NEW TRUCE QUELLS GANG VIOLENCE - FOR NOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 001342 SIPDIS SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA MARKINGS AND QUOTE MARKINGS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016 TAGS: PINS ASEC PGOV HA SUBJECT: NEW TRUCE QUELLS GANG VIOLENCE - FOR NOW Classified By: (U) Classified by Amb. Janet A. Sanderson for reason 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: MINUSTAH's top gang expert reports that on July 21 Cite Soleil's most powerful gang leader, Evens Jeune, re-imposed a truce to end the recent violence and kidnappings that have Port-au-Prince. MINUSTAH says there have been no hostile actions reported in the Airport Road area bordering Cite Soleil since late morning July 21. Jeune,s motives in easing and then re-imposing the truce are unclear, but his actions may be intended to underscore his power both to the government and to other gang leaders. While any reduction in the recent upsurge in violence is welcome, it is nonetheless worrying that Jeune apparently has the ability to turn the pressure up or down at will. End summary. ¶2. (C) ADCM met late July 22 with Lizbeth Cullity, Deputy Chief of MINUSTAH's Political Affairs Section and its principal gang expert. Cullity has lived in Haiti since the 1980s and for more than ten years headed the UN Human Rights Office in Port-au-Prince. She provided the following update on current gang developments. Evens Jeune Re-imposes Truce -------------- ¶3. (C) Cite Soleil gang leader Evens Jeune met with other gangsters July 21 to insist on an end to the recent upsurge in violence. Jeune, also known as "Ti Couto" (little knife) for his penchant for dismembering his victims, is the most powerful gang leader in the area. He threatened to kill any of the other gangsters who disobeyed his order. ¶4. (C) The recent uptick in violence - especially lucrative kidnappings - was largely due to financial pressures on lower- and mid-level gang members. Jeune and a few other senior leaders benefit from regular pay-offs from businessmen who want to continue operations in industrial areas near Cite Soleil, and from other income streams, such as market taxes. But other gang members, who are dependent on revenues from kidnapping and petty crime, suffered financially during the gang truce that brought relative peace to Port-au-Prince following Preval's election. (Note: A prominent businessman who operates a factory on Airport Road offered a similar economic analysis of the recent violence. End note.) ¶5. (C) Lower-level gang members also grew impatient with empty overtures from the GOH, which produced no concrete results. A series of Preval emissaries - including Jean-Jacques Joel, Rene Momplaisir, and Rene Civil - were in contact with the gang leaders. But the gang members saw no progress in addressing their demands, notably for some form of amnesty. Gang members particularly distrust Preval confidant Bob Manuel, whom they recall as an aggressive Minister of State for Public Safety under whose tenure some 18 gang leaders were killed. ¶6. (C) About a month ago, Jeune realized that pressure was mounting from mid-level gangsters. He took several steps to reassert his authority. He personally oversaw the capture, torture, and execution of two young Haitian National Police recruits who mistakenly entered Cite Soleil. When gang leader "Amiral" seized a generator from rival "Blade," Jeune insisted it be returned and showed no respect to Amiral. Jeune authorized gang leader "Ti Blan" to challenge MINUSTAH directly, including by threatening that a MINUSTAH presence would not be tolerated in the Pele or Cite Militaire neighborhoods adjacent to Cite Soleil. Finally, Jeune "declared war" and permitted the gang members to begin the violence we have witnessed in the past several weeks. ¶7. (C) Comment: Jeune's reasons for stopping the violence July 21 are less clear. One possibility is that, after several weeks of kidnapping, the lower-level gang members have replenished their coffers and are content to stand down. Another is that he wanted to send a signal both to other gang leaders and to the GOH that he has the capability to unleash or restrain the gangs as he chooses. A third is that he was somehow induced by Preval's intermediaries to call the truce. GOH threats of action against the gangs may have been a contributing factor in his decision, but probably were not decisive in view of limited MINUSTAH and HNP capability. End Comment. Background on Evens Jeune -------------- PORT AU PR 00001342 002 OF 002 ¶8. (C) According to Cullity, Jeune is a young man, perhaps in his early twenties. He is "just a punk" who rose to become the number two and "hatchet man" (literally) for gang leader "Labanier". Labanier was closely affiliated with Lavalas, but then learned in 2002 that Aristide wanted him killed. Labanier shopped around for a country to give him political asylum in exchange for telling what he knew about Aristide,s nefarious activities. Eventually, businessman Andy Apaid, who had been financing the gang, arranged for Labanier to leave. Before he could get out, however, Jeune killed him and assumed control of the gang. Unlike Labanier, Jeune is not political. He is openly dismissive of Lavalasien efforts to manipulate the gang now. Jeune's power in Cite Soleil stems not merely from his ruthlessness, but also from his "Boston" gang's control of the key access roads into Cite Soleil, which are significant both strategically and financially. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Cullity is a recognized expert on the Cite Soleil gangs and we have a high degree of confidence in her information. Jeune's motives for re-imposing the post-election truce on July 21 remain unclear, but indeed there has been a return to calm since then. While we're happy to see the end of - or at least a pause in - the recent upsurge in violence, it is also deeply worrying that Jeune appears to have the ability to turn the pressure on or off at will. Moreover, when lower-level gang members run out of the proceeds of their latest kidnappings, the cycle of violence seems likely to begin again. SANDERSON