EGYPTIAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL: NABIH BERRI IS A JOKE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007321

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2016
TAGS: FR KDEM LE PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL: NABIH BERRI IS A JOKE,
DIALOGUE WILL FAIL

REF: A. BEIRUT 3565


B. BEIRUT 3584

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: EMBASSY Paris NEA Watcher met 11/7 with his
Egyptian counterpart, Yahya Oda, and 11/8 with Lebanese
Charge d'Affaires Ghady al-Khoury (protect),to discuss
political developments in Lebanon. While Oda predicted the
current dialogue between the March 14 Group and
Hizballah/Aounists would go nowhere, al-Khoury believed PM
Siniora would eventually be compelled to accept an expansion
of his cabinet on Hizballah's terms. End summary.

Questioning the MFA's Official Line
--------------


2. (C) Speaking about the current dialogue in Beirut between
PM Siniora and the March 14 group leaders on the one hand,
and Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun and Hizballah
on the other, Oda said that the Egyptian MFA's official line
is that Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri is doing a great
job in facilitating the talks, and serves as an important
intermediary between Siniora and Hizballah. Shifting to what
Oda said was his personal analysis, he dismissed Berri as "a
joke" with no real power and predicted that the current
dialogue would go nowhere.


3. (C) Oda further assessed that Hizballah leader Hassan
Nasrallah's threat to mobilize vast demonstrations if Siniora
did not agree to expand his cabinet on Hizballah's terms was
a sign of weakness, not of strength. While Nasrallah's
popularity had soared in the immediate aftermath of the
recent conflict with Israel, with each passing day more and
more Lebanese were coming to view the war as a disaster for
Lebanon. Moreover, Hizballah found itself constrained by the
LAF's deployment in southern Lebanon alongside a strengthened
UNIFIL, discomfited by PM Siniora's international support,
and dismayed by the prospect of further international
pressure on the implementation of UNSCR 1701. Nasrallah was
therefore scrambling to capitalize on his waning aura of
victory by bandying about threats in the hope of securing
lasting political advantage.


4. (C) However, Oda said Nasrallah was too shrewd to permit
any Hizballah demonstration to turn violent. The sight of
Hizballah supporters attacking Saad Hariri's Sunni
supporters, for example, would cost Nasrallah much of his
popularity in the Arab world. Moreover, Oda predicted that
if it came to violence, Michel Aoun's Maronite supporters --
already uncomfortable with Aoun's alliance with the Shi'a --
would flock to Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'Ja'. Finally,
Nasrallah knew that even if he put one million demonstrators
on the street, the March 14th group could do the same. Noisy
confrontations would therefore solve nothing.

Hizballah Turning the Other Cheek?
--------------


5. (C) In an 11/8 meeting, Lebanese Charge d'Affaires Ghady
al-Khoury agreed that Nasrallah was determined to avoid
violence. Ghady said that senior figures in Amal had assured
him that Nasrallah had ordered his followers not to respond
with violence even if they found themselves the victims of
aggression. However, al-Khoury assessed that Nasrallah was
negotiating from a position of strength because the March 14
coalition could not match Hizballah's demonstrators man for
man, nor could they match Hizballah's organizational
capacity. Moreover, he said that Hizballah had cleverly
offered to accept less than a blocking one-third minority's
worth of seats in PM Siniora's cabinet, provided that Siniora
and his allies agreed to new parliamentary elections. But
Druze Leader Walid Jumblatt would never accept such a
proposition, because Jumblatt stood to lose the most from any
fresh round of elections. Consequently, al-Khoury predicted
it would only be a matter of time before Siniora agreed to
allow Aoun and Hizballah into the cabinet on their terms
(i.e., with the necessary number of seats to block any
cabinet decision they might disagree with) in order to avoid
the greater evil of elections.


6. (C) As for the Aoun-Hizballah alliance, al-Khoury noted
that Aoun firmly believed that Hizballah's leadership had
never lied to him, unlike nearly all of the politicians he
currently found himself at odds with. Moreover, Aoun found
it ironic to be accused of being pro-Syrian by politicians
who had all accommodated the Syrian occupation of Lebanon
over the course of many years. In his own mind, Aoun
believed his anti-Syrian credentials were stronger than
anyone's -- a point al-Khoury echoed. "It's ridiculous to
call Aoun pro-Syrian," he said.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
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