FRENCH MFA EVER MORE PESSIMISTIC ON LEBANON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007668 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2016 TAGS: FR LE PGOV PREL SY SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA EVER MORE PESSIMISTIC ON LEBANON REF: PARIS 7211 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: Damien Loras, Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy's cabinet advisor for the Middle East, told us December 4 that he was "quite pessimistic" about Lebanon's future and doubtful that PM Siniora's government would survive. Nevertheless, he said the MFA was not inclined at present to favor the creation of an international tribunal under the UNSC's Chapter VII authority. Expressing his personal view, Loras questioned whether UNIFIL could be sustained if Hizballah were to win new parliamentary elections. For the moment, the French remain focused on the increasingly difficult task of isolating Syria (FM Douste-Blazy phoned German FM Steinmeier on December 3 and warned him that President Chirac would cancel a December 5 meeting with Chancellor Merkel if Steinmeier did not scrub a planned visit to Damascus on December 4). In addition, the Quai is considering inviting PM Siniora to a mid-December meeting of the European Council in order to demonstrate international support for his government. Finally, the Quai has drafted a PRST ("deliberately low-key on disarming Hizballah") in response to SYG Annan's letter on UNSCR 1701 implementation, which they are sharing with USUN today. End summary. Hizballah Holding Cards; Syrians Need to Pay a Price -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S) In what has become a familiar refrain from French officials, Damien Loras, Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy's cabinet advisor for the Middle East, told us December 4 that he was "quite pessimistic" about Lebanon's future. While the Quai continues to bank on the survival of PM Siniora's government, Loras assessed that the Hizballah-Amal-Aoun axis had more cards to play (e.g., sit-ins, violent protests, mass resignation from parliament) at the moment than did Siniora. The one politician who might be able to broker a compromise, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, was justifiably afraid for his life and sounded increasingly like a Hizballah spokesman. Moreover, Loras saw little prospect for compromise from the Hizballah/Aounist camp inasmuch as Tehran and Damascus were calling the shots. "The problem is that the Syrians think they can act with impunity -- they haven't had to pay a price for this summer's war or for Pierre Gemayel's assassination," said Loras. Chapter VII -------------- ¶3. (S) Loras noted that Ambassador (to Lebanon) Emie is a strong advocate of alleviating the pressure on the March 14 coalition by establishing an international criminal tribunal under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, thereby obviating the need for Lebanese parliamentary approval. The Quai, however, remains unpersuaded by this argument. Loras said it was unlikely such an attempt would succeed in the UNSC, and even if it did, it would certainly not have unanimous support. Moreover, the optic of the international community imposing a tribunal on Lebanon would play into the Syria-Hizballah strategy of depicting PM Siniora as a western stooge, making the prospects for the tribunal's successful operation even dimmer. Finally, Loras noted that the Quai's lawyers had serious misgivings about the legal basis for going the Chapter VII route. Future of UNIFIL -------------- ¶4. (S) Stressing that he was sharing a personal opinion that does not reflect official MFA policy, Loras questioned whether the Siniora government could long survive in its current form. He hypothesized that if new parliamentary elections were held from which the Hizballah-Amal-Aounist alliance emerged further strengthened, then there would be no prospect for implementing UNSCR 1701 in the foreseeable future. He speculated that, under those circumstances, French participation in UNIFIL (and indeed, UNIFIL's continued operation) might become untenable. Enough Angst: What the French Are Doing -------------- ¶5. (S) Loras indicated that for the moment, the French remain focused on the increasingly difficult task of keeping the Syrian regime isolated. In that regard, FM Douste-Blazy phoned German FM Steinmeier on December 3 and warned him that President Chirac would cancel a December 5 meeting with Chancellor Merkel if Steinmeier did not scrub a planned visit to Damascus on December 4. (Loras admitted that he did not PARIS 00007668 002 OF 002 know whether Steinmeier heeded Douste-Blazy's warning, or whether President Chirac would actually follow through on his threat if Steinmeier did not.) Loras noted that the French were dismayed to learn, during a stop in Paris on November 27 by Russian DFM Saltanov, that Syrian President Bashar al-Asad would be received in Moscow later this month. (Note: We were told separately by other Quai officials that Saltanov, who was en route to Moscow following a visit to Lebanon and Syria that included a meeting with Asad, gave the French a blunt warning. "Bashar is not his father," said Saltanov, who suggested that the new Syrian leader was less calculating -- and, consequently, perhaps more dangerous -- than the late Hafez al-Asad. Saltanov said that efforts to put the Syrian regime "under siege" -- a reference to the establishment of an international tribunal for the Rafik Hariri assassination -- risked sparking a backlash against French interests both inside and outside of Lebanon. "Don't sacrifice Lebanon to get Bashar," was the essence of Saltanov's message. The French were surprised by Saltanov's bluntness, but unswayed. End note.) ¶6. (S) In addition, the French may invite PM Siniora to attend a mid-December meeting of the European Council in order to demonstrate international support for him and his government. "We know it's not much, but it might help a little," said Loras. ¶7. (S) Finally, Loras said that the French found UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's letter on UNSCR 1701 SIPDIS implementation to be "very disappointing -- we were told we would be disappointed, and we were." Nonetheless, the French had prepared a PRST which the French UN delegation planned to share December 4 with USUN. ¶8. (S) Somewhat paradoxically in light of his criticism of the SYG's letter, Loras said that the French objective with the PRST was "not to increase the pressure" on the Siniora government by making demands on UNSCR 1701 implementation that might further provoke Hizballah. Consequently, the French draft was "very low-key" on the question of Hizballah disarmament. In fact, Loras admitted there was no explicit reference to disarmament at all, only an implict one. Poloff cautioned Loras that USUN would likely have difficulty supporting a text, however well-intentioned, that appeared to give Hizballah a pass on disarmament -- especially if that same text contained an unhelpful fixation on Israeli overflights and the status of Sheba Farms. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON