Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PESHAWAR67
2006-02-13 11:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Peshawar
Cable title:
A DEBATE ON WAZIRISTAN SECURITY: FRONTIER CORPS VS. PAKISTAN
VZCZCXRO4607 PP RUEHLH RUEHPW DE RUEHPW #0067/01 0441135 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 131135Z FEB 06 FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6508 INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0161 RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHFSI/DIR FSINFATC PRIORITY RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1905 RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 0077 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0364 RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 0815 RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 0068 RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 0832 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0254 RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 2055
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PESHAWAR 000067
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL PK PTER EAID SNAR KDEM AF
SUBJECT: A DEBATE ON WAZIRISTAN SECURITY: FRONTIER CORPS VS. PAKISTAN
ARMY
REF: ISLAMABAD 498
CLASSIFIED BY: Gautam Rana, Political Officer, U.S. Consulate ,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
----------
SUMMARY
-------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PESHAWAR 000067
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL PK PTER EAID SNAR KDEM AF
SUBJECT: A DEBATE ON WAZIRISTAN SECURITY: FRONTIER CORPS VS. PAKISTAN
ARMY
REF: ISLAMABAD 498
CLASSIFIED BY: Gautam Rana, Political Officer, U.S. Consulate ,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Two of the Northwest Frontier Province's (NWFP) most
experienced journalists covering the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) maintain growing security problems (see
reftel) are hampering GOP counter-terrorism efforts in North and
South Waziristan. These problems are spilling over into the
adjoining settled area of Dera Ismail Khan (DIK) and could
spread to other FATA agencies. Both argue the worsening
security situation can only be resolved by military action, with
one opting for exclusive use of the Frontier Corps (FC) and the
other claiming that the regular Army must continue to take the
lead. End summary.
--------------
Worsening Security
--------------
2. (C) Rahimullah Yusufzai of the The News and Ismail Khan of
the Dawn are two of the most senior correspondents covering the
FATA in Pakistan. Both have extensive contacts with the
Taliban, tribal leaders and Islamist extremists as well as with
GOP government, military and intelligence officials. Yusufzai
interviewed Osama Bin Laden in 1998.
3. (C) North and South Waziristan evince mounting security
problems, according to the journalists. Pro-government tribal
elders are regularly assassinated, the Political Agents remain
unable to enforce their law enforcement decisions, and the
Pakistan Army has not conducted a major operation since Lt.
General Hamid Khan assumed command of the 11th Corps in October
of 2005. In this vacuum, extremists have gained considerable
strength. In South Waziristan alone, Yusafzai asserted former
Taliban Commissar Baitullah Masud has 13,000 supporters under
his command. While Army officers maintain Baitullah is vital to
their plans to maintain the local peace, Yusafzai claims
Baitullah continues to support Taliban groups infiltrating into
Afghanistan.
4. (C) FATA security problems have also spilled over into the
settled district of DIK, according to the journalists. The
security situation in Tank is "very bad," in part because the
major tribal groups of South Waziristan have long resided in the
region and militants among them are increasingly carrying out
targeted assassinations in DIK. Both journalists expect the
security environment in DIK to deteriorate and warned similar
problems could easily spill over into other FATA agencies.
--------------
Army or FC?
--------------
5. (C) The two reporters agreed that military action --
followed-up with a long-term focus on economic and political
development -- is vital to turn around the situation, but
differed on which military organization would be more effective.
Yusufzai advocated the exclusive use of the Frontier Corps (FC)
in the FATA because its ranks are composed of tribal members
under regular Army officers. As a result, the FC knows the
customs and the people of the region and is therefore better
able to handle the situation. Yusufzai suggested that using the
regular Army has, and will continue to, inflame the situation
because its Punjabi-dominated ranks are resented by tribal
groups. On the other hand, Khan argued the Army is the better
choice and should continue to form the main military force, due
to its training, resources, and efficiency. The Army is not
plagued by cross-cutting tribal loyalties that compromise
operational security. Khan noted that, as Pashtuns, the loyalty
of FC scouts would first be to their tribes, then as Muslims,
and finally as Pakistanis. Just as importantly, the FC has
proven to be ineffective against determined militant elements,
particularly in the first major counter-terrorism offensive
PESHAWAR 00000067 002 OF 002
launched in the spring of 2003.
--------------
Comment
--------------
6. (C) Khan and Yusufzai's remarks mirror those of other
journalists commenting on the current FATA security situation.
However, their solution - more aggressive military action - runs
counter to GOP statements emanating from the Governor's House
and the 11th Corps Headquarters justifying a lull in major
offensives to win over greater civil cooperation. These two
journalists could not disagree more with that policy and both
call for tough military action before security problems spill
over into adjoining regions. END COMMENT.
SPANGLER
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL PK PTER EAID SNAR KDEM AF
SUBJECT: A DEBATE ON WAZIRISTAN SECURITY: FRONTIER CORPS VS. PAKISTAN
ARMY
REF: ISLAMABAD 498
CLASSIFIED BY: Gautam Rana, Political Officer, U.S. Consulate ,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Two of the Northwest Frontier Province's (NWFP) most
experienced journalists covering the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) maintain growing security problems (see
reftel) are hampering GOP counter-terrorism efforts in North and
South Waziristan. These problems are spilling over into the
adjoining settled area of Dera Ismail Khan (DIK) and could
spread to other FATA agencies. Both argue the worsening
security situation can only be resolved by military action, with
one opting for exclusive use of the Frontier Corps (FC) and the
other claiming that the regular Army must continue to take the
lead. End summary.
--------------
Worsening Security
--------------
2. (C) Rahimullah Yusufzai of the The News and Ismail Khan of
the Dawn are two of the most senior correspondents covering the
FATA in Pakistan. Both have extensive contacts with the
Taliban, tribal leaders and Islamist extremists as well as with
GOP government, military and intelligence officials. Yusufzai
interviewed Osama Bin Laden in 1998.
3. (C) North and South Waziristan evince mounting security
problems, according to the journalists. Pro-government tribal
elders are regularly assassinated, the Political Agents remain
unable to enforce their law enforcement decisions, and the
Pakistan Army has not conducted a major operation since Lt.
General Hamid Khan assumed command of the 11th Corps in October
of 2005. In this vacuum, extremists have gained considerable
strength. In South Waziristan alone, Yusafzai asserted former
Taliban Commissar Baitullah Masud has 13,000 supporters under
his command. While Army officers maintain Baitullah is vital to
their plans to maintain the local peace, Yusafzai claims
Baitullah continues to support Taliban groups infiltrating into
Afghanistan.
4. (C) FATA security problems have also spilled over into the
settled district of DIK, according to the journalists. The
security situation in Tank is "very bad," in part because the
major tribal groups of South Waziristan have long resided in the
region and militants among them are increasingly carrying out
targeted assassinations in DIK. Both journalists expect the
security environment in DIK to deteriorate and warned similar
problems could easily spill over into other FATA agencies.
--------------
Army or FC?
--------------
5. (C) The two reporters agreed that military action --
followed-up with a long-term focus on economic and political
development -- is vital to turn around the situation, but
differed on which military organization would be more effective.
Yusufzai advocated the exclusive use of the Frontier Corps (FC)
in the FATA because its ranks are composed of tribal members
under regular Army officers. As a result, the FC knows the
customs and the people of the region and is therefore better
able to handle the situation. Yusufzai suggested that using the
regular Army has, and will continue to, inflame the situation
because its Punjabi-dominated ranks are resented by tribal
groups. On the other hand, Khan argued the Army is the better
choice and should continue to form the main military force, due
to its training, resources, and efficiency. The Army is not
plagued by cross-cutting tribal loyalties that compromise
operational security. Khan noted that, as Pashtuns, the loyalty
of FC scouts would first be to their tribes, then as Muslims,
and finally as Pakistanis. Just as importantly, the FC has
proven to be ineffective against determined militant elements,
particularly in the first major counter-terrorism offensive
PESHAWAR 00000067 002 OF 002
launched in the spring of 2003.
--------------
Comment
--------------
6. (C) Khan and Yusufzai's remarks mirror those of other
journalists commenting on the current FATA security situation.
However, their solution - more aggressive military action - runs
counter to GOP statements emanating from the Governor's House
and the 11th Corps Headquarters justifying a lull in major
offensives to win over greater civil cooperation. These two
journalists could not disagree more with that policy and both
call for tough military action before security problems spill
over into adjoining regions. END COMMENT.
SPANGLER