S/P KRASNER'S DISCUSSION WITH LEADING FRENCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007847 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2016 TAGS: PARM PREL FR IR SUBJECT: S/P KRASNER'S DISCUSSION WITH LEADING FRENCH STRATEGISTS ON IRAN Classified By: CDA Karl Hofmann for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: During a December 13 lunch with Policy Planning Director Stephen Krasner, three of France's leading strategic thinkers worried that, absent tough talk from the U.S., Iran would continue to develop a nuclear weapons program and scorn the IAEA with total impunity. They urged the U.S. to disabuse Iran of its dangerous misconceptions while remaining open to a face-saving "Libya option" that could bring Iran back into the NPT tent. Otherwise, they warned, the U.S. would soon also have to contend with the imminent nuclear ambitions of moderate Gulf States that fear Iran as an irresponsible rival. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Dr. Stephen Krasner, director of Policy Planning at the State Department, met over lunch December 13 with three of France's leading strategic thinkers: Therese Delpech, director of strategic affairs, Atomic Energy Agency; Bruno Tertrais, head of research, Foundation for Strategic Affairs (FRS); and Francois Heisbourg, special advisor, FRS. Krasner was joined by DCM, Matthew Waxman, Principal Deputy Director of Policy Planning, and Todd Deatherage, Special Assistant. While all three participants had served in the past as advisors to the GoF, their views were strictly their own and did not necessarily reflect thinking within the French government. ¶3. (C) All three analysts offered a grim portrait of an intransigent Iran run by a secretive cabal of mullahs deliberately blind to international realities and a president who views opposition to the United States as the basis of his popular support. The Iranian leadership -- including the Guardian Council and President Ahmadinejad -- has lost any sense of limits, and their certainty that they need not fear a U.S. military strike could give rise to a major miscalculation, they added. Delpech and Heisbourg warned that a poor showing by Ahmadinejad's hardline party in the December 15 local elections might paradoxically embolden the president, spurring him to push the nuclear program as hard and as fast as he could. (Note: Partial results announced December 18 indicated that moderate conservatives were winning key seats throughout the country, beating Ahmadinejad's party in what was being viewed as a referendum on his unyielding nuclear policy. End Note.) ¶4. (C) The analysts implored the U.S. to articulate in no uncertain terms that the military option remains on the table, arguing that failure to do so would fuel Iranian underestimations of American strength. "We are feeding their misperception of who we are. They haven't paid one cent for their misdeeds," warned Delpech. Heibourg proposed -- with only partial levity -- that the U.S. engage in red flag exercises in Nevada using 10-ton bunker busters, and then "make sure there is a four-page spread in AdWeek...All unrelated to Iran, of course." ¶5. (C) Tertrais posited the "Libya option" as a possible way forward, under which Iran would agree to voluntarily abandon its weapons of mass destruction program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and further aid with its civil nuclear program. Although Tertrais was skeptical that "a regime that lives off opposition to the U.S." would accept such a quid pro quo, he thought it would nonetheless be useful to convey to the Iranians that it could be an option. Heisbourg agreed, but cautioned that the question of U.S.-Iranian dialogue cannot be seen through the lens of Iraq -- as he interpreted the Iraq Study Group report to suggest -- and that the U.S. must be clear that a dialogue with Iran cannot be about exchanging Iran's cooperation in Iraq for U.S. agreement to an Iranian WMD program. That Iran possesses a relatively pluralistic system is both the good and the bad news, according to Delpech: unlike Libya, it is not ruled by a single personality, so a combination of pressures and incentives could soften Iranian resistance to negotiation with the U.S. On the other hand, that same pluralism precludes the decisiveness that would be necessary to chart a new policy course. ¶6. (C) All agreed that the U.S. and France must each develop policies that address the likelihood of Gulf States' defensive nuclear ambitions. The same states that viewed Israel's longstanding presumed nuclear capability as "only existential" are now terrified by Iran's nuclear posturing, Delpech suggested. "Israel is only an enemy, while Iran is a rival," Heisbourg rejoined. Tertrais predicted that moderate Arab states might broach the subject of what security guarantees the U.S. or NATO could provide, and could be willing to enter more explicit defense alliances with the U.S. and other nuclear powers. The difficulty, Heisbourg added, will be in finding balanced defense alliances with both Israel and other Middle Eastern countries, an PARIS 00007847 002 OF 002 equilibrium he called "not at all straightforward." ¶7. (C) There was no agreement on how far Iran had proceeded technologically in its pursuit of uranium enrichment. Delpech said that when visiting Iran in April, she had the impression that progress had slowed considerably, but she now believes Iran will meet its stated goal of 3,000 centrifuges by spring. Ahmadinejad had promised to announce a major step forward in March to coincide with the Persian New Year; Delpech predicted that he might reveal that Iran has succeeded in developing laser enrichment, which could be undetected by IAEA inspectors. Heisbourg agreed, saying that the Natanz facility had clearly become a "Potemkin village," and illicit research was being done elsewhere. Tertrais, however, demurred, saying he did not expect any major announcements within the next two years that would indicate Iran was "rushing to get the bomb." ¶8. (C) Ultimately, all three concluded that their own lack of consensus is emblematic of the fundamental problem: the inscrutability of the Iranian regime. "The extent of our ignorance is monumental," Heisbourg said, referring to the U.S., France and Western intelligence networks. Heisbourg criticized the U.S. for being particularly out of touch with the on-the-ground reality, adding that in meetings with senior U.S. officials, he had the impression that U.S. policymakers had the mental image of Iran as the Soviet Union. He stridently asserted that the Swiss Ambassador in Tehran is a "very imperfect lens" through which to view Iranian society, although he would not elaborate. Delpech chided him for being too severe, saying that even countries and individuals with strong ties to, and assets in, find it hard to assess the political environment. She related the story of her meeting with an Iranian-French political analyst, who spends half his time in Iran, but still told her it would be impossible for him to offer interesting analysis of the upcoming elections because "power there is more a conspiracy than a government." ¶9. (U) S/P Director Krasner has cleared this message. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm HOFMANN