A/S FRIED AND MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR ON KOSOVO, RUSSIA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007770 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL 12/07/2016 TAGS: PREL PHUM RU TU SR FR SUBJECT: A/S FRIED AND MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR ON KOSOVO, RUSSIA, TURKEY, AFGANISTAN Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Karl Hofmann. Reasons 1.4b, d ¶1. (C) Summary: A/S Fried and MFA Political Director Araud on December 6 discussed whether Russia would wield a veto at the UNSC to thwart Kosovar independence. Araud called for a resolution that would facilitate a Russian abstention. A/S Fried agreed, but insisted there must be a common diplomatic front ready to move forward regardless of Moscow. Thwarting Kosovar independence would foment violence, he warned The French noted Germany thought a further UNSC resolution necessary in order to recognize an independent Kosovo. Araud commented on renewed Russian assertiveness and antagonism toward the U.S., judging that Moscow was acting like a 19th century power that saw foreign affairs as a zero sum game. The French public was increasingly dubious of Putin although French policy remained guided by Chirac's personal relationships. A/S Fried called for vigilance to counter potential Russian undermining of Georgian sovereignty. On Turkey and EU accession, Araud forecast greater turbulence ahead since the matter had become a campaign topic in upcoming French Presidential elections. He said Chirac had asked PM Erdogan for a gesture on Cyprus without which France would have to endorse the European Commission report. (Note: The meeting took place before the Turkish proposal of the following day. End note.) A/S Fried asked Araud to clarify French notions for an International Contact Group for Afghanistan. Fried also suggested looking at a follow-up joint statement on Lebanon by the French and U.S. Presidents. End Summary. ¶2. (U) A/S Dan Fried, accompanied by DCM, PolMC and Poloff (notetaker) met December 6 with a French MFA delegation headed by Political Director Gerard Araud. French participants included Deputy Political Director Veronique Bujon-Barre, IO A/S-Equivalent Sylvie Bermann, Deputy Director for Continental Europe (Russia) Dominique Gazuy, PESC Director Jean-Louis Falconi, FM Cabinet Adviser for Balkans Arnaud Danjean, FM Cabinet Adviser for Afghanistan Francois-Xavier Carrel-Billiard, NATO Desk Officer Alexis Morel, and, as notetakers, Political Director Staffer Gael Veyssiere and Russia External Policy Desk Officer Marin Sirakov. Kosovo -- How to Secure a Russian Abstention ¶3. (C) On Kosovo Araud saw Moscow hardening its position and suggested there was a real possibility Russia would veto a draft UNSC resolution on the final status of Kosovo. The Russian ambassador to France had warned Araud earlier in the week that Russian public opinion prevented Moscow from breaking with Serbia over Kosovar independence. Araud called for strenuous efforts to accommodate a Russian abstention. A/S Fried said the message he had gotten in Moscow from Deputy FM Titov was less definitive; Russia could either abstain or veto, with Putin likely to take the final decision himself. Fried for his part had told Titov that Kosovar independence was inevitable and there would be a heavy price to pay for any nation that stood in the way. Thwarting Kosovar independence would lead to violent riots and turn KFOR into an occupyin force, a prospect unacceptable to the U.S. which had forces on the ground. Fried told Araud we must move forward together and be ready to stare down Moscow on Kosovo independence. Moscow would be quick to exploit any rifts between the European and U.S. positions. Bujon-Barre warned that the German MFA had conveyed it could not endorse any unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. Bermann underscored the need for legal cover for recognition of Kosovar independence; UNSCR 1244 (2001),the current operative authority, was inadequate, she stated. Fried noted that even tacit Russian support (i.e., abstention at the UNSC) was important. But in any event, the Quint needed to be determined to achieve that legal cover, and the best way to avoid a Russian veto was to signal to Moscow our willingness to support a final status decision based on Ahtisaari's recommendations with or without the Russians. ¶4. (C) Araud suggested UN Envoy Ahtisaari should refrain from circulating his proposals until after upcoming Serbian elections. It would be better to go to the UNSC on the pretext of an overt Serbian refusal, Araud advised. MFA Cabinet Adviser for the Balkans Arnaud Danjean believed the January elections would not produce a more flexibl Serbian government. The more moderate Serbian President Tadic's party would almost certainly need to form a coalition government with PM Vojislav Kostunica, who would demand a hard line on both Kosovar independence and cooperation with ICTY. Fried remarked that Kostunica' electorate could split, with some unwilling to jeopardize prospects of EU accession for Serbia through obduracy on Kosovo. Araud observed tha Serbian obstruction of the ICTY had frozen the EU-accession process. H noted that some EU members (Italy, Greece, Romania, Austria) nonetheles favored resuming negotiations on accession while suspending in advance the implementation of any agreement until the resolution of the ICTY impasse. Turkey: French Elections Mean More Turbulence Ahead PARIS 00007770 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) France is in the thick of elections and Turkey has become a campaign topic, Araud stated. Politicians were making declarations without regard to MFA guidance. Regrettably, there would be further turbulence in the coming six months before the election, he predicted. Meantime, French interests were hurting in Turkey. Ankara had retaliated by blocking access to the MFA for the French ambassador and hindering commercial deals. Outraged Turks were sending back to France their Legion d'Honneur decorations. Arnaud recounted that PM Erdogan ha evidently been blindsided by the EC report on Turkish accession. At Riga Chirac asked PM Erdogan for a gesture on Cyprus; otherwise, France would be constrained to back the EC report. Merkel had delivered the same message. Arnaud remarked that Greek PM Kostas Karamanlis in Riga had ironically seemed to advocate on behalf of Turkey, arguing for the merits of Turkish democracy and the need for further EU incentives. ¶6. (C) PESC Director Jean-Louis Falconi said the issue of a review clause regarding Turkish implementation of the Ankara Protocol would come to a head next week at the December 14 dinner of EU heads of state Both Falconi and Bermann maintained Turkey had an obligation to act on the Ankara Protocol by year's end. Arnaud said that France would back suspension of only 8 chapters regarding EU accession although some in the GOF were militating for a harsher response. Araud volunteered that EU accession for Cyprus had been a blunder. The European public's view of Turkey was degrading; Turkish refusal to allow Cyprus access to Turkish air and sea ports did not play well and compounded the ever-present tensions in Europe over Islam. Araud commented that the Iraq intervention had also inflamed Turkish views of the West. Araud regretted the lack of a viable go-between on Turkish accession within the European Union, adding that the UK was disqualified from the role because its approach had been too one-sided in support of Turkish accession. Fried suggested that EU-President Finland should have been natural candidate. Falconi concurred, noting the irony that Finland instead had presided over setbacks for Turkish accession after having first launched the process during an earlier Finnish EU presidency. Russia's Bold Return. ¶7. (C) Araud judged that Russia was back on the international scene and determined to antagonize the U.S. wherever possible. In Araud's analysis, Russia was acting like a 19th-century power, treating foreign affairs as a zero sum game; Russia brandished its energy resources like a weapon; and, lastly, Russia would only engage with other sovereign states and would not work with multilateral entities such as the European Union. The independence of Ukraine had been too bitter a pill for Russia to swallow, Araud remarked. In sum, said Araud, Putin's Russia had become "unpredictable and brutal." Watch Georgia's Back ¶8. (C) Fried commented that Putin had been emboldened by the transatlantic fall-out during the run-up to the 2003 Iraq intervention and believed, mistakenly, in a profound split. A common transatlantic approach was critical to dealing with Russia and there could be need fo even greater coordination in future, Fried concluded. He underscored the importance of vigilance to protect Georgia's sovereignty. Russia may try to precipitate a crisis which would have widespread repercussions within the region. French President and Public Out of Sync on Putin ¶9. (C) MFA Cabinet Adviser Danjean observed that Chirac's personal rapport with Putin continued to guide French policy on Russia. This would likely change, regardless of Chirac's successor after the 2007 elections. Sarkozy, Danjean noted, was responsive to public opinion, a shown by his stance on Turkish EU accession. The French public increasingly saw Russia as a Mafia state and Putin as a quasi-dictator. (Bio Comment: Danjean is a self-avowed Sarkozy supporter and will stan for election to the National Assembly as a UMP candidate.) Araud opine that, whoever wins the French presidential election, French policy on Russia would be shaped in coordination with PM Merkel. Lebanon ¶10. (C) A/S Fried suggested to Araud the possibility of a follow-up joint statement on Lebanon by the French and U.S. Presidents, similar t the statement issued in early 2005. Araud said he would explore the topic with Presidential Diplomatic Counselor Maurice Gourdault-Montagne IO A/S- Equivalent Sylvie Bermann registered a complaint alleging U.S. refusal to engage at the UNSC on a response to the SYG 1701 report. (Comment: Bermann appeared not to be aware of headway made that same da in discussions between the French delegation and USUN.) Afghanistan: A Contact Group Would Be Remedy For Stovepiping ¶11. (C) A/S Fried asked Araud to expand on the notional French proposal PARIS 00007770 003 OF 003 for an International Contact Group for Afghanistan. Araud, who described French thinking to date as "brainstorming," said the French wanted the International Contact Group to comprise the G-8, NATO, EU an the EU as the core group. There would be opportunities for ad hoc participation by main ISAF contributors, for instance the Netherlands and Poland; if addressing border or drug issues, then neighboring countries could get involved. Araud hoped the Contact Group would foste coherent political discussion. MFA Cabinet Adviser Carrel-Billard argue the Contact Group would serve as a counter to "stovepiping," by providing a common format for exchanges. A/S Fried noted that the proposal had prompted complaints from the Afghan government. He stressed that the U.S. wanted to be working together with France and asked Araud for a GoF non-paper on the proposal. Comment: Gerard Araud, A Political Director with an Atlanticist Hue ¶12. (C) Gerard Araud, the French ambassador to Israel from 2003-2006, succeeded Stanislas de Laboulaye in September as Political Director, a position the French MFA considers similar to Undersecretary for Political Affairs. Araud has a reputation as a confirmed Atlanticist; he has had close links to the Embassy for many years. Araud jested to A/S Fried that a recent French book on the Arabist networks and sympathies of President Chirac had branded Araud a "Sarko-Zionist" -- a (nasty) word play on "Sarkozist," the term for supporters of UMP Interior Minister Sarkozy's bid for the French Presidency, and on Araud's friendly rapport with Israel. Engaging, skilled, self-confident and at times flamboyant, Araud entered the French diplomatic service in ¶1982. His first posting was to Tel Aviv. He subsequently served at CAP, the MFA equivalent to S/P, in Washington, in Paris at the MFA Division of Economic and Financial Affairs, and, from 1993-1995 as the diplomatic adviser to Defence Minister Leotard during the rightist Prim Ministership of Edouard Balladur, before serving from 1995-2000 as the French Deputy Permanent Representative to NATO. ¶13. (U) A/S Fried cleared this cable. 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