TOGO: EX-MINISTER BOKO DISCUSSES RECENT EVENTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000741 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2016 TAGS: PREL PHUM MARR PINR TO FR SUBJECT: TOGO: EX-MINISTER BOKO DISCUSSES RECENT EVENTS AND HIS PLANS TO ENTER POLITICAL FRAY REF: A. 05 PARIS 4103 ¶B. LOME 55 ¶C. PARIS 553 ¶D. 05 PARIS 952 ¶E. 05 PARIS 1229 PARIS 00000741 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Togo's former Interior Minister Francois Boko on January 31 discussed Togo-Cote d'Ivoire arms trafficking (planes piloted by Belarusian mercenaries were involved in the November 2004 bombings in Cote d'Ivoire and had transited Togo, but France did not pursue information Boko says he provided); political developments in Togo (President Faure uninterested in reform, continues to allow and benefit from illicit activities of his associates); and Boko's intentions to play a public role in Togo-related politics. Boko and the head of the Paris law firm that employs him also offered brief comments on China's activities in Africa. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) At his invitation, we met on January 31 with Francois Boko, who had served as Togo's Interior Minister until April 2005, when he was removed from office, took refuge in the German Embassy, and then left for exile in France. Boko had broken ranks with the GoT by calling for the postponement of elections in Togo in view of the instability building during the pre-election period (Ref A). TOGO-COTE d'IVOIRE ARMS TRAFFICKING -------------- ¶3. (C) Boko commented extensively on the links between Togo and the November 6, 2004, bombing in Cote d'Ivoire, when GOCI forces attacked a French military base, killing nine French soldiers and an Amcit civilian. He said that the two Sukhoi-25 aircraft used in the bombing had been provided to the GOCI by former French gendarme Robert Montoya (Refs B and C). Montoya had obtained these and other aircraft and military equipment from Belarus and had also engaged Belarusian pilots and technicians. The planes had arrived unassembled in Togo, where they were assembled and then flown to Cote d'Ivoire. Boko said that the GoT leadership and military were aware of the presence of the planes and pilots/technicians in Togo. Boko said that French forces also had to be aware of their presence because the Belarusian planes were kept at the same Lome air facility the French were using to operate their own air missions in support of French forces in Cote d'Ivoire. ¶4. (C) After the November 6 bombings, Boko said that he had had the Belarusian pilots/technicians arrested when they returned to Togo from Cote d'Ivoire. He said that there were nine of them. Boko said he furnished details about their identities and activities to the French, through France's Embassy in Lome and also through direct contact with General Poncet, who then commanded France's Operation Licorne in Cote d'Ivoire. Boko thought there would be high French interest in the information he had conveyed but was surprised when the French did not express much interest. After holding the nine Belarusians for about two weeks, Boko was told by the French (including General Poncet, who communicated directly with Boko) to release them. The only explanation he received (again including from General Poncet) was that France "was not looking to complicate relations with Belarus over this matter." ¶5. (C) Boko said he found this lack of French interest surprising inasmuch as the bombing had resulted in the deaths of French soldiers. He predicted that a scandal was brewing that might erupt once French judicial investigation (Ref C, paras 6-7) of the case unearthed more facts. Boko said that recent French media reports on the "discovery" of a second set of planes in Lome, along with their connection to Montoya, were in fact an old story that the press should have reported a year ago. This issue was "news" only because of Judge Brigitte Raynaud's investigation, itself prompted by legal claims on the part of the families of the soldiers killed in the raid. The planes had been sitting unused at the Lome air facility since the time of the bombings in Cote d'Ivoire. ¶6. (C) Boko said that Robert Montoya was among the group of French and other non-Togolese that had long had access to the Eyadema regime. This group, which included Charles Debbasch (Ref D),was involved in a great deal of nefarious activity in Togo, Boko asserted, and had always enjoyed the protection of the regime. Boko said that after the French press this PARIS 00000741 002.2 OF 004 past week had begun reporting on Montoya, his arms trafficking, and his connection to Cote d'Ivoire, Montoya's wife went to a notary in Togo who handled Montoya's businesses. This notary, according to Boko, dissolved all of Montoya's businesses and then created new ones, but listed different owners. This, Boko said, was done to protect Montoya's assets should legal action be taken against him or his companies. Boko said that the GoT had issued Debbasch a Togolese diplomatic passport as a form of protection. Even though Debbasch had been convicted of financial offenses in France and was therefore subject to arrest (Ref E),Boko claims that Debbasch traveled to France to celebrate the December 2005 holidays without, apparently, being hindered by the GoF. 7, (U) See concluding paragraphs of this message for recent media reports on the investigation into the November 6, 2004, bombing. DEVELOPMENTS IN TOGO -------------- ¶8. (C) Boko said that Faure was making no effort to institute reform and seemed content to live within the structures Eyadema had left for him. Boko related that the small inner circle surrounding Faure (which included foreigners such as Montoya and Debbasch) continued to carry out their illicit activities, which benefited themselves and Faure as well. This reliance on criminal or quasi-criminal activities allowed Faure to lead a comfortable, if not luxurious, life, and provided no incentive for him to institute the kinds of reforms that might make Togo more acceptable to international lenders or private sector investors. All of which was very bad for Togo, in Boko's view. ¶9. (C) Boko noted Faure's inability to gain international "recognition." No one of significance wanted to meet with him and he could be considered a pariah internationally. One of his only formal trips abroad had been to Iran, and who needed Iran's blessing, Boko asked rhetorically. Boko said that Faure had nine wives, one of whom was a cousin of opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio (see below),with another being the daughter of Ghana's President Kufuor. Boko said these marriages were useful for Faure politically. BOKO EXASPERATED WITH THE FRENCH -------------- ¶10. (C) Throughout the meeting, Boko expressed dismay with French attitudes towards Togo. The French apparently did not want to pursue the November 2004 bombing and the links with Togo and Belarus, but this reticence, he again predicted, could become more problematic if Judge Raynaud's investigation gained traction with the media. (NOTE: French investigative judges have a great deal of independence and can pursue investigations that in some cases the rest of the GoF might not want investigated. END NOTE.) Boko said the French also did not seem concerned about Faure and his failure to reform. Exasperated, Boko said France appeared ready to do what it has done so many times before -- back "the man of the moment" so long as "the man" can ensure some degree of stability. Boko noted that the French had invested so much in Eyadema that they perhaps could not contemplate starting from scratch. He acknowledged that events in Cote d'Ivoire, after Houphouet's death, may have served as a lesson to the French in terms of seeking stability rather than letting chaos ensue when a dynasty ends. BOKO'S POLITICAL AMBITIONS -------------- ¶11. (C) Boko confided that he was soon going to re-enter the Togolese political scene. He was scheduled to be the main speaker at a February 4 event in Paris to which all Togolese, the press, and friends of Togo were invited. He explained that he was not speaking at this event to proclaim himself as the "opposition's new leader," but instead hoped that the meeting would allow for open discussion of events in Togo and serve as a vehicle for uniting the Togolese diaspora. ¶12. (C) Boko said he planned to speak on three general themes: (1) the need for Togo's opposition leaders and members of the diaspora to put aside factional differences and meet together to discuss Togo's future and adopt a common roadmap for progress; (2) the need to reassure and win over Togo's military by explaining that "reform" was not directed against the military; and (3) the need to unite in demanding that Togo's constitution and laws be respected, particularly concerning presidential succession. PARIS 00000741 003.2 OF 004 ¶13. (C) Boko at an earlier meeting revealed that the GoF, upon allowing him to live in France, suggested that he not get involved in politics. Pressed about this, Boko countered that he was not a formal "political refugee" and that he was therefore not subject to GoF control over his activities. He did say, however, that he had informed the GoF that he would not speak publicly about "sensitive" issues, such as the Montoya affair or Togo's role in international drug smuggling. He told the French that he would focus on Togo's future and how to instill political change in a positive manner. Boko indicated that GoF security elements provide intermittent surveillance of his home and workplace to protect him and his family. RIVALRY WITH OLYMPIO? -------------- ¶14. (C) Boko said he did not have much contact with Gilchrist Olympio, who seemed to want to avoid Boko and who resented the possibility of Boko's becoming a new opposition figure. In Boko's opinion, Olympio was past his prime and should understand that a new generation was on the scene. It was futile for Olympio to try to refight political battles dating back to the 1960s, when Eyadema ousted Olympio's father from power and may have been involved in his death. Boko was very annoyed that after the February 4 meeting was announced in December, Olympio a few weeks later announced a meeting of his own, to take place at the same time and on the same date as Boko's February 4 meeting. To Boko, this was a ham-fisted attempt to disrupt Boko's meeting. Boko said the Togolese community harshly criticized Olympio's announcement. Realizing his error, Olympio had not said anything further about holding his meeting and Boko was not sure it would take place. Boko expected 400-500 to attend Boko's meeting. ¶15. (C) Boko also criticized Olympio for his willingness to meet with and possibly curry favor with Faure. He noted that Olympio seemed to go out of his way to travel to places where he knew he would have a chance to meet with Faure. This, Boko claimed, discredited Olympio in the eyes of the Togolese diaspora. As a parting shot, Boko said that Olympio suffered credibility problems because Faure was married to one of Olympio's relatives. ¶16. (C) COMMENT: It was not clear from Boko's remarks the extent to which he is prepared to anoint himself a leader (or THE leader) of the Togolese opposition. He denied that he intended to do so, speaking of his simple desire to unite the Togolese people. Still, his own ambition did not lie deeply below the surface of his comments, and we will try to assess his motives as well as the degree to which the Togolese community views him as a new leader. END COMMENT. ¶17. (SBU) BIO NOTE: Boko said he was happy working at the law offices of Alain Feneon, where he is one of five lawyers engaged in facilitating the work of non-African companies in Africa. He said, however, that he was applying for one of the four vacant vice-presidency positions at the African Development Bank. At the same time, his French-citizen wife was applying for a position at the EU in Brussels, which would require commuting daily by TGV. He said he did not know how feasible obtaining either job would be, as they would both place strains on the Boko household, which would be complicated by the birth of his second child within the next few weeks. Boko said the couple also had a nine-year-old son. VISIT TO LAW OFFICE, COMMENTS ON CHINA -------------- 18, (C) Boko offered a tour of his law office, where we met with the firm's head, Alain Feneon (PROTECT THROUGHOUT). The firm is heavily engaged in providing consulting services and legal advice to companies doing business in Africa and to a few African groups seeking opportunities in Europe. The firm has operated since 1978 and Feneon has been closely involved in the OHADA project to harmonize the commercial and business laws of several African countries. He described the difficulties of reconciling civil and common law approaches but stressed the great progress OHADA has made. ¶19. (C) Feneon and Boko described the appeal of Africa to international businesses, particularly those interested in infrastructure development and resource extraction. Boko said he was working on several projects involving UNDP activity in Africa and one case involving Benin and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Boko noted that Faure had recently rescinded an oil contract with the Hunt Oil Co.; he suspected that Faure would make a new deal with the Chinese. PARIS 00000741 004.2 OF 004 ¶20. (C) Feneon said he was aware of "at least 500 Chinese companies," most of which were state owned, seeking opportunities in Africa. He said the Chinese were "interested in everything." Several clients of Feneon's firm are Chinese and he provided a brochure on the firm printed in Chinese. Feneon described one case involving China and Namibia. He said that Namibia had been unable to repay a Chinese loan. The Chinese, he said, quickly told Namibia, "don't worry about it. Just give us 5,000 passports and residency documents." Feneon claimed that 5,000 Chinese families were resettled in Namibia as a result and were now engaged in any number of small and large business activities in Namibia. Feneon commented that this kind of arrangement helped solve two problems for the Chinese: easing population pressures and establishing communities in Africa that could be of use to China later. PRESS REPORTS ON TOGO-COTE d'IVOIRE-MONTOYA -------------- ¶21. (SBU) Paris daily Le Monde carried two articles on January 31 concerning the investigations into the November 6, 2004, bombing incident in Cote d'Ivoire and the Togo/Montoya connection. This followed previous Le Monde coverage reported Ref C. One article said that Judge Raynaud's visit to Togo in mid-January had been useful and that she obtained numerous documents implicating Montoya, whom she reportedly wanted to prosecute for "complicity" in the bombing. French General Michel Masson of the French military's Directorate for Military Intelligence reportedly confirmed Montoya's involvement in supplying the two aircraft that did the bombing. The article also outlines Montoya's involvement with the Belarusian pilots/technicians (the article says there were eight of them, whereas Boko said there were nine). The Belarusians were reportedly released from Togolese custody into the care of a Belarusian woman who turned out to be Montoya's secretary. Le Monde reports that Montoya is also under investigation by Togolese authorities. Montoya is quoted in the article as admitting his involvement in the affair but denying its illegality. ¶22. (U) The second Le Monde article contains statements by the Ivoirian members of the crews of the two aircraft involved in the bombing (both aircraft were piloted by a Belarusian with an Ivoirian co-pilot). The Ivoirians are quoted as saying they did not intend to attack the French base but rather nearby hostile forces. Because of the proximity to the base, any bombing of the French was accidental. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton