FRANCE PROPOSES INTELLIGENCE-SHARING CONTACT GROUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 007714 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: UPON KOREAN REUNIFICATION TAGS: PARM KNNP PREL PGOV KN FR SUBJECT: FRANCE PROPOSES INTELLIGENCE-SHARING CONTACT GROUP TO COMBAT PROLIFERATION NETWORKS REF: A. STATE 193703 ¶B. STATE 150039 ¶C. PARIS 06189 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. Summary: (C) According to the MFA non-proliferatio officer, France shares the U.S.'s conviction that financial and transportation networks that facilitate North Korea's proliferation activities must be curbed. To that end, the GoF believes there is room for more coordination and intelligence sharing within the context of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to identify and map the ever-changing routes along which financial resources and sensitive technology and equipment travel. MFA officials note that the GoF plans to propose a contact group that would meet four times per year on the margins of the PSI's Operational Experts Group (OEG) meetings. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Poloff met December 1 with Arnaud Mentre, desk officer in the MFA's bureau of Disarmament and Non-proliferation, to deliver ref A demarche on examples of DPRK proliferation. We also delivered the demarch to Raul Fernandez, DAS for International Financial Affairs at the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Mentre thanked the U.S. for sharing information on entities known to contribute to North Korea's proliferation efforts. He added that the GoF was familiar with these entities' and individuals' reputations as notorious proliferators. Thanks to the EU's new sanctions against North Korea announced November 20, all EU nations should have the legal means to block proliferators' assets and inspect suspicious cargo, he asserted. Mentre said the GoF was pleased to learn that the U.S. had delivered a similar demarche to Switzerland, because it is necessary for both the UNSC and the EU to encourage active Swiss involvement in freezing proliferators' assets. ¶3. (C) Mentre urged the U.S. to reconsider tactics when the UNSC sanctions committee meets. Following meetings at the MFA with Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration November 30, Mentre had understood that the U.S. fears that a discussion of specific luxury goods during committee meetings could degenerate into endless quibbling over particular items and effectively postpone meaningful enforcement of sanctions. While the GoF shares the U.S. frustration with China and Russia's obstruction and procrastination, Mentre said the GoF perceives that both nations might remain open to clear guidelines on what type of goods should be sanctioned, even if they are reluctant to identify specific products. ¶4. (C) Mentre said the MFA was pleased that the U.S. shared its conviction that PSI might provide a forum for regular intelligence sharing on proliferators shipping routes, transfer and refueling points, and the names of suspected companies (Ref B). The MFA is developing a policy paper that it will soon share with the Department, which will propose the formation of a contact group composed of all interested PSI partners, he said. (NOTE: Mentre earlier mentioned a nascent MFA idea for intelligence-sharing measures under the aegis of PSI during a September 13 meeting with Poloff (Ref C)). The group would meet quarterly on the margins of the OEG meetings to share intelligence on proliferation. He said the contact group would not emphasize interception of suspicious cargo, but rather information sharing that the GoF hopes will "sensitize" some flagging PSI partners to the ubiquity and complexity of proliferators' shipping networks. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON