Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS7242
2006-11-06 16:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
MFA POLICY PLANNER SEES YEARS OF VIOLENCE AHEAD IN
how-tonull Lucia A Keegan 11/07/2006 03:01:31 PM From DB/Inbox: Lucia A Keegan Cable Text: C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 07242 SIPDIS cxparis: ACTION: POL INFO: AGR PAO AMB DAO STRASBOU DCM FCS SCI ORA UNESCO ODC ECON DISSEMINATION: POLOUT CHARGE: PROG APPROVED: POL/MC:JROSENBLATT DRAFTED: POL:RWALLER CLEARED: POL/D:BTURNER VZCZCFRI664 OO RUEHC RUEHXK RUEHZL RUCNDT DE RUEHFR #7242 3101618 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 061618Z NOV 06 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2887 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0976
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 007242
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2016
TAGS: FR KDEM PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: MFA POLICY PLANNER SEES YEARS OF VIOLENCE AHEAD IN
IRAQ, LITTLE CHANCE OF DISARMING HIZBALLAH IN LEBANON
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 007242
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2016
TAGS: FR KDEM PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: MFA POLICY PLANNER SEES YEARS OF VIOLENCE AHEAD IN
IRAQ, LITTLE CHANCE OF DISARMING HIZBALLAH IN LEBANON
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Christian Nakhle, head of the Middle East and North
Africa cell at the Centre d'Analyse et de Prevision (i.e.,
the "CAP," the Quai's S/P-equivalent),shared his views of
Lebanon and Iraq with NEA Watcher on 11/3. Nakhle, whose
analyses are distributed within the MFA but do not constitute
official policy, was uniformly pessimistic on Iraq. Noting
the existence of several layers of violence (jihadist,
neo-Baathist, inter-communal),he assessed that at each level
events were trending in a negative direction that would take
years to reverse. The closest historical parallel was the
Lebanese civil war, which continued until all parties were
exhausted. He suggested that a similar state of exhaustion
might prove to be a prerequisite for any true reconciliation
between Iraq's major ethnic groups, although it could take
more than a decade before the groups reached that point.
2. (C) Moreover, Nakhle judged that Iraq's neighbors were
generally content with a violent status quo that served their
sundry interests. Iran, for example, was happy to see the
U.S. bogged down in a conflict that provided Tehran leverage
in its standoff with the UNSC. Similarly, in his analysis
Egypt and Saudi Arabia were content with a degree of chaos
that diverted Washington's attention from the President's
Freedom Agenda and that dampened the Arab appetite for
democratization -- though both countries feared the eventual
repercussions of homegrown jihadists returning from Iraq.
3. (C) Turning to Lebanon, Nakhle based his analysis on two
premises: First, Lebanon's Christian community had lost faith
in the West and was therefore (like General Michel Aoun)
betting on an alliance with the Shia (and specifically
Hizballah) to protect the community's interests; second,
Hizballah was succeeding at selling itself within Lebanon as
a Lebanese institution rather than as a puppet of Iran and
Syria. Consequently, Nakhle deemed it "impossible" for the
Hariri bloc to split General Aoun away from Hizballah (and
Syria) during the next few years.
4. (C) In addition, Nakhle predicted that the disarmament of
Hizballah -- as called for in UNSCRs 1559 and 1701 -- would
not happen because the political and military costs of that
disarmament were prohibitive. "The IDF did not disarm
Hizballah, not because it was impossible, but because the
cost was too high. If that was true for the IDF, it is even
more so for UNIFIL," he said. As for the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF),Nakhle said there was no chance of the LAF
disarming Hizballah given the reluctance of Lebanon's Sunni
and Christian communities to make the inevitable political
concessions that would be required to secure Hizballah's
acquiescence. "It would be the death of the Taif Accord,"
said Nakhle, who claimed most Lebanese preferred an armed but
politically quiescent Hizballah to a disarmed Hizballah with
a dominant position in the Lebanese parliament. According to
Nakhle, the international community had yet to come to terms
with the inconvenient truth that most Lebanese Sunnis and
Christians simply did not want to see Hizballah disarmed.
5. (C) Comment: Nakhle, whose 15-year career in the MFA has
encompassed four year tours in both Jerusalem and Cairo, said
he enjoyed the freedom that the CAP affords him to provide
analysis ostensibly unfettered by policy constraints. He
seemed particularly enamored of the notion that the U.S.
should not continue to disaggregate its policies, on Iraq,
Lebanon, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but should
instead recognize that Arab public opinion had created strong
linkages between these disparate crises -- linkages which
made it difficult to achieve meaningful progress on any given
front without simultaneous progress on the others. In this,
as with his analysis of Iraq and Lebanon, we suspect he does
not stray too far from the unspoken consensus at the Quai.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2016
TAGS: FR KDEM PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: MFA POLICY PLANNER SEES YEARS OF VIOLENCE AHEAD IN
IRAQ, LITTLE CHANCE OF DISARMING HIZBALLAH IN LEBANON
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Christian Nakhle, head of the Middle East and North
Africa cell at the Centre d'Analyse et de Prevision (i.e.,
the "CAP," the Quai's S/P-equivalent),shared his views of
Lebanon and Iraq with NEA Watcher on 11/3. Nakhle, whose
analyses are distributed within the MFA but do not constitute
official policy, was uniformly pessimistic on Iraq. Noting
the existence of several layers of violence (jihadist,
neo-Baathist, inter-communal),he assessed that at each level
events were trending in a negative direction that would take
years to reverse. The closest historical parallel was the
Lebanese civil war, which continued until all parties were
exhausted. He suggested that a similar state of exhaustion
might prove to be a prerequisite for any true reconciliation
between Iraq's major ethnic groups, although it could take
more than a decade before the groups reached that point.
2. (C) Moreover, Nakhle judged that Iraq's neighbors were
generally content with a violent status quo that served their
sundry interests. Iran, for example, was happy to see the
U.S. bogged down in a conflict that provided Tehran leverage
in its standoff with the UNSC. Similarly, in his analysis
Egypt and Saudi Arabia were content with a degree of chaos
that diverted Washington's attention from the President's
Freedom Agenda and that dampened the Arab appetite for
democratization -- though both countries feared the eventual
repercussions of homegrown jihadists returning from Iraq.
3. (C) Turning to Lebanon, Nakhle based his analysis on two
premises: First, Lebanon's Christian community had lost faith
in the West and was therefore (like General Michel Aoun)
betting on an alliance with the Shia (and specifically
Hizballah) to protect the community's interests; second,
Hizballah was succeeding at selling itself within Lebanon as
a Lebanese institution rather than as a puppet of Iran and
Syria. Consequently, Nakhle deemed it "impossible" for the
Hariri bloc to split General Aoun away from Hizballah (and
Syria) during the next few years.
4. (C) In addition, Nakhle predicted that the disarmament of
Hizballah -- as called for in UNSCRs 1559 and 1701 -- would
not happen because the political and military costs of that
disarmament were prohibitive. "The IDF did not disarm
Hizballah, not because it was impossible, but because the
cost was too high. If that was true for the IDF, it is even
more so for UNIFIL," he said. As for the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF),Nakhle said there was no chance of the LAF
disarming Hizballah given the reluctance of Lebanon's Sunni
and Christian communities to make the inevitable political
concessions that would be required to secure Hizballah's
acquiescence. "It would be the death of the Taif Accord,"
said Nakhle, who claimed most Lebanese preferred an armed but
politically quiescent Hizballah to a disarmed Hizballah with
a dominant position in the Lebanese parliament. According to
Nakhle, the international community had yet to come to terms
with the inconvenient truth that most Lebanese Sunnis and
Christians simply did not want to see Hizballah disarmed.
5. (C) Comment: Nakhle, whose 15-year career in the MFA has
encompassed four year tours in both Jerusalem and Cairo, said
he enjoyed the freedom that the CAP affords him to provide
analysis ostensibly unfettered by policy constraints. He
seemed particularly enamored of the notion that the U.S.
should not continue to disaggregate its policies, on Iraq,
Lebanon, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but should
instead recognize that Arab public opinion had created strong
linkages between these disparate crises -- linkages which
made it difficult to achieve meaningful progress on any given
front without simultaneous progress on the others. In this,
as with his analysis of Iraq and Lebanon, we suspect he does
not stray too far from the unspoken consensus at the Quai.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON