HARIRI ALLY SEES MARCH 14 IN STRONG POSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 007803 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR DORAN/MARCHESE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016 TAGS: FR LE PGOV PREL SY SUBJECT: HARIRI ALLY SEES MARCH 14 IN STRONG POSITION Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Basile Yared, Sa'ad Hariri's representative in Paris, told Poloff on December 14 that Arab League SYG Amr Moussa had a "difficult" meeting with Hizballah and Amal officials late December 13. According to Yared, Hizballah stunned Moussa by insisting not only that it obtain a blocking minority in the government in exchange for supporting the international tribunal, but also that it be able to re-approve the tribunal once the blocking minority was in place (thereby ensuring that Hizballah would have an opportunity to reverse the Siniora cabinet's decision). Yared stressed that neither Druze Leader Walid Jumblatt nor Sa'ad Hariri would agree to such a concession. Both were adamant about establishing the tribunal as soon as possible in order to put maximum pressure on Damascus. (Note: Yared confirmed a rumor we heard from Lebanese A/DCM Ghady El-Khoury that Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah was also holding out for an assurance that he would not be summoned to appear before the tribunal, either as a suspect or as a witness. Yared added that by the same token, the Syrian regime was trying to get assurances that any Syrian suspects would not be allowed to implicate higher-ups in Damascus and also to limit the tribunal's scope to the Rafik Hariri assassination. End note.) ¶2. (C) Yared was nonetheless upbeat about the strength of the March 14 coalition. Nasrallah, he said, was being "squeezed" by March 14, UNIFIL, and Syria/Iran, and could not resort to violence without becoming anathema in the Arab world and losing the support of many of his Shi'ite followers. As for Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri (who Yared saw as clever but paralyzed),the Siniora Cabinet had "put him in the corner" by approving the international tribunal agreement. If Berri refused to convene the parliament, Yared predicted that the GOL would seek third-party (e.g., Saudi) financing for the tribunal in order to bypass the constitutional requirement for parliamentary approval. Moreover, he said that March 14 MPs might threaten to impeach Berri. Even if they failed to muster enough votes to do so, the attempt would leave Berri weakened and on the defensive. ¶3. (C) Yared saw Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun as a lost cause: "He listens to no one. He trusts no one. He thinks he knows it all. And he's losing support." Aoun, he continued, would not abandon his quest for Lebanon's presidency but was the last thing that Lebanon needed at time like this. "His military background did not prepare him very well for leading in a democracy," Yared said with polite contempt. ¶4. (C) Yared, who made no secret of his access to President Chirac, denied that Chirac was feeling pessimistic about the situation in Lebanon. To the contrary, said Yared, the "French MFA types" had overestimated Hizballah's strength in the early days of the current political crisis, but March 14 had proven them wrong in Chirac's eyes. Yared predicted that the end of the Chirac presidency would produce a change "in priority, but not in policy" (i.e., France would continue to support Lebanon, but Chirac's successor would probably not invest the same amount of energy in managing that policy). Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON