A/S FRIED AND MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR ON KOSOVO, RUSSIA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007770

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL 12/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM RU TU SR FR
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED AND MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR ON KOSOVO, RUSSIA,
TURKEY, AFGANISTAN


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Karl Hofmann. Reasons
1.4b, d



1. (C) Summary: A/S Fried and MFA Political Director Araud on
December 6 discussed whether Russia would wield a veto at the UNSC to
thwart Kosovar independence. Araud called for a resolution that would
facilitate a Russian abstention. A/S Fried agreed, but insisted there
must be a common diplomatic front ready to move forward regardless of
Moscow. Thwarting Kosovar independence would foment violence, he warned
The French noted Germany thought a further UNSC resolution necessary in
order to recognize an independent Kosovo. Araud commented on renewed
Russian assertiveness and antagonism toward the U.S., judging that
Moscow was acting like a 19th century power that saw foreign affairs as
a zero sum game. The French public was increasingly dubious of Putin
although French policy remained guided by Chirac's personal
relationships. A/S Fried called for vigilance to counter potential
Russian undermining of Georgian sovereignty. On Turkey and EU
accession, Araud forecast greater turbulence ahead since the
matter had become a campaign topic in upcoming French Presidential
elections. He said Chirac had asked PM Erdogan for a gesture on Cyprus
without which France would have to endorse the European Commission
report. (Note: The meeting took place before the Turkish proposal of
the following day. End note.) A/S Fried asked Araud to clarify French
notions for an International Contact Group for Afghanistan. Fried also
suggested looking at a follow-up joint statement on Lebanon by the
French and U.S. Presidents. End Summary.


2. (U) A/S Dan Fried, accompanied by DCM, PolMC and Poloff
(notetaker) met December 6 with a French MFA delegation headed by
Political Director Gerard Araud. French participants included Deputy
Political Director Veronique Bujon-Barre, IO A/S-Equivalent Sylvie
Bermann, Deputy Director for Continental Europe (Russia) Dominique
Gazuy, PESC Director Jean-Louis Falconi, FM Cabinet Adviser for Balkans
Arnaud Danjean, FM Cabinet Adviser for Afghanistan Francois-Xavier
Carrel-Billiard, NATO Desk Officer Alexis Morel, and, as notetakers,
Political Director Staffer Gael Veyssiere and Russia External Policy
Desk Officer Marin Sirakov.

Kosovo -- How to Secure a Russian Abstention


3. (C) On Kosovo Araud saw Moscow hardening its position and suggested
there was a real possibility Russia would veto a draft UNSC resolution
on the final status of Kosovo. The Russian ambassador to France had
warned Araud earlier in the week that Russian public opinion prevented
Moscow from breaking with Serbia over Kosovar independence. Araud
called for strenuous efforts to accommodate a Russian abstention. A/S
Fried said the message he had gotten in Moscow from Deputy FM Titov was
less definitive; Russia could either abstain or veto, with Putin likely
to take the final decision himself. Fried for his part had told Titov
that Kosovar independence was inevitable and there would be a heavy
price to pay for any nation that stood in the way. Thwarting Kosovar
independence would lead to violent riots and turn KFOR into an occupyin
force, a prospect unacceptable to the U.S. which had forces on the
ground. Fried told Araud we must move forward together and be ready to
stare down Moscow on Kosovo independence. Moscow would be quick to
exploit any rifts between the European and U.S. positions. Bujon-Barre
warned that the German MFA had conveyed it could not endorse any
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. Bermann underscored
the need for legal cover for recognition of Kosovar independence; UNSCR
1244 (2001),the current operative authority, was inadequate, she
stated. Fried noted that even tacit Russian support (i.e., abstention
at the UNSC) was important. But in any event, the Quint needed to be
determined to achieve that legal cover, and the best way to avoid a
Russian veto was to signal to Moscow our willingness to support a
final status decision based on Ahtisaari's recommendations with or
without the Russians.


4. (C) Araud suggested UN Envoy Ahtisaari should refrain from
circulating his proposals until after upcoming Serbian elections. It
would be better to go to the UNSC on the pretext of an overt Serbian
refusal, Araud advised. MFA Cabinet Adviser for the Balkans Arnaud
Danjean believed the January elections would not produce a more flexibl
Serbian government. The more moderate Serbian President Tadic's party
would almost certainly need to form a coalition government with PM
Vojislav Kostunica, who would demand a hard line on both Kosovar
independence and cooperation with ICTY. Fried remarked that Kostunica'
electorate could split, with some unwilling to jeopardize prospects of
EU accession for Serbia through obduracy on Kosovo. Araud observed tha
Serbian obstruction of the ICTY had frozen the EU-accession process. H
noted that some EU members (Italy, Greece, Romania, Austria) nonetheles
favored resuming negotiations on accession while suspending in advance
the implementation of any agreement until the resolution of the ICTY
impasse.

Turkey: French Elections Mean More Turbulence Ahead

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5. (C) France is in the thick of elections and Turkey has become a
campaign topic, Araud stated. Politicians were making declarations
without regard to MFA guidance. Regrettably, there would be further
turbulence in the coming six months before the election, he predicted.
Meantime, French interests were hurting in Turkey. Ankara had
retaliated by blocking access to the MFA for the French ambassador and
hindering commercial deals. Outraged Turks were sending back to France
their Legion d'Honneur decorations. Arnaud recounted that PM Erdogan ha
evidently been blindsided by the EC report on Turkish accession. At
Riga Chirac asked PM Erdogan for a gesture on Cyprus; otherwise, France
would be constrained to back the EC report. Merkel had delivered the
same message. Arnaud remarked that Greek PM Kostas Karamanlis in Riga
had ironically seemed to advocate on behalf of Turkey, arguing for the
merits of Turkish democracy and the need for further EU incentives.


6. (C) PESC Director Jean-Louis Falconi said the issue of a review
clause regarding Turkish implementation of the Ankara Protocol would
come to a head next week at the December 14 dinner of EU heads of state
Both Falconi and Bermann maintained Turkey had an obligation to act on
the Ankara Protocol by year's end. Arnaud said that France would back
suspension of only 8 chapters regarding EU accession although some in
the GOF were militating for a harsher response. Araud volunteered that
EU accession for Cyprus had been a blunder. The European public's view
of Turkey was degrading; Turkish refusal to allow Cyprus access to
Turkish air and sea ports did not play well and compounded the
ever-present tensions in Europe over Islam. Araud commented that the
Iraq intervention had also inflamed Turkish views of the West. Araud
regretted the lack of a viable go-between on Turkish accession within
the European Union, adding that the UK was disqualified from the role
because its approach had been too one-sided in support of Turkish
accession. Fried suggested that EU-President Finland should have been
natural candidate. Falconi concurred, noting the irony that Finland
instead had presided over setbacks for Turkish accession after having
first launched the process during an earlier Finnish EU presidency.
Russia's Bold Return.



7. (C) Araud judged that Russia was back on the international scene and
determined to antagonize the U.S. wherever possible. In Araud's
analysis, Russia was acting like a 19th-century power, treating foreign
affairs as a zero sum game; Russia brandished its energy resources like
a weapon; and, lastly, Russia would only engage with other sovereign
states and would not work with multilateral entities such as the
European Union. The independence of Ukraine had been too bitter a pill
for Russia to swallow, Araud remarked. In sum, said Araud, Putin's
Russia had become "unpredictable and brutal."

Watch Georgia's Back


8. (C) Fried commented that Putin had been emboldened by the
transatlantic fall-out during the run-up to the 2003 Iraq intervention
and believed, mistakenly, in a profound split. A common transatlantic
approach was critical to dealing with Russia and there could be need fo
even greater coordination in future, Fried concluded. He underscored
the importance of vigilance to protect Georgia's sovereignty. Russia
may try to precipitate a crisis which would have widespread
repercussions within the region.

French President and Public Out of Sync on Putin


9. (C) MFA Cabinet Adviser Danjean observed that Chirac's personal
rapport with Putin continued to guide French policy on Russia. This
would likely change, regardless of Chirac's successor after the 2007
elections. Sarkozy, Danjean noted, was responsive to public opinion, a
shown by his stance on Turkish EU accession. The French public
increasingly saw Russia as a Mafia state and Putin as a quasi-dictator.
(Bio Comment: Danjean is a self-avowed Sarkozy supporter and will stan
for election to the National Assembly as a UMP candidate.) Araud opine
that, whoever wins the French presidential election, French policy on
Russia would be shaped in coordination with PM Merkel.

Lebanon


10. (C) A/S Fried suggested to Araud the possibility of a follow-up
joint statement on Lebanon by the French and U.S. Presidents, similar t
the statement issued in early 2005. Araud said he would explore the
topic with Presidential Diplomatic Counselor Maurice Gourdault-Montagne
IO A/S- Equivalent Sylvie Bermann registered a complaint alleging U.S.
refusal to engage at the UNSC on a response to the SYG 1701 report.
(Comment: Bermann appeared not to be aware of headway made that same da
in discussions between the French delegation and USUN.)

Afghanistan: A Contact Group Would Be Remedy For Stovepiping


11. (C) A/S Fried asked Araud to expand on the notional French proposal

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for an International Contact Group for Afghanistan. Araud, who
described French thinking to date as "brainstorming," said the French
wanted the International Contact Group to comprise the G-8, NATO, EU an
the EU as the core group. There would be opportunities for ad hoc
participation by main ISAF contributors, for instance the Netherlands
and Poland; if addressing border or drug issues, then neighboring
countries could get involved. Araud hoped the Contact Group would foste
coherent political discussion. MFA Cabinet Adviser Carrel-Billard argue
the Contact Group would serve as a counter to "stovepiping," by
providing a common format for exchanges. A/S Fried noted that the
proposal had prompted complaints from the Afghan government. He
stressed that the U.S. wanted to be working together with France and
asked Araud for a GoF non-paper on the proposal.

Comment: Gerard Araud, A Political Director with an Atlanticist Hue


12. (C) Gerard Araud, the French ambassador to Israel from 2003-2006,
succeeded Stanislas de Laboulaye in September as Political Director, a
position the French MFA considers similar to Undersecretary for
Political Affairs. Araud has a reputation as a confirmed Atlanticist;
he has had close links to the Embassy for many years. Araud jested to
A/S Fried that a recent French book on the Arabist networks and
sympathies of President Chirac had branded Araud a "Sarko-Zionist" -- a
(nasty) word play on "Sarkozist," the term for supporters of UMP
Interior Minister Sarkozy's bid for the French Presidency, and on
Araud's friendly rapport with Israel. Engaging, skilled, self-confident
and at times flamboyant, Araud entered the French diplomatic service in

1982. His first posting was to Tel Aviv. He subsequently served at
CAP, the MFA equivalent to S/P, in Washington, in Paris at the MFA
Division of Economic and Financial Affairs, and, from 1993-1995 as the
diplomatic adviser to Defence Minister Leotard during the rightist Prim
Ministership of Edouard Balladur, before serving from 1995-2000 as the
French Deputy Permanent Representative to NATO.


13. (U) A/S Fried cleared this cable.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

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