CHIRAC ADVISER HINTS AT SOFTENING IN FRENCH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007787 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR DORAN/MARCHESE; NEA/FO FOR DANIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2016 TAGS: FR KDEM LE PGOV PREL SY SUBJECT: CHIRAC ADVISER HINTS AT SOFTENING IN FRENCH POSITION ON TRIBUNAL REF: A. PARIS 7723 (NOTAL) ¶B. PARIS 7727 ¶C. PARIS 7770 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: In a December 12 meeting, Dominique Boche (President Chirac's Middle East adviser) hinted at a possible softening in France's position on establishing an international tribunal for Lebanon. Boche said that France would support whatever position the Government of Lebanon (GOL) took with respect to the tribunal, implying clearly that France is open to delaying the tribunal's establishment if that would alleviate pressure on the Siniora government. Boche dismissed the idea of a joint U.S.-French presidential statement on Lebanon, saying that such a statement might embarrass Siniora, who was already under attack from Hizballah for being too closely aligned with Washington. Boche also saw little scope for encouraging more active Vatican diplomacy on Lebanon. On a more positive note, Boche assessed that Arab League SYG Amr Moussa's efforts to negotiate an accord might find traction with Hizballah, given that Narallah had reached the limits of what could be achieved through legal, peaceable protest. He confirmed that President Chirac pressed Israeli FM Livni to take a harder line on Syria. End summary. Hints of Slippage on Tribunal -------------- ¶2. (S) PolMC and NEA Watcher met December 12 with Dominique Boche, President Chirac's Middle East adviser. They pressed Boche to clarify a comment made during a December 11 meeting at the MFA (septel follows) suggesting that France was open to delaying the establishment of an international tribunal for the Rafik Hariri assassination in the hope that such a delay would alleviate pressure on PM Siniora's government. Boche initially dodged the question, saying that the leaders of the March 14 coalition understood they would lose all political credibility if the tribunal were not established. France, he added, was not prepared to "sacrifice" the tribunal. In response to further questioning, however, Boche avoided spelling out France's position on the tribunal's timing, saying only that France wanted a "peaceful solution" and would support whatever stance the GOL took on the question. (Comment: We interpreted Boche's elliptical answer as confirmation that the French are indeed prepared to consider a delay in the tribunal's establishment, probably in response to what they are hearing from one or more sources in Lebanon. End comment.) Reticent on Presidential Statement -------------- ¶3. (C) Boche questioned the utility of a joint U.S.-French presidential statement to express support for the Siniora government (as proposed by A/S Fried to PolDir Araud on December 7, ref C),suggesting that such a statement might embarrass PM Siniora, who was already under fire from the Lebanese opposition for being too tightly aligned with Washington. Given those reservations, Boche suggested it might be better for the two heads of state to stake out their positions individually. (Note: Boche seemed less troubled by the prospect of a joint EU declaration, and said that France had submitted a draft statement which it hoped would be promulgated by the EU Council of Ministers on December 15. He noted that the French had not yet received any comment on their draft. End note.) Boche said he saw little scope for increased Vatican diplomacy vis-a-vis Lebanon. Hopeful on Amr Moussa -------------- ¶4. (C) Boche assessed that the situation in Lebanon was slightly better than it had appeared just 48 hours earlier. Though the size of Hizballah's December 10 demonstration was worrisome, he expressed relief that Sheikh Nasrallah's followers had not crossed the line between peaceful protest and civil disobedience (e.g., blockading the airport, occupying government buildings). He was therefore cautiously upbeat about Arab League SYG Amr Moussa's attempt to PARIS 00007787 002 OF 003 negotiate a compromise between the March 14 coalition and the Hizaballah-Amal-Aoun axis. Boche assessed that both sides needed a negotiated solution, since Hizballah had already run up against the limits of what legal, peaceful protest could accomplish, whereas PM Siniora's government could not continue to function under the status quo. "They need each other," Boche summarized. ¶5. (C) Boche was also encouraged by the broad terms of Moussa's proposed deal. "It has something for everyone: Hizballah gets a stronger position in the government, Aoun gets electoral reform, the Christians get a new president, and March 14 gets the international tribunal," said Boche. Asked whether he believed Hizballah was prepared to cross the Asad regime on the tribunal's establishment, Boche agreed that the question was pivotal. "The key question is whether Hizballah has freedom of action. Is Hizballah totally dependent on Syria, or does Hassan Nasrallah have some room for maneuver? We'll see," said Boche, who added that Iran seemed to have less to fear from the tribunal than did Syria. While he conceded that Hizballah might, at some point down the road, try to use its enhanced cabinet position to paralyze the GOL's cooperation with the international tribunal, Boche said the greater danger would be the failure to reach a political accord. Livni Visit -------------- ¶6. (S) Boche's readout of Israeli FM Livni's December 6 meeting with President Chirac tracked with post's previous reporting (refs A and B). Livni reportedly told Chirac that Israel was extending tacit support to Siniora, but made clear that the GOI was not prepared to take steps on overflights or on Sheba Farms in the interest of helping the embattled Lebanese Prime Minister. "She left no hope of Israeli concessions," Boche said ruefully. ¶7. (S) Boche confirmed that Chirac and Livni did not discuss the status of the "security package" that France had hoped would dissuade the GOI from continuing its overflights of Lebanon. Boche claimed that France was still working on the content of the package, but offered no insight as to when the package would be presented to the GOI. Israel Soft on Syria? -------------- ¶8. (S) Boche said that President Chirac, who deplored the "impunity" which the Syrian regime seemed to enjoy at the moment, pushed Livni to explain why Israel was so indulgent of Damascus. "It's clear that there is a tacit entente between Tel Aviv and Damascus," said Boche, who intimated that Israeli leaders, uncomfortable with the turbulent political scene in Lebanon, harbored a secret nostalgia for the days when Syria occupied Lebanon and Damascus was the address for all questions Lebanese. "We understand the reasons why Israel does not want to see the fall of the Syrian regime. But the Israelis do not understand that you can only get results from Syria via pressure," said Boche. He continued: "We told the Israelis, if you want to do overflights, it would be better to do them over Syria than Lebanon." ¶9. (S) In a related aside, Boche took a jab at the U.S. by reading from a cable from the French embassy in Damascus. The cable described the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group as "a blast of oxygen" for the Asad regime, adding that the ISG report had only reinforced the regime's conviction that the West badly needed Syria's assistance. Giving Up the Right of Return? -------------- ¶10. (S) During a lengthy discussion of Israeli-Palestinian affairs, Livni encouraged Chirac to "help the Palestinians understand" that Palestinian refugees enjoyed no "right of return" to Israel, which was and would remain a national homeland for the Jews. Any right of return would have to be exercised in the context of a future Palestinian state that would serve as a national homeland for the Palestinians. Though Boche discounted the possibility of Chirac making a PARIS 00007787 003 OF 003 public statement to that effect (as Livni seemed to hope),he said that the French were well aware of the role this question played in the collapse of the Camp David II talks. He suggested it could most usefully be addressed in a future international conference on the Middle East (as advocated by President Chirac),in which the international community could extend guarantees to both parties on this and other subjects. Chirac-Mubarak Exchange on Muslim Brotherhood -------------- ¶11. (S) Turning to Chirac's December 8 meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Boche said Chirac used the meeting to explore Mubarak's views on Syria. In Chirac's analysis, there were two schools of thought in the Arab world on dealing with the Bashar al-Asad regime: The Saudi approach (i.e., opposing Asad) and the "more prudent" Egyptian approach, which tried to ameliorate the regime's behavior without jeopardizing its survival (for fear that Syria's Muslim Brotherhood (MB) would prove the most likely alternative to the current Alawite regime). Chirac questioned this logic, asking whether Mubarak found the Syrian MB as objectionable as its Egyptian counterpart. Mubarak's unambiguous answer was "yes." The Syrian MB was no better than its affiliates, he argued, adding that all MB chapters shared the same characteristics. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON