WHA A/S SHANNON'S 2/2 MEETINGS WITH FRENCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000792 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA AND NEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON FR AR VE BL BR CO CA IR HA SUBJECT: WHA A/S SHANNON'S 2/2 MEETINGS WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS ONS 1.4 B/D ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A/S Shannon visited Paris on February 2 to discuss the full range of WHA issues with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency. On Haiti, Shannon encouraged France to consider symbolic gestures during the election period to demonstrate GOF engagement, an action the GOF said it would consider. He reviewed the evolution of U.S relations with Venezuela, and was told that in the GOF,s opinion, Venezuela "would not agree" to a nuclear Iran. Shannon praised President Chirac,s message to Bolivian President Morales urging cooperation with the U.S. French officials said they would use GOF influence to work with Morales and encourage him not to be overly influenced by Venezuelan President Chavez. French interlocutors also briefed Shannon on FM Douste-Blazy's recent trip to Colombia, reviewed the recent elections in Canada, and discussed French relations with Brazil and Argentina. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) A/S Shannon met with A/S-equivalent for the Americas Daniel Parfait, President Chirac,s advisor on the Americas Dominique Boche, PDAS-equivalent for the Americas Jean-Marc Laforet and DAS-equivalents Yves Oudin, Pierre-Alain Coffinier and Michel Pinard. He was accompanied by DCM Karl Hofmann, POL M/C Josiah Rosenblatt, ECON/C Ken Merten, D/POL/C Bruce Turner and Poloff Peter Kujawinski (notetaker). -------------- GENERAL -------------- ¶3. (C) Shannon explained U.S. attempts to link democratic institutions with economic development in Central and South America. Parfait and Boche both agreed that development was needed to sustain democracy. Shannon expressed the hope that the U.S. and France would find ways to deepen and broaden their cooperation to address the challenges of the region, given common purposes in many areas. His interlocutors agreed, noting that French and U.S. efforts were often complementary, since each tended to have more influence in different countries. -------------- HAITI AND THE CARIBBEAN -------------- ¶4. (C) Shannon explained that, as technical conditions for holding elections improved, violence became the only means to stop the elections. It was for this reason that the U.S. 
planned a Coast Guard ship visit as a symbolic gesture to boost security. Furthermore, the U.S. would push MINUSTAH to be active in the interim period between the first round and likely second round of the elections. Shannon encouraged France to also consider a symbolic gesture. Parfait said that time might be too short for sending gendarmes or helicopters, but he was open to considering all possibilities, and would pass on this request immediately to the Prime Minister,s office. ¶5. (C) Shannon said the U.S. was prepared to live with whoever won the elections. Boche expressed concern, in the event of Preval's election, that Aristide might return. Shannon said the U.S. would speak to South Africa to try to prevent Aristide from leaving there and speculated that Preval would see that it was not in his own interest that Aristide return. He argued that Aristide's only claim to legitimacy would be in the event of no elections. Parfait said the GOF had already demarched South Africa on this subject, and had encouraged them to keep Aristide there. Shannon said that in a post-election scenario, MINUSTAH should begin to transition from static security to peace-building operations such as disarmament. Parfait agreed and said a post-election Core Group meeting would be important to discuss steps forward. ¶6. (C) Parfait said that Haiti was at the top of the list of discussions France had with all countries in South America, but especially in the Caribbean. In French overseas territories there, the presence of illegal Haitian immigrants was contributing to a rise in tensions. He said Spain, the Netherlands, France and representatives from the European Commission had recently met to discuss the Caribbean, in particular the rise in violence and drug smuggling. Parfait suggested that the U.S. join the next meeting of these interested parties. Shannon agreed that this would be worthwhile. -------------- VENEZUELA -------------- ¶7. (C) During his meeting with Parfait, Shannon reviewed the evolutions in the U.S.-Venezuela relationship, and explained in particular why the U.S. had decided not to sell lethal military equipment to Venezuela. Shannon added that the U.S. was increasingly concerned that Chavez's anti-American rhetoric was his core message, and furthermore, Chavez was seeking to disrupt good relations between the U.S. and other South American countries. Parfait thanked Shannon for his explanation, remarking that it helped him better understand U.S. policy. He added that during a recent conversation with President Chirac, Chavez claimed the U.S. was trying to kill him. Boche cautioned against provoking Chavez, given his paranoid tendencies; there was a risk of escalation. Moreover, Chavez was genuinely popular in the region, he noted. ¶8. (C) Shannon enumerated Chavez's attempts to destroy the historically good relationship between the U.S. and Venezuelan armed forces and posit the U.S. as the theoretical invading force during Venezuelan exercises. Asked about Venezuelan interest in purchasing submarines from France, Boche insisted that discussions were at a preliminary stage and that no decisions had been taken, a statement echoed by Parfait. Boche acknowledged that there were currently some bilateral tensions between France and Venezuela and that U.S. concerns were also a factor to be taken into consideration. But he challenged the U.S. to explain why such sales would constitute a threat to U.S. interests. (Comment: Boche's insistence that no decision had been made on selling submarines to Venezuela contrasted with recent statements made by Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Maurice Gordault-Montagne (Boche's superior) to the Ambassador suggesting that France ultimately would not agree to sell the submarines. End comment.) Parfait promised transparency with the U.S. on the matter. ¶9. (C) Parfait briefed Shannon on his recent trip to Venezuela, in which he and MFA Secretary General Stanislas de Laboulaye discussed Iran with Venezuelan officials. The GOF,s conclusion, said Parfait, was that Venezuela would not agree to a nuclear Iran, although it needed to be convinced that Iran had crossed the line in attempting to gain a nuclear weapon capacity. A key to convincing Venezuela would be a strong statement from IAEA Director General el-Baradei, said Parfait. Although the GOF understands it would be hard for Chavez to vote against Iran, it believes he will do so if the IAEA statements are strong enough, said Parfait. (Note: Venezuela was one of three countries that voted against referring Iran to the UNSC. End comment) -------------- BOLIVIA -------------- ¶10. (C) Shannon expressed appreciation for the messages on the importance of governing responsibly that President Chirac passed to President Morales during the latter's visit to Paris. Boche responded that Morales was aware that he lacked international experience and needed international support and good relations with Europe and the U.S. Morales was also willing to listen to advice, he added, and recently had called Chirac to thank him for receiving him in Paris and solicit his advice on traveling to an unnamed country. (Comment: Iran. End comment.) Boche said Chirac had argued against such a visit, leading to Morales' agreement to postpone the trip. Boche said France wanted to help Morales, which explained Cooperation Minister Girardin's attendance at his inauguration. Parfait said the relationship between Presidents Chirac and Morales seemed to be very good, due in part to Morales, "admiration" for Chirac,s long-standing interest in indigenous peoples. ¶11. (C) Shannon confirmed, based on his own meeting with Morales in La Paz, that Morales appeared to have understood the French message on governance, noting that he had discerned a new openness to relations with the U.S. Boche said Morales' only complaint about the U.S. had been that U.S. assistance was conditional; otherwise he had assured France that any rules affecting foreign companies would be transparent and designed to last. Shannon cautioned that Morales would come under pressure from his own constituency's expectations for more radical change, adding that the U.S. and others could use this to their advantage. He said President Bush had called Morales on February 1 to congratulate him on his election. The U.S., said Shannon, was not looking for a fight; it was looking for a relationship. Parfait welcomed this, and said France (and the EU) was prepared "to do a lot" in Bolivia. -------------- COLOMBIA -------------- ¶12. (C) A/S Shannon asked Parfait for a read-out on French FM Douste-Blazy,s January trip to Colombia. Parfait said that it was a good trip even though there has heretofore been no movement on release of FARC-held hostages, especially Ingrid Betancourt. Before continuing, Parfait said he felt obliged to note that French relations with Colombia are "excellent," that there is between $300 and $400 million of French investment in Colombia, and that Colombia vies with Brazil as one of the largest sources of Latin American students in France. ¶13. (C) In explaining the recent Douste-Blazy hostage release initiative, Parfait said that President Uribe had surprised the GOF by almost immediately announcing "contrary to the agreed plan" the French initiative publicly. "Does the FARC agree with our proposal?" Parfait asked; "unfortunately we still don,t know; we don,t have an answer from them." Parfait said the GOF realized that it was very likely being manipulated by the FARC. He said the GOF had been talking with Spain and Switzerland about obtaining a stronger communique. Parfait added that the GOF was still talking with FM Barco about the initiative and that those discussions had been "very good." The GOF has also been in touch with the Catholic Church as well as a representative of the communist party to seek their input. Parfait noted that this hostage return proposal is the "most serious proposal on the table" and that it seems like "a good moment to get something." A/S Shannon replied that the U.S. sees the hostage issue as a Colombian issue and one that the GOC needs to determine how to resolve. He opined that the FARC would use any hostage release to try and create a problem for President Uribe. ¶14. (C) Parfait said he wanted to reassure A/S Shannon that the GOF and "the Europeans" harbor no "romantic" illusions about the FARC. He said that France supports the fight against the FARC, has "nothing against" President Uribe, and has "nothing against your aggressive policy" in Colombia. Boche added that the Betancourt case was a delicate issue for France and assured Shannon that France would act in a transparent manner and that it had no interest in weakening Colombian president Aribe. -------------- CANADA -------------- ¶15. (C) Boche expressed concern that new Canadian PM Harper had no connection to France. He said GOF leaders were interested in developing a personal relationship with him as soon as possible, in order to reestablish the close ties of the past. Boche said Canada was an important country for France, given the convergence of French and Canadian approaches to such issues as peacekeeping, assistance and development, and multilateralism. Shannon responded that good French-Canadian relations were good for Canada and the Western Hemisphere, noting that the conservative party had performed surprisingly well in traditional liberal bastions in Quebec. He praised the political symbolism of an Anglophone from western Canada who spoke French during the election campaign. Boche responded that Harper's apparent receptivity to Quebec's specific situation and a favorable economic situation bode well for keeping separatist tendencies under control. -------------- BRAZIL -------------- ¶16. (C) Parfait said Brazil is France,s "main partner" in Latin America and the GOF believes Brazil plays an important stabilizing role in the region. He noted that French companies consider a presence in Brazil to be an essential component to any global strategy. Shannon agreed and said that Brazil was an emerging democratic power. Parfait mentioned a February 28 conference on the financing of development, which would include consideration of President Chirac,s pet project: an international tax on airline tickets. Brazil would be making a decision, said Parfait, on whether it would support Chirac,s project. Parfait added that France had asked Brazilian President Lula da Silva to exercise a "moderating influence" on Venezuelan President Chavez. -------------- ARGENTINA -------------- 17.(C) Parfait said France is worried that Argentina remains confronted with "lots of problems," particularly economic ones. He noted that French firms in Argentina had lost considerable amounts of money in 2001-2002 and that French economic interests in the country remain significant. Parfait said that France was concerned about the lack of fiscal reforms and the quick resurgence of inflation. Given President Kirchner,s weak and unpredictable economic policy, there was little incentive for foreigners to invest in Argentina. More broadly, Parfait reported, the GOF was "unsure" of Kirchner,s long-term political and economic intentions. Parfait explained that in his most recent trip to Buenos Aires his primary goal was to "maintain the relationship" and to "express disappointment about their economic policies." He noted that, for their part, the Argentines were very interested in a visit from President Chirac and strongly encouraged Parfait to press for one after returning to Paris. Parfait explained that no such trip is planned for President Chirac at this time and that "to go that far, you have to be going to other places in the region too." Despite the economic and political worries, French interests there are significant. ¶19. (C) Parfait asked whether the USG still had special concerns about the Tri-Border Region between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. A/S Shannon said that the USG has good cooperation with all three governments and that those governments were also concerned about the money laundering and other international criminal activity in the region. He reported that Argentina, as the only country in the region to have experienced international terrorism on its soil, worked closely with relevant USG agencies in monitoring activities in the region. A/S Shannon noted that Brazil in particular had a problem in that it hosts a large ethnic Syrian population which has some small radicalized Islamic elements in its midst. ¶20. (U) A/S Shannon cleared this cable. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton