NEA DAS GORDON GRAY'S DECEMBER 5 MEETING WITH MFA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007716 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016 TAGS: FR KDEM PGOV PREL SUBJECT: NEA DAS GORDON GRAY'S DECEMBER 5 MEETING WITH MFA COUNTERPART FRANCK GELLET Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a December 5 meeting with NEA DAS Gordon Gray, Franck Gellet, the MFA DAS-equivalent for the Persian Gulf, observed that the Gulf states were privately alarmed by Iran's nuclear ambitions, although their public discourse was not particularly helpful. He asked whether the U.S. had any binding bilateral agreements with the Gulf states that, in the event of an Iranian attack, would produce an American military riposte. He also noted a paradoxical attitude from the Gulf states vis-a-vis the Sunni insurgency in Iraq: On the one hand, the Gulf states feared the day when the jihadists would come home to roost; on the other hand, their antipathy toward the Shi'ites prevented them from taking a more vigorous stance against the insurgency. Gellet summed up the French approach to democratization in the Gulf as "let them go at their own pace." End summary. Much Concern About Iran -------------- ¶2. (C) In a December 5 meeting with NEA DAS Gordon Gray, Franck Gellet, the MFA DAS-equivalent for the Persian Gulf, said that there was a dichotomous discourse from the Gulf states with respect to the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program. In private, the Gulf states were generally quite candid with the French about the threat they perceived from a nuclear-armed Iran, whereas their public statements tended -- unhelpfully -- to downplay the threat. "They're completely terrified of Iran," said Gellet, who added that the Gulf states feared not only Iranian adventurism, but the prospect of Iranian retaliation in the aftermath of a strike on Iran's nuclear program. Gellet said the one exception to the above pattern was Kuwait. The Kuwaitis told the French that they were more concerned about the risks to the environment of a civilian nuclear accident in Iran than they were by the prospect of nuclear-armed Iran flexing its military muscle (in large part because the Kuwaitis assessed that they were already hopelessly disadvantaged in terms of conventional military strength in comparison to Iran). Gellet said he thought the Kuwaiti analysis was wrong, and that while the ecological risks of a civilian accident were real, the dangers posed by a nuclear-armed Iran were just as real. ¶3. (C) Gellet evinced notable curiosity about U.S. defense commitments in the region, asking whether the U.S. had any binding bilateral commitments that would obligate Washington to respond militarily in the event of an Iranian attack on a Gulf state. Gray pointed out that the U.S. has for decades considered the Gulf to be a vital strategic interest, and said that in light of our extensive security cooperation in the region, our Gulf allies felt little need to press for legalistic assurances. Gellet noted France's defense cooperation agreements with Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, adding: "If something happened, we'd be involved too." Iraq -------------- ¶4. (C) Gellet assessed that at the moment, the Gulf states were even more concerned about Iraq than about Iran and were waiting for Iraq to split along ethnic lines, with deleterious consequences for the entire region. In particular, he noted that the Saudis and others were concerned by the prospect of jihadists coming home to roost. Gellet found it paradoxical that, notwithstanding these concerns, the Gulf countries were not doing much to help the situation. "They could be doing more on controlling financing and deterring their own nationals from joining the fighting," he said. ¶5. (C) The real problem, in Gellet's opinion, is that the Gulf states have little affinity for an Iraqi government which they see, first and foremost, as a Shia government. He ascribed the lack of Gulf involvement in the International Compact for Iraq, as well as the failure to act more decisively against those supporting the Sunni insurgency, to Sunni-Shia antipathy. Gellet believed that the Saudis, in particular, had no interest in talking to Iraq's Shia leadership (although he hastened to add that Iraqi Shi'ites had done precious little to cultivate the Saudis, and had -- in his opinion -- no intention of sharing power with Iraq's Sunni minority). However, Gellet thought it would be very helpful if the Saudis agreed to host the Iraq Compact signing ceremony. Looking beyond the signing ceremony, he concluded: "If we want to involve them (the Gulf states) in supporting the Iraqi government, then we need a new power structure." Gray questioned Gellet's analysis, pointing out that the PARIS 00007716 002 OF 002 demographic realities of Iraq suggested that the Gulf states would need to reconcile themselves to the new political reality. Democracy in the Gulf: Don't Push -------------- ¶6. (C) Gellet described the recent elections in Bahrain as "a step in the right direction," and said that the presidential election in Yemen had been "ok" from a French perspective (although President Saleh's re-election had never been in doubt). He stressed, however, that France's approach was to let the Gulf states "go at their own pace" with respect to democratization. "In order to avoid the appearance of interfering in their internal affairs, we probably shouldn't push the Gulf States on this," said Gellet. DAS Gray pushed back against the "don't push" argument, noting our support for democratization had led to encouraging progress from a number of Gulf States over the past year. With remarkable candor, Gellet admitted that due to the relatively high standard of living in most Gulf States, there was comparatively little pressure from the French public for the Quai d'Orsay to take a harder line on promoting democracy. "We're not driven by French public opinion on this question," said Gellet, who acknowledged that the U.S. took a different approach. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON