S E C R E T PORT AU PRINCE 000130

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD
FROM CHARGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PINR PHUM HA JO
SUBJECT: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH UN ASG FOR PEACEKEEPING

REF: A. USUN 0092


B. TD-314/0336-06

C. CARNEY-DUDDY TELCON 13 JANUARY

Classified By: CDA Timothy M. Carney for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Ass't Sec'y Gen'l Hedi Annabi (strictly protect) of
DPKO came over for dinner a deux at the Residence 18 January
to talk the issues: a Deputy SRSG position still MIA;
Haitian pressure on SRSG Valdes to perform better; weakness
in Jordanian military performance and possible U.S. actions
to help deter violence on election day.


2. (C) Annabi, an old friend from UN efforts in Cambodia of
the late 80s, confirmed he is in Haiti to bolster morale (ref
A) and focus on political affairs, elections, military,
police, justice, civil affairs and immediate post-electoral
economic stabilization. He had already met with Haitian
presidential candidates, and with the Jordanian Troop
component commander. I lamented the continuing UN failure to
provide an experienced Deputy to SRSG Valdes. He noted that
an American (Kennedy) had agreed to the job, and SG Kofi
Annan had approved the assignment after which the candidate
backed out. A set of further candidates, including another
American, are in the final stages. I argued that whoever is
picked must have the stature to run MINUSTAH for the interim
period between Valdes' departure and nomination of a new SRSG.


3. (C) In discussing Haitian private sector and civil society
criticism of SRSG Valdes, I explained that leaders have
targeted the SRSG because they believe only he can energize
the MINUSTAH Force to deal with the reality of, and prospects
for, further deterioration in security. They particularly
cite the Jordanian component,s incompetence in the Cite
Soleil slum area of operations. (NOTE: PM Latortue called
the SRSG together with civil society/business leaders Andy

Apaid and Reginald Boulos on 18 January. Valdes told me the
good meeting proceeded in a civil atmosphere with focus on
solving problems. Civil society leaders have ended mass
action against MINUSTAH, we understand. END NOTE) I added
that I had seen the SG,s letter to PM Latortue, elements of
which are in the press, defending Valdes, describing
criticism of him as "defamation" and asserting the criticism
is "unjustified."


4. (S/NF) Annabi readily accepted my observation, based on
UN assignments in Cambodia, Somalia and South Africa, that UN
Missions all have weaknesses. I recounted 13 January
observations to me by ICRC ResRep Cedric Piralla (protect).
He cited NGO figures for civilian casualities in Cite Soleil
as having risen from 100 wounded in October to between 170
and 205 in December. Half of these are women and children.
Assertions that all were used as human shields strain
credulity. He noted that Jordanians fired 28,000 cartridges
in December, an astonishing figure even given that the troops
frequently shoot in the air. ICRC plans to raise these
issues in writing with the Acting Force Commander. Annabi
mentioned that he, too, was struck by the very large
expenditure of ammunition. He said that Jordanian military
leadership has proven poor in a number of missions other than
Haiti (ref B), and that Prince Zeid, the Jordanian Permrep
who himself spent a period as a mid-ranking member of a UN
peace-keeping mission, is aware of the problem. Annabi added
that he had seen the Jordanian Commander here who said flatly
that his forces would not enter Cite Soleil. The officer
needs to be removed, he concluded, adding that the entire
Jordanian unit must be transferred elsewhere in Haiti and
different units brought in. We raised moving the Pakistani
Formed Police Unit (100 strong) currently in Gonaive that
actually has armored vehicles with it, as well as body armor
and, perhaps, bringing up the rest of the Peruvians and the
Uruguayans and putting the Jordanians in the much more
peaceful south, but concluded this could not happen before
the first round of elections.


5. (S/NF) In further discussing electoral security, I
described to Annabi the PM's 14 January ideas (ref. C) about
adding an important psychological element of deterrence
against election-day violence through the presence of first
world military. Annabi confirmed that the idea had come from
the SRSG and that New York favors it. The PM had spoken to
me of bringing in Canadian or French forces for a short
period and asked that the U.S., if it could not put a unit on
the ground, instead send Navy and Coast Guard ships to be
present three or four days before the elections and then on
election day. He suggested that, if possible, crews resume
the practice of civic action works or, even, tourism, and
that definitely helicopters from the ship should be seen
regularly in the skies around the capital. I doubted that
civic action efforts would be possible, but mooted a possible
shipboard lunch for the President or PM, and use of
helicopters to carry command staff of the ship to lunch at
the U.S. Residence. I told Annabi that Washington is seized
with the matter.
CARNEY