AMBASSADOR GODEC'S DECEMBER 7 MEETINGS IN PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007756 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016 TAGS: FR KDEM PGOV PREL TS SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR GODEC'S DECEMBER 7 MEETINGS IN PARIS Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia Robert Godec held bilateral meetings on December 7 with Christian Testo, MFA DAS-equivalent for North Africa, and Jean-Pierre Filiu, Associate Professor at Sciences Po and former French DCM in Tunis. Testo and Filiu each described their Tunisian interlocutors as proud, prickly, and prone to resist any overt pressure on questions of human rights or democratization. Both expressed concern that the government's refusal to open the political system was ultimately counterproductive, and fed Islamic extremism. Testo noted, however, that France is extremely reluctant to apply pressure which might destabilize the regime. "We need the Tunisians," he said. End summary. ¶2. (C) U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia Robert Godec met on December 7 with Christian Testo, MFA DAS-equivalent for North Africa. Testo said that French-Tunisian relations, though correct, "lacked a certain warmth," especially when compared to France's relations with Algeria and Morocco. He ascribed the comparative coolness both to Ben Ali's personal style (he rarely travels and seldom visits Paris) as well as to French unease with the Tunisian president's brand of genteel totalitarianism. A Relationship Defined by "Little Problems" -------------- ¶3. (C) Though he said relations between France and Tunisia were not marred by any major problems, Testo identified a number of "little problems" that plagued the relationship. Foremost of these were disputes over personal status cases (i.e., divorces and child custody issues). In addition, Testo noted perennial problems related to French citizens acquiring or disposing of Tunisian real estate. Last but not least, he pointed to Tunisia's lack of cooperation in facilitating the repatriation of Tunisian nationals picked up by the French authorities for illegal immigration. He noted that the Tunisian Embassy consistently refused to issue such nationals a laissez-passer, making their repatriation a legal and bureaucratic nightmare. Concern Over Drift -------------- ¶4. (C) Turning to Tunisia's internal politics, Testo assessed that President Ben Ali's failure to open the political system was a major error which ultimately fueled Islamic extremism. He expressed concern about the drift of Tunisian society, which he said was becoming increasingly less secular. In that regard, he questioned the wisdom of the concessions that President Ben Ali had made to Tunisian Islamists in recent years. ¶5. (C) Testo expressed concern about the state of Ben Ali's health and speculated that the Tunisian leader suffered from one or more chronic ailments, although he had no precise information about his medical condition. He admitted that the French had little insight into the question of presidential succession due to the opaque nature of the regime. Not only was President Ben Ali carefully insulated by a small clique of his wife's relatives, but the Tunisian political class was paralyzed by the fear of omnipresent informers and thus studiously committed to rehearsing carefully scripted positions. Testo was particularly critical of FM Abdallah, who had elevated giving only the official line into a high art form. But No Stomach for Confrontation -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador Godec raised the possibility of pressing the GOT to increase political freedoms, but Testo made it clear that France saw little to be gained by applying overt pressure to the regime. Tunisia, whatever its faults, was one of the few states to play a consistently moderating role within the Arab League. Moreover, it boasted a solid middle class and was comparatively advanced in terms of women's rights. Consequently, the Quai was skeptical of any approach that might jeopardize Tunisia's stability. In addition, the Tunisians "detested" international pressure and bristled at the notion of conditionality. Testo noted that when the EU, in order to protest an incident in which the Tunisians spiked a German attempt to hold a meeting on human rights in Tunis, attempted to convoke the Tunisian ambassador to Brussels, the ambassador refused to attend. ¶7. (C) "We need the Tunisians," said Testo, who added that the French envisioned political reform in Tunisia as being PARIS 00007756 002 OF 002 driven by carrots rather than sticks. Testo conceded, however, that the problem with that approach was that the regime appeared increasingly insular and all too willing to perpetuate the status quo -- even at the cost of foregoing incentives for political change proffered by the EU and others. The Islamist Threat -------------- ¶8. (C) Jean-Pierre Filiu, a career diplomat on loan to Sciences Po who was formerly the French DCM in Tunis, offered a similar analysis in a separate meeting later that day. When asked by Ambassador Godec about encouraging political progress in Tunisia, Filiu observed that the Tunisians were constantly attempting to play the French and Americans off each other, although Filiu added that, to his knowledge, that tactic had never succeeded thanks to close cooperation between the U.S. and French missions. Filiu assessed that the Tunisians were deeply worried by the Freedom Agenda, which they saw as a direct threat to their stability. He noted that the Tunisian strategy was to pay lip service to democracy while avoiding any meaningful reform, as illustrated by the government's willingness to host a MEPI regional office in Tunis while simultaneously preventing Tunisian NGOs from interacting with MEPI. ¶9. (C) Filiu opined that the status quo in Tunisia could continue indefinitely so long as the Tunisian economy continued to grow at 5-6% per year. A cooling of the economy would, however, mean increased migratory pressure and political pressure. With respect to the latter, Filiu expressed concern that the regime's suppression of political Islam was merely feeding Islamic extremism. Satellite television broadcasts from the Arabian peninsula, especially Saudi-sponsored "Iqra", were also feeding the trend by propagating Wahhabist values. Noting that the Tunisian regime was "not very good" at detecting and apprehending Islamic extremists, Filiu estimated that a significant number of Tunisian jihadists left the country each week to join the insurgency in Iraq. Moreover, Filiu claimed that a Japanese investigation had determined that a webmaster for the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had been operating out of suburb north of Tunis. ¶10. (C) That revelation, said Filiu, raised a disquieting question: Did the authorities know about the webmaster's activities and quietly permit him to operate, or were they unaware of his presence? Filiu assumed the authorities were unaware, just as they had no prior inclination that the April 2002 Djerba synagogue bomber had been recruited by an al-Qaeda cell until after he had carried out his attack. Small wonder, he reasoned, that the Tunisian leadership was "fundamentally afraid" of its own population and of the future. ¶11. (U) This cable has been cleared by Ambassador Robert Godec. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON