MINUSTAH CLOSES IN ON CITE SOLEIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PORT AU PRINCE 001755

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR
DRL
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
TREASURY FOR JEFFREY LEVINE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR ASEC KCRM KJUS HA
SUBJECT: MINUSTAH CLOSES IN ON CITE SOLEIL

REF: A. PAP 1622

B. PAP 1481

C. PAP 832

Classified By: Classified by Deputy Chief of Mission Thomas C. Tighe fo
r reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Under continued prodding from President
Preval (ref A),MINUSTAH and the HNP over the past week have
taken significant steps to secure the access routes areas
immediately adjacent to Cite Soleil and the major north-south
artery within the district, route 9. According to MINUSTAH's
intelligence department, the Joint Mission Analysis Center
(JMAC),Cite Soleil's four principal gang leaders continue to
act in concert and are coordinating plans to resist the
advance of MINUSTAH and the HNP. JMAC estimates that the
gangs have roughly 300 active members and roughly 150-200
long barrel/high caliber weapons at their disposal.
Disarmament Committee President Alix Fils-Aime on September
14, two days after his formal installation, outlined for the
Ambassador a strategy of both gang disarmament and broader
efforts to promote development and social peace. Fils-Aime
stated that individuals with outstanding warrants against
them, including General "Bibi," would not be eligible to
participate. (At roughly the same time as Fils-Aime's
meeting with the Ambassador, MINUSTAH troops transferred Bibi
into the custody of the HNP.) Presidential representative
"Samba Boukman," a Lavalas activist who has replaced Rene
Momplaisir as Preval's liaison with "popular organizations"
joins Fils-Aime on the disarmament committee. GoH and
MINUSTAH officials insist that Preval is committed to break
the power of the gangs, and recent developments toward
restoring security in Cite Soleil are the most promising
since MINUSTAH arrived in June 2004. Though MINUSTAH and the
GoH must prove they can sustain this level of effort,
MINUSTAH leadership is finally coordinating within its own
mission and with the GoH in support of a resolute policy
formulated under President Preval's direction. End Summary.

MINUSTAH Closes In
--------------


2. (SBU) SRSG Edmond Mulet on September 11 briefed Core
Group Ambassadors on the most recent developments to secure
the areas immediately adjacent to Cite Soleil in preparation
for an effort to gain control of Cite Soleil itself.
MINUSTAH continued to redeploy troops from the provinces to
Port-au-Prince. Beginning on September 10, MINUSTAH was
transferring 300-400 Chilean and Uruguayan troops to
concentrate on securing route national 1, demarcating the
eastern border of Cite Soleil. These troops will have an
additional 30 armored personnel carriers and other vehicles
at their disposal. Brazilian troops had expanded their
patrols and checkpoints to include the periphery of the
northern Cite Soleil gang strongholds of Druillard and Bois
Neuf and increased patrols along route 9, the major road
bisecting Cite Soleil from north to south immediately west of
route national 1. Brazilian troops had also established an
important stronghold (an abandoned hotel) in the Solino
neighborhood of Cite Militaire, immediately adjacent to an
important access route into Cite Soleil. MINUSTAH and the
HNP had now established a total of 32 checkpoints, 22 of
which the HNP operated independently. A MINUSTAH political
official informed emboffs that she had toured route national
1 with Mulet on September 12, and that he had been ecstatic
to see the entire stretch bordering Cite Soleil (roughly 1
km),tightly controlled by a variety of MINUSTAH troops,
police, and HNP.

Gang Intel
--------------


3. (C) JMAC Director Michael Center (strictly protect) on
September 7 briefed Polcouns on MINUSTAH's intelligence
assessment of the situation in Cite Soleil Center related
that the four principal gang leaders in the area, Evans
Jeune, Amaral Duclonet, William "Ti Blan" Baptiste, and
"Beloney" continued to coordinate their activities, including
kidnappings outside of Cite Soleil, and prepare for a common

PORT AU PR 00001755 002 OF 004


defense of their turf. He estimated that the four controlled
a total of roughly 300 gang members who would actively engage
MINUSTAH and the HNP. Gang leaders have large numbers of
pistols, some of which they rent to lower-level criminals,
but Center estimated that they have only 150-200 long barrel
shot guns and semi- or fully-automatic weapons at their
disposal. Nevertheless, he cautioned, the gang leaders
exercised efficient command and control and maximized the
force of their arms. Leaders "issued" guns to various gang
members on any given day accordingto spcific needs. They
do not keep arms caches,but rather keep arms pre-positioned
in strategicpositions throughout their neighborhoods in
orde to respond to incursions. Local residents dared ot
touch these weapons or otherwise interfere.

4. (SBU) Gangs had recently incrased construction of "tank
traps" or other traffic obstacles to impede MINUSTAH and HNP
vehicles, and were also fortifying defensive positions. Gang
leaders have organized wider networks of hangers-on,
including women and children, to act as spotters and
look-outs. Among other resources, gangs use DVD's such as
"Black Hawk Down" as manuals to train their followers.
Center allowed that increased pressure from MINUSTAH around
Cite Soleil had had some impact on gang members, but that
signals were mixed. Evans lieutenant "Ti Henri" recently
turned himself in (without handing over any weapons) to the
Brazilian contingent and offered up some limited information
about gang organization. MINUSTAH turned him over the to the
GoH, who released him shortly afterward. Within days, Ti
Henri had reportedly made up with Evans and participated in
kidnappings and attacks on MINUSTAH troops.


5. (C) MINUSTAH established the JMAC roughly one year ago to
provide intelligence in support of the mission's mandate.
Staffed by personnel from various MINUSTAH departments, the
JMAC is modeled roughly on the lines of an U.S. military's
J-2, with additional police and civilian personnel. JMAC
operates a network of paid informants, who have provided
extensive and detailed information regarding the specific
gang members. Center indicated that in order to protect its
sources, the JMAC did not disseminate information unless it
supported a specific operation. Thus, he had not yet
utilized most of the information he had gathered about
specific gang leaders. Additionally, the JMAC seeks to
gather information to use in legal criminal cases, not only
military operations. Shortly after Polcoun's meeting with
center, two political activists from Cite Soleil sought out
contact with the Embassy. In a meeting with Polcouns, they
corroborated much of Center's conclusions regarding the
organization of the gangs. The activists stressed that the
majority of the population would support government moves to
re-establish law and order and disarm the gangs.

DDR President Goes to Work
--------------


6. (SBU) Prime Minister Alexis on September 11 formerly
installed the GoH's re-constituted disarmament committee --
the existence of a disarmament committee under the former
interim government was news to emboffs and Haitian observers
-- under Committee President Alix Fils-Aime. The committee
comprises four other officials from the ministries of
interior, justice, social affairs, and women's affairs, the
newly installed inspector general of the HNP (number two in
the organization) Fritz Jean, and the president's
representative, musician and activist Jean-Baptiste Jean
Philippe, aka "Samba Boukman." Fils-Aime on September 14
told the Ambassador during a courtesy call that he was
pleased with the qualifications of his committee colleagues
and had already assigned them tasks. He stressed that
participation in DDR would be limited to those who were not
currently wanted by the police. Fils-Aime had asked
Port-au-Prince's chief prosecutor Claudy Gassant to provide
him a list of all outstanding warrants. Thus General Bibi, a
gang leader from the Solino neighborhood of Cite Militaire
who had several warrants against him outstanding, was not
eligible to enter the program. Bibi, whom Fils-Aime
described as wanted for kidnapping and rape, among other
charges, on September 5 unexpectedly announced his entrance

PORT AU PR 00001755 003 OF 004


into the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
(DDR) program and turned himself along with two cohorts to
MINUSTAH troops while surrendering small arms. (Note:
According to press reports, at roughly the same time as the
Ambassador's meeting with Fils-Aime MINUSTAH turned Bibi over
to the HNP, and Gassant planned to arraign him on September

15. Fils-Aime noted that the associates who had accompanied
Bibi' did not have warrants pending, and thus could formally
enter the DDR program if they still wished. End Note).


7. (SBU) Fils-Aime would not require the surrender of
specific classes or numbers of weapons per individual as a
condition of participation in the program. He expected that
groups of participants would come in conjunction with the
surrender of "lots" (groups) of weapons. MINUSTAH experts
had told him that in any case that DDR programs did not
generally recapture more than 25% of illegal weapons. His
goal was to create "momentum" for social peace by publicizing
the surrender of weapons from various groups from throughout
the country. Promisingly, several groups from different
departments, including Guy Philipe in the South, had already
contacted him.


8. (SBU) Fils-Aime stressed that his program encompassed
broader goals than weapons collection and job training. He
hopes to coordinate the integration of development projects
immediately into neighborhoods where people had joined the
DDR program. In line with MINUSTAH's broader goals to
reach-out to community residents on the margins of gang
activity (ref B),he wants the women's and youth's ministries
to cooperate in implementing those projects. He plans to
coordinate with the media and the ministry of information to
publicize progress and promote a general atmosphere of social
peace. He also wants to recruit civil society organizations
to help in these efforts to reduce the divide between the
social classes. The Ambassador expressed full support for
these goals and suggested that Fils-Aime consider approaching
professional unions, such as the doctor's association, to
help provide services in disarmed neighborhoods. The
Ambassador also highlighted work that the USAID mission had
carried out though its partners, principally the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) and pledged to
provide Fils-Aime a briefing on IOM activities and to
coordinate future efforts.

Who is Samba Boukman?
--------------


9. (C) President Preval's appointment of Samba Boukman to
the disarmament committee elicited protests from anti-Lavalas
quarters. Per Ref C, Boukman is a self-described Lavalas
activist from the Port-au-Prince district of Bel-Aire (a poor
but established neighborhood immediately north of the
national palace) who played an active role in building
support for Preval during the presidential campaign.
Boukman has reportedly replaced Rene Momplaisir within
Preval's inner circle as Preval's liaison to "popular
organizations" (referring to grass roots organiztions in the
slum, nomenclature originally coine by Aristide). (Note:
President Preval, by allaccounts, fired Rene Momplaisir as
his liaison t Cite Soleil in the wake of the failure of gang
members to accommodate his demands that they disarm. The
Cite Soleil activists cited in para 5 related to Polcouns
that as a result of the failure of the gang leaders and
Preval to reach an agreement, Momplaisir and his associate
Jean Joseph Joel are also unable to return to Cite Soleil
End Note.) Boukman actively cooperated with MINUSTAH in
early 2006 in removing gang members, led by "General Toutou"
from Bel-Aire. Lavalas opponents accused Boukman of
organizing violent pro-Aristide demonstrations in the summer
of 2004, particularly during the period of the so-called
"operation Baghdad" instability in Port-au-Prince in
September 2004. Post believes those charges are unfounded.
In a conversation with Polcouns in March, Boukman stressed
the importance of establishing order in poor neighborhoods
and supporting President Preval's development plans. He
added that he believed President Aristide's return to Haiti
would generate instability, and that he and other moderate FL
activists were quietly working against his return.

PORT AU PR 00001755 004 OF 004



Comment
--------------


10. (C) It appears we are finally beginning to see concrete
results from the intense round of consultations Preval
initiated with MINUSTAH and the demands he has made on
MINUSTAH leaders to intensify their efforts to combat
insecurity. Both MINUSTAH and the GOH must demonstrate that
they can not only sustain the current level troops and police
in the streets, but implement a final phase to break the
power of the gang leaders and follow up on their ambitious
policy goals, notably implementation of DDR and maintenance
of a permanent police presence in Cite Soleil and the
surrounding neighborhoods. Fils-Aime is a breath of fresh
air, exhibiting an impressive combination of strategic vision
and management sense. We will watch to see if he is able to
maintain his current level of energy as he runs up against
the lack of capacity within the GoH. SRSG Mulet informed the
Core Group that MINUSTAH and the GoH would formally initiate
the DDR program on September 24, thus establishing the first
performance indicator for the revived DDR program.

SANDERSON