist from the Port-au-Prince district of Bel-Aire (a poor but established neighborhood immediately north of the national palace) who played an active role in building support for Preval during the presidential campaign. Boukman has reportedly replaced Rene Momplaisir within Preval's inner circle as Preval's liaison to "popular organizations" (referring to grass roots organiztions in the slum, nomenclature originally coine by Aristide). (Note: President Preval, by allaccounts, fired Rene Momplaisir as his liaison t Cite Soleil in the wake of the failure of gang members to accommodate his demands that they disarm. The Cite Soleil activists cited in para 5 related to Polcouns that as a result of the failure of the gang leaders and Preval to reach an agreement, Momplaisir and his associate Jean Joseph Joel are also unable to return to Cite Soleil End Note.) Boukman actively cooperated with MINUSTAH in early 2006 in removing gang members, led by "General Toutou" from Bel-Aire. Lavalas opponents accused Boukman of organizing violent pro-Aristide demonstrations in the summer of 2004, particularly during the period of the so-called "operation Baghdad" instability in Port-au-Prince in September 2004. Post believes those charges are unfounded. In a conversation with Polcouns in March, Boukman stressed the importance of establishing order in poor neighborhoods and supporting President Preval's development plans. He added that he believed President Aristide's return to Haiti would generate instability, and that he and other moderate FL activists were quietly working against his return. PORT AU PR 00001755 004 OF 004 Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) It appears we are finally beginning to see concrete results from the intense round of consultations Preval initiated with MINUSTAH and the demands he has made on MINUSTAH leaders to intensify their efforts to combat insecurity. Both MINUSTAH and the GOH must demonstrate that they can not only sustain the current level troops and police in the streets, but implement a final phase to break the power of the gang leaders and follow up on their ambitious policy goals, notably implementation of DDR and maintenance of a permanent police presence in Cite Soleil and the surrounding neighborhoods. Fils-Aime is a breath of fresh air, exhibiting an impressive combination of strategic vision and management sense. We will watch to see if he is able to maintain his current level of energy as he runs up against the lack of capacity within the GoH. SRSG Mulet informed the Core Group that MINUSTAH and the GoH would formally initiate the DDR program on September 24, thus establishing the first performance indicator for the revived DDR program. SANDERSON