DOD U/S EDELMAN'S DECEMBER 1 MEETING WITH CHIRAC'S

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007684 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2016 TAGS: FR IS KDEM LE PGOV PREL SY SUBJECT: DOD U/S EDELMAN'S DECEMBER 1 MEETING WITH CHIRAC'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER GOURDALT-MONTAGNE Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: In a December 1 meeting with DoD U/S Edelman devoted primarily to Syria/Lebanon, French NSA-equivalent Maurice Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) assessed that Syria was the weakest link in the Hizballah-Syria-Iran axis and wondered whether Israel could apply more pressure on Syria, a question he said he would put to his Israeli counterpart later in the month. He assessed that the recent spate of high-level European visitors to Damascus had not been helpful, and said rumors about the Iraq Study Group's possible recommendations on engaging with Syria had further complicated matters. MGM noted that Pierre de Bousquet, head of the DST (French internal security service),had quietly visited Damascus to warn the Asad regime that it would be held accountable for chaos in Lebanon and for any attacks against UNIFIL. Bousquet also cautioned the Syrians that French policy vis-a-vis Lebanon would not change even after President Chirac leaves office in 2007. With respect to the current political crisis in Lebanon, MGM said France was putting "maximum pressure" on Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, although it was unclear what Berri could do under the circumstances. ¶2. (S) Summary cont'd: MGM discussed continuing French efforts to end Israeli overflights of Lebanon. On Turkey-EU, MGM said it was not in France's interest to burn bridges with Turkey, and pointed out that President Chirac had taken a political risk by speaking out against legislation on the Armenian genocide. On Serbia, MGM said that "we need to do everything we can" to prevent Serbian Radical Party leader (and indicted war criminal) Vojislav Seselj from being elected. Riga summit discussion septel. End summary. Participants -------------- ¶3. (U) DoD U/S Eric Edelman, accompanied by DCM, DATT, DoD DAS Daniel Fata, and Poloff (notetaker),met December 1 at the Elysee with Maurice Gourdault-Montagne (MGM),French national security advisor-equivalent. MGM was accompanied by Dominique Boche, President Chirac's advisor for the Middle East; Admiral Edouard Guillaud, the president's military advisor; and strategic affairs advisor Laurent Bili. Dealing with a Recalcitrant Syria -------------- ¶4. (S) After a quick discussion of the Riga Summit (see septel),conversation immediately turned to the Middle East. U/S Edelman and MGM agreed that Syrian behavior on a broad range of issues -- support for Iraqi insurgents, interference in Lebanon, and sponsorship of Hamas, Hizballah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad -- had not improved. MGM assessed that Syria was the weakest link in the Hizballah-Syria-Iran axis and therefore the logical target for international pressure. However, he confessed to being somewhat puzzled by Israel's failure to take a more aggressive line with Syria. He said he would use a meeting later in December with PM Olmert's military advisor, Major General Gadi Shamni, to discuss strategy and to explore whether Israel could apply more pressure. ¶5. (C) MGM assessed that the recent spate of high-level European visitors to Damascus had been unhelpful, and had only reinforced Bashar al-Asad's perception that the West needed him. Noting that Asad's European interlocutors had left Damascus empty-handed, MGM said he had warned British envoy Nigel Sheinwald that his visit would prove counterproductive, particularly if it became public. Although Sheinwald was "upbeat" following his discussions in Damascus, MGM observed that the Syrians (with Iranian complicity) had lost no time in "pulling the rug out from under" the Lebanese government by engineering the resignation of the Shiite Ministers and the assassination of Pierre Gemayel. MGM pointed out that rumors about the Iraq Study Group's (ISG) forthcoming recommendations, and in particular the expectation that the ISG would recommend some sort of U.S. dialogue with Syria, had further complicated matters. De Bosquet Visit to Damascus -------------- ¶6. (C) MGM noted that, unfortunately, the French found themselves obliged to talk to the Syrian regime on matters relating to the interdiction and prosecution of French jihadists seeking to enter Iraq via Syria. To that end, the French had recently despatched Pierre de Bousquet, head of the DST (French internal security service) to Damascus, where PARIS 00007684 002 OF 003 he held talks with Syrian military intelligence chief Assef Shawkat. MGM said Bousquet made the following points: -- Syria will be held responsible for any chaos in Lebanon; -- Syria will also be held accountable for any attacks against UNIFIL; -- Constructive Syrian behavior would elicit a positive reaction; -- If the Syrians behaved, France would support a resumption of talks on the Golan Heights. ¶7. (C) Finally, Bousquet warned the regime against miscalculating the future direction of French policy. While it was true that President Chirac was nearing the end of his mandate, France would still be France even after Chirac's departure -- and its Lebanon policy would be the same. (MGM noted parenthetically that he was pleased to see that France's Socialist Party was on board with that message. Socialist presidential candidate Segolene Royal, then in Lebanon, had made this clear.) Intriguingly, Shawkat invited Bousquet to make those same points directly to Asad, a request that the French interpreted either as evidence either that Asad did not listen to Shawkat, or that the latter needed Bousquet to personally reinforce the message. MGM said the Bousquet-Asad conversation had not yet taken place. Brammertz Investigation -------------- ¶8. (C) Turning to the UNIIC investigation, MGM said Brammertz had done "serious work" and that the Syrians were desperate to avoid an international tribunal. He noted that France had "tried its best" to persuade the Russians to facilitate a speedy establishment of the tribunal. In addition, he said both France and Saudi Arabia (Prince Bandar met with President Chirac the week of November 19) were putting "maximum pressure" on Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri to end the current political crisis. "We need Berri to play a role," said MGM, who nonetheless questioned whether Berri could deliver. Israeli Overflights -------------- ¶9. (C) With respect to Israeli overflights of Lebanon, MGM said the French were trying to dampen down the "crisis" that the overflights had engendered in Franco-Israeli relations. He noted that France continued to develop a package of security measures aimed at reducing the need for such flights, and said that the French military and the IDF had held consultations in that regard. He thanked U/S Edelman for U.S. assistance in sensitizing the GOI to France's concerns. Noting that air defense rules of engagement did not leave much margin for error, he said it would be tragic if a UNIFIL soldier were open to fire simply because he was following the rules of engagement. ¶10. (C) Nonetheless, he expressed frustration that the Israelis had not fully taken on board France's concerns. He pointed to the fact that, while there had been a slight reduction in the number of overflights, the flights continued. He stressed that of fourteen recent violations of Lebanese airspace, eleven took place over French UNIFIL positions. "We have asked the Israelis not to misbehave, and we have warned them that our soldiers are not Fijians," said MGM. In addition to the dangers of an unwanted confrontation, such overflights undermined UNIFIL's credibility. MGM noted that he had given Israeli Ambassador Shek a blunt warning: If the overflights continued, the French peacekeepers might simply announce that the Israelis were impeding them from doing their job and go home -- which would not be in Israel's interest. Turkey/Serbia -------------- ¶11. (C) Recalling U/S Edelman's prior service as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, MGM noted that France had "no interest in burning bridges" with Ankara over the question of Turkey's admission to the EU. He added that President Chirac had taken a personal political risk in speaking out against the National Assembly's attempt to criminalize denial of the Armenian genocide. He questioned whether Turkish PM Erdogan would attempt to win the Turkish presidency in 2007. Turning to Serbia, MGM said "we need to do everything we can" to prevent Serbian Radical Party leader (and indicated war criminal) Vojislav Seselj from being elected president and that France would push for SAA to be extended to Serbia at the EU Summit. PARIS 00007684 003 OF 003 ¶12. (U) U/S Edelman has cleared this cable. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON