PREVAL REVIVES DDR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 001543 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CAR DRL S/CRS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) TREASURY FOR JEFFREY LEVINE E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2011 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR ASEC KCRM HA SUBJECT: PREVAL REVIVES DDR REF: PAUP 1481 Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary. President Preval has asked MINUSTAH to develop and prepare to implement a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration ((DDR) plan to serve as the carrot in his "carrot and stick" policy to combat Port-au-Prince's armed gangs (reftel). MINUSTAH's DDR department is preparing a program to offer an option of vocational education or micro-enterprise grants for up to 1,000 participants. MINUSTAH's police (UNPol) are prepared to manage weapons collections. DDR staff stress that the GoH must make key policy determinations, most importantly the eligibility requirements for the participants. The government has yet to settle its policy: presidential advisor Alix "Boulon Fils-Aime has agreed "in principle" to become president of a national disarmament committee, but continues to press for and closely monitor MINUSTAH progress in combating gang activity and pacifying neighborhoods in the Cite Militaire district, adjacent to the gang strongholds in Cite Soleil. DDR staff over the past year had worked to develop a broader strategy focused on violence suppression and community development after the failure of its traditional approach of weapons for benefits exchange failed under the interim government. MINUSTAH leadership, however, feels obliged to support Preval's policy and is encouraged that that he is committed to a more aggressive security posture. Post shares the reservations regarding a re-initiation of a weapons exchange, but notes positive developments since the last attempts to implement DDR; notably, the direct involvement of President Preval and his commitment to the permanent presence of security forces in gang-controlled areas, whether the gangs agree to DDR or not. The Carrot -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In response to a request made by President Preval to MINUSTAH leaders on Saturday, August 5, DDR staff at MINUSTAH are scrambling to finish a plan that will offer participants the option of receiving vocational education or a grant and training to operate a small business. Preval set a target implementation date of September 4, and DDR staff are attempting to meet that deadline, but they doubt that MINUSTAH and the GoH will have finalized all aspects of the program by that time. ¶3. (SBU) DDR staffer Eric Calpas informed Polcouns on August 16 that the DDR section would divert nearly all of its budget, roughly $3.6 million for FY07, to the new program. The department would assign all staff, totaling 56 countrywide, to the implementation of the program. Those in the field (rughly half) were in the process of re-locating toPort-au-Prince. Calpas planned to accommodate up o 1,000 participants, who would the choice of reeiving vocational education in one of seven exising Port-au-Prince vocational schools or a grantand ongoing training to set up a micro-enterprise (He confided that he had approached business laders about the possibility of employing the paricipants, but encountered "a lot of nervousness" o their part.) MINUSTAH would pay tuition directy to the schools and offer participants a subsistence allowance (yet to be determined) while in school. Calpas estimated that grants, training, and subsistence to those entering micro-enterprises would total roughly $3,000 per person over 18 months. The DDR department had already made arrangements with the vocational schools and had identified local NGOs to support the micro-enterprise initiative. ¶4. (SBU) Calpas stressed that UNPol would take responsibility for collecting and enforcing discipline, removing participants if they failed to uphold their commitment. The GoH would settle critical policy questions, most importantly the eligibility standards for individuals and the numbers and types of weapons required in exchange for benefits. Calpas admitted that the program would attract not only gang members, but a large number of Haitians across the PORT AU PR 00001543 002 OF 003 spectrum of the poorer classes. The GoH, he underlined, would have sort out the issue of fairness. Preval had said that the GoH would establish a national disarmament committee to liaise with MINUSTAH and coordinate among the ministries, and GoH sources had indicated that presidential advisor Alix "Boulon" Fils-Aime would become the committee's president, but MINUSTAH had yet to establish formal contact with Fils-Aime. (Note: Fils-Aime confirmed to Polcouns on August 17 on the phone that he had "agreed in principle" to become the president of the disarmament committee, but wanted specific assurances, along with official publication, of his responsibilities before formally accepting the position. End Note.) Out with the New, In with the Old -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Preval's request has forced the DDR department to suspend its efforts to move toward broader anti-gang and community development initiatives and back toward a weapons exchange program. DDR chief Desmond Molloy had over the past twelve months reshaped his department's workplan to focus on the broader goals he labeled "violence suppression" and "community security." He would have preferred, he admitted to Polcouns several weeks ago, to have changed officially the name of his department and its programs to distance them from previous failures, but UN bureaucracy made that impossible. (Note: Molloy in late July made the rounds of the bilateral missions, including a call on the Ambassador, to emphasize his department's new approach and re-establish support within the international community. End Note.) Calpas (acting for Molloy while he is on leave) told Polcouns during their August 16 conversation that the DDR department hoped to preserve the new approach and still implement broader programs they had begun to develop, but were now dependent on donor contributions since they had redirected their own budget to respond to Preval. The Stick -------------- ¶6. (C) Immediately following the discussion with Calpas, UNPol Commissioner Graham Muir confirmed to Polcouns that UNPol was prepared to take an active role in the projected DDR program. Equally important, at the urging of Preval, UNPol was now fully integrated in the intensified MINUSTAH effort to pacify the Cite Militaire, immediately to the east of Cite Soleil on the other side of route national 1, and bordered on the other side by the airport road, Port-au-Prince's most critical business artery. According to Muir, Preval had made clear that he wanted MINUSTAH to have ultimately completely secured Cite Militaire all along route national 1 to decisively demonstrate to the gangs in Cite Soleil that there was no way out of their neighborhoods and disarmament was their only option. Preval called meetings with senior MINUSTAH leadership to go over tactical plans on almost a daily basis -- Preval had called MINUSTAH leaders and senior Haitian security personnel to another meeting at the palace that evening. ¶7. (C) Apart from seeking pacification of the area around Cite Soleil, Preval was pushing MINUSTAH to devise special operation tactics to eliminate the worst gang leaders without provoking wider fire fights or inflicting collateral damage. Muir reported that MINUSTAH commanders were often required to remind Preval of the limits of their capabilities. (In a separate earlier conversation with a MINUSTAH political department official, she related that Preval had asked why MINUSTAH could not track the gang leaders from vans with surveillance devices from the periphery of Cite Soleil, "like you see in the movies.") ¶8. (C) As a result of Preval's urging, UNPol and the HNP had established static checkpoints and, with MINUSTAH military forces, patrolled along airport and road and route national ¶1. Additionally, Senegalese, Chinese, and Nigerian Formed Police Units (FPUs) had followed behind MINUSTAH troops and established permanent posts in Cite Militaire. Muir singled out the Senegalese in particular, who "spoke French, are PORT AU PR 00001543 003 OF 003 comfortable with the population, only fire when fired on, and fire back at the right people." MINUSTAH and UNPol were taking control of Cite Militaire block by block with the support of the population. The final steps in the process were to tighten the noose around resident gang leaders William Baptiste, "Ti Blanc," and "Beloney." If MINUSTAH captured or killed either of them in the process, it would serve as a warning to the remaining gang leaders in Cite Soleil. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Though the re-initiation of a weapons exchange program as a central element of anti-gang policy is cause for concern, all other indications are that Preval, after a period of coming to grips with the issue, is committed to decisive action to deal with the gang problem. Moreover, for the first time since the establishment of the MINUSTAH mission in 2004, Preval's initiative has spurred its military, police, and civil elements to act in an integrated fashion in lockstep support of government policy. Success, however, is not guaranteed. The government must still take difficult policy decisions regarding eligibility for the program and demonstrate a longer-term ability to maintain focus and cabinet discipline to carry through the carrot and stick policy. Fils-Aime, the disarmament czar apparent, is capable and a hard worker, but he is not yet up to speed on MINUSTAH plans and has not been involved in any of the discussions between the Preval government and the gang leaders. Ultimately, the success of this iteration of DDR will likely not be measured by the number of weapons collected, but by the ability of MINUSTAH and the GoH to maintain a permanent law-enforcement presence in areas currently controlled by the gangs. SANDERSON