FRENCH PRESIDENCY VIEWS ON IRAQ, LEBANON, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007322

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016
TAGS: FR IZ KDEM PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: FRENCH PRESIDENCY VIEWS ON IRAQ, LEBANON, AND
OTHER MIDDLE EAST ISSUES

REF: A. STATE 181094


B. PARIS 6512

C. PARIS POINTS OF 11/8

Classified By: A/DCM Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: A/DCM met 11/8 with Dominique Boche,
President Chirac's foreign policy advisor for the Middle East
and North Africa and received a short readout of Iraqi
President Jalal Talabani's visit to France November 1-2.
Boche noted that Talabani did not raise France's
long-standing offer to train Iraqi security forces in France,
adding that even if Talabani had raised the subject, the
French no longer consider the offer to be on the table.
Boche was skeptical about PA President Mahmoud Abbas' ability
to form a national unity government with Hamas; appeared
confident that Lebanese PM Siniora would be able to resist
pressure from Hizballah and from Free Patriotic Movement
leader Michel Aoun to expand the government; and predicted
that President Chirac's successor would be tempted to open a
dialogue with Damascus -- but would soon discover that
sending envoys to Asad's regime was an exercise in futility.
He confirmed that France expects to sign a revised military
cooperation agreement with Kuwait during the Emir's visit to
Paris on November 30. Turning to President Chirac's foreign
policy legacy in the region, Boche noted that improved
relations with Israel over the past two years have allowed
France to move beyond a "declaratory, and largely
condemnatory, policy approach" to an "operational policy"
that allows France to influence events on the ground. End
summary.

Talabani Visit
--------------


2. (C) PolMinCouns and NEA Watcher met 11/8 with Dominique
Boche, President Chirac's Counselor for the Middle East and
North Africa. Boche provided a succinct readout of the
November 1-2 visit to France of Iraqi President Jalal
Talabani, saying that the atmosphere in Talabani's meeting
with Chirac was quite warm. Talabani avoided making specific
requests of Chirac and the conversation between the two
presidents remained general, yet encompassed discussion of
Turkey, Syria and Iran. Talabani was upbeat on Turkey ("this
was interesting coming from Talabani," said Boche) and
sharply critical of Damascus, which he said was facilitating
insurgent operations in Iraq. (Note: In a meeting with Arab
Ambassadors in Paris following his meeting with President
Chirac, Talabani denied having discussed Syria with Chirac.
However, Iraqi Ambassador Abboud confirmed that Chirac and
Talabani discussed Syria at length. End note.) With respect
to the security situation inside Iraq, Talabani came across
as overly optimistic in Boche's opinion. "He cited some
figures about how the number of attacks was declining. This
struck us as wishful thinking," said Boche.


3. (C) In terms of French support for Iraq, the mere fact
that Paris agreed to the visit constituted support for
Talabani and for the United States in the run-up to the
mid-term elections, Boche said without a hint of irony.
Stressing that it was in no one's interest (other than
perhaps Iran's) to see the situation in Iraq deteriorate
further, Boche pointed to the fact that France had forgiven
80 percent of Iraq's bilateral debt. When A/DCM noted the
USG's interest in 100% debt relief (Ref A),Boche responded
that Talabani had not pressed for a cancellation of the
remaining 20 percent, although Boche hinted that any further
French economic assistance -- even in the context of the Iraq
Compact -- was unlikely; France sees the revival of Iraqi
petroleum revenues (itself dependent on the reduction of
corruption in the petroleum sector),rather than a
continuation of international assistance, as the key to
Iraq's future economic growth. By the same token, Talabani
did not raise France's longstanding offer to train Iraqi
security forces in France. "As you know, when we made our
offer the Iraqis never did respond," said Boche, who made it
clear that the French now consider the offer to be off the
table because they judge that the Iraqi Ministry of the
Interior has been compromised by the infiltration of and
support for Shia militias. (Note: As reported Ref B, the Quai
told us several weeks ago that the training offer was no
longer in prospect; we consider Boche's comments as
definitive confirmation of that position. End note.)


4. (C) Boche gently scoffed at the Iraqi Education Minister's
request that France assist in providing textbooks to Iraqi
schools, suggesting this was not an appropriate priority for
a country in crisis. In the end, the only "deliverable" for
Talabani's visit was a French commitment to open a diplomatic
office in Irbil. Asked how he saw France's relations with
Iraq evolving over the next six to twelve months, Boche said
that it was totally dependent on the security situation -- a
situation he saw as headed downhill. He anticipated that,
whatever the outcome, France's 2007 presidential election
would have little impact on the Elysee's Iraq policy. "It's
natural for candidates to debate international questions
during a campaign, but after the election continuity
prevails," he said.

Israeli-Palestinian Relations
--------------


5. (C) Turning to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Boche
said the situation in the Occupied Territories was
deteriorating in every respect: political, security, and
humanitarian. He expressed skepticism that Palestinian
Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas would reach agreement
with Hamas on the composition of a new PA government. When
asked about the Quai spokesperson's dismissive comments about
the Roadmap (Ref C) he appeared unaware of the comments but
suggested that there had been no change in France's position
on the Roadmap or the Quartet. He attempted to differentiate
Chirac's call for an international conference on Middle East
peace from similar calls made by Spain, Saudi Arabia, and
others, explaining that only France was interested in
exploring what the international community might do to help
the parties take risks for peace (as opposed to prescribing a
solution).

Lebanon
--------------


6. (C) With respect to Lebanon, Boche appeared to take for
granted that Siniora would be able to fend off demands by
Hizballah and Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement for an
expanded role in the government. He assessed that the
"aberrant" alliance between Aoun and Hizballah was merely
tactical and inherently unstable; he was therefore optimistic
about the possibility of engineering a split between Aoun and
Hizballah.


7. (C) As for the performance of UNIFIL, Boche offered the
Quai's prosaic analysis of UNSCR 1701 implementation, which
posits a linkage between enforcement of the arms embargo and
ending Israeli overflights of Lebanon. Boche said he
harbored no illusions that Israel would entirely halt
overflights of Lebanon, and seemed somewhat understanding of
Israel's insistence on acquiring its own aerial imagery.
However, he complained that certain overflights, such as
those flown at low-altitude over Beirut, had no intelligence
value and were simply ill-considered provocations. (Note: In
a related development, French Defense Minister Michele
Alliot-Marie told the National Assembly on November 8 that
French peacekeepers assigned to UNIFIL came within two
seconds of firing on Israeli jets that buzzed their position
on October 31, saying "a catastrophe was barely avoided."
The Israeli Embassy in Paris is seeking details of the
incident. End note)

Syria: No Point in Courting Asad
--------------


8. (C) With a nod to the spate of European envoys who have
visited Damascus in recent weeks before returning to their
own capitals empty-handed, Boche noted wryly that France's
EU partners were rushing to Syria at the very moment that
Saudi Arabia was more determined than ever not to haggle with
Bashar al-Asad. He conceded that it was natural, at moments
of a diplomatic blockage, for well-intentioned parties to
assume that direct dialogue might move things forward; only
the painful experience of seeing their envoys repeatedly
return empty-handed would disabuse them of this notion.
"I've seen this four or five times over the course of my
career," said Boche, who thought it inevitable that Chirac's
successor would likewise be tempted to send out some sort of
feeler to Damascus during the first six months of his or her
presidency. "It won't lead to anything," he said. Chirac,
after all, had gone further than any other European leader in
reaching out to Bashar following the death of Hafez al-Asad,
yet the Syrian regime gave nothing back.


9. (C) Shifting gears, Boche said he was struck by the
inexorable Islamization of Syrian society taking place under
the Baathist regime's nose. "It's much less secular than it
was just a few years ago," he said, whether measured by
mosque attendance, the number of women wearing the veil in
public, or the number of Muslims fasting during Ramadan. "Of
course, it's the only way of showing resistance to the
regime," he added.

Iran/Gulf States
--------------


10. (C) Recalling the visit to Paris several weeks ago of
Iranian President Ahmadinejad's personal envoy, Mojtaba
Hashemi-Samareh, Boche said he thought the current Iranian
regime was dominated by millenarians. Boche said that Chirac
tried (with little apparent success) to persuade
Hashemi-Samareh that Iran's interests were not served by
fomenting instability in Lebanon, Iraq, or Afghanistan.
Boche added that Iran's exploitation of Arab frustration with
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would likely bring Tehran
into conflict with moderate Arab governments in the future.
Turning to the Gulf States, Boche confirmed that France
expects to sign a revised version of its existing military
cooperation agreement with Kuwait during a visit to Paris by
the Kuwaiti Emir on November 30. Boche said the Kuwaitis
were intent on strengthening their bilateral relations with
France, which had diminished signficantly since the time of
the first Gulf War.

Chirac's Middle East Legacy
--------------


11. (C) Asked about Chirac's foreign policy legacy in the
Middle East, Boche pointed to the steady improvement in
Franco-Israeli relations over the past two years. As a
result of that improvement, France had moved away from a
"declarative and largely condemnatory" approach to the
Arab-Israeli conflict which was popular in the Arab world but
ineffectual. "We had moral influence, but we had no
influence on the ground," said Boche. In lieu of that
approach, France had adopted an "operational policy" rooted
in good relations with both the Palestinians and the
Israelis. He noted that now when Chirac speaks to Israeli PM
Olmert, Olmert asks Chirac's advice -- a significant change
from just a few years ago. Consequently, France (and by
extension, Europe) was better positioned to play an effectual
role on the ground, as demonstrated by the expansion of
UNIFIL. Boche concluded his tour d'horizon with the hope
that in the future Europe would play an even bigger role in
the region.


12. (C) Comment: Boche's comments are further evidence that
no new meaningful commitment to Iraq, political or otherwise,
is in prospect as we enter the final months of the Chirac
presidency. We were struck by his apparent complacency on
Lebanon, with respect to the domestic political situation as
well as UNIFIL's position on the ground. On the latter
point, he evinced no concern about whether UNIFIL would be
able to sustain its peacekeeping role over the longer term.








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