EMBASSY PARIS SUBMISSION TO THE 2005/2006 REPORT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 PARIS 000718 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR PM/SNA, EUR/WE; OSD FOR OSD/PA&E, OASD/ISA/EUR, OASD/ISA/NP, OASD/ISA/AP, OASD/ISA/NESA AND OASD/ISA/BTF E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL MARR MCAP FR SUBJECT: EMBASSY PARIS SUBMISSION TO THE 2005/2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMON DEFENSE REF: A. STATE 223383 ¶B. PARIS 000005 This message is sensitive but unclassified. Not for Internet dissemination. Due to its length, this is part one of a three part message ¶1. (U) Summary: This telegram constitutes Embassy Paris's country submission for the 2005/2006 Report to Congress on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense (requested Ref A). We report on developments that took place during calendar years 2004 and 2005 and offer cost sharing information for U.S. fiscal years 2004 and 2005. Embassy's contributions to the Report to Congress are keyed to paragraphs in Ref A where specific information is requested. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Ref A Para 8: General Assessment -------------- -------------- Overview -------------- ¶2. (U) France bears a significant share of the burden of defending international security and stability. It is firmly committed to conflict resolution, non- and counterproliferation, as well as to maintaining adequate conventional and nuclear capabilities. Only a few nations have the military capability to project power to a distant theater and sustain operations. France is one of these nations. It has the military personnel, equipment, and command capabilities as well as the will to employ them throughout the world. It is this total operational capability, and the resolve to act on the international stage, which allows the French military to participate and lead in an international framework, including through the European Union and NATO. Africa comprises the heaviest French military commitment abroad. However, France is also a significant contributor to international military operations in Central--Southwest Asia and the Balkans. By helping to stabilize sensitive areas in Central Asia, the Balkans, or in Sub-Saharan Africa, overseas operations led by the French Armed Forces have helped to prevent those areas from becoming safe-havens for terrorist activity. Throughout 2004 and 2005, France has been a major contributor in the fight against terrorism as part of the international coalition in Afghanistan. As such, France 
volunteered to participate under the command of the United States in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Moreover, security, stabilization and training operations led by the French Armed Forces within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is helping Afghanistan in its transition from a terrorist sanctuary to a growing democracy. ¶3. (U) France maintains the largest active duty military force in the European Union and the second largest active duty military force in NATO, with an active force of approximately 355,000. Furthermore, France sustains a large percentage of this active duty force deployed in operations in overseas French territories or in sovereign territories around the world. The average number of deployed forces outside of France was 35,000 in 2004, and 32,500 in 2005. Over 13,500 of those deployed are actively engaged in international mandates supporting counter- terrorist operations, humanitarian operations, peacekeeping operations, stability operations, and capacity building. To support this level of external international mandate operations, France spends approximately USD 790 million per year from a defense budget of 52 billion dollars. France's Global Reach: Peace Support Operations Worldwide -------------- -------------- ¶4. (U) France eagerly participates in international peace support operations and is a leading force contributor to stabilization operations in the Balkans and in Africa. In Cote d'Ivoire, France's most significant overseas operation, French troops enforce a tenuous cease-fire and are providing the backbone to the United Nations operation as a quick reaction force. French troops have been actively engaged since the summer of 2004 in preventing the Darfur crisis from expanding into Chad. In the Balkans, French troops are present in every military mission across Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia: SFOR/EUFOR, KFOR, UNMIBH, UNMIK, EUMM, and ALTHEA. During "Operation Secure Tomorrow," to stabilize Haiti, France deployed the second largest contingent alongside the United States. Contributing troops under international mandate is a point of principle in Paris. The UN, where France has a veto as a permanent member of the Security Council, is its preferred forum for crisis resolution. France has observers currently participating in UN missions in the Balkans, Georgia, Lebanon, Israel, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Burundi, DROC, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Western Sahara, and Haiti. It also participates in the multinational force in the Sinai. France and the War in Iraq -------------- ¶5. (U) The French government has forbidden its military from contributing troops to the NATO training mission inside Iraq (NTM-1). One French officer is working on the training mission staff at SHAPE Headquarters in Belgium, and the GoF pledged 660,000 euros in February 2005 to help finance NTM-1. In 2005, the GoF took initial steps to contribute to the development of Iraqi defense and security capabilities. Under the European Union's EUJUSTLEX program, France has pledged to train 200 Iraqi police officials and judges in rule of law training in France, making France the top EU contributor to this program. Approximately 40 Iraqi police officials (non-military) completed month-long training at the Ecole Nationale Superieure des Officiers de Police and the Ecole Nationale de Police in 2005. A third course started at the end of 2005 for judicial instruction at the Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature. At the same time, a French offer to train up to 1,500 Iraqi paramilitary police (gendarmes) outside Iraq remains unimplemented, although an Iraqi Ministry of Interior delegation visited France in July 2005 to further discuss the proposal. Currently there is a single Gendarme Officer in Iraq, responsible for provision of security for French embassy staff in Baghdad. France and the War on Terrorism -------------- ¶6. (U) France is currently the third-largest contributor to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and one of the few nations other than the U.S. to have had troops engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom, ISAF and training programs for the Afghan army since these efforts began. French Mirage-2000 fighters have flown with USAF fighters to assist American and Afghan ground troops. French deployments to the Horn of Africa remain focused on counterterrorism; the French assisted in the establishment of USCJTF Horn of Africa, and otherwise continue to allow the U.S. to share their base in Djibouti in connection with operations in the Indian Ocean, Red Sea and Persian Gulf. France is a part of Task Force 150, a multinational naval force that patrols the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to interdict the movement of suspected terrorists from Afghanistan to the Arabian Peninsula. ¶7. (U) France participates in Operation Active Endeavor in the Eastern Mediterranean. France is also actively involved with the Proliferation Security Initiative. It is also a party to all 12 existing international terrorism conventions and is active in the UN and G8 counterterrorism committees. ¶8. (U) In 2005, France continued to discover and dismantle terror networks present on its soil, including several that recruited jihadists to Iraq. Following the July 2005 bombings in London, French officials worked closely with their British counterparts. They also identified a number of deficiencies in their counterterrorism capabilities, and proposed legislation to remedy these deficiencies. This fast-tracked legislation became law in late January, 2006. The French government is also expected to issue in February 2006 a "white book" on terrorism that will underscore their belief that terrorism is a primary strategic threat to France, and that dealing with it is consequentially a central priority. France consults extensively with the U.S. on terrorism, at the tactical and strategic level. Africa -------------- ¶9. (U) The French military has shown an increasing interest to cooperate with others, particularly with the U.S., in Africa. In the past three years, there have been Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) executed in three African countries, NEO planning for four other potential crises, as well as U.S. and French multilateral programs, such as GPOI - ACOTA, RECAMP, and joint financial and logistical support for ECOWAS, ECCAS, and the African Union. In the Gulf of Guinea and Trans-Sahel region, France has expressed interest in the U.S. effort to improve the posture of African countries in the fight against terrorism. Both the U.S. and France continue to broadly support capacity building for African militaries. (See paragraphs 12, 32 40, 42-43, 46, 59, 72, 82-86, 89 and 94 for more on French involvement in Africa.) France, NATO and ESDP -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Despite its singular stance on alliance membership (France is not a member of NATO's integrated military command),France has continued to demonstrate willingness to engage in NATO responses to common challenges. France has been a major contributor to operations in the Balkans (SFOR, now EUFOR, and KFOR) and in NATO's operations in Afghanistan (International Security Assistance Force). In KFOR in Kosovo, French troops are the second-largest national contingent, significantly outnumbering U.S. units. In Afghanistan, France has some 900 troops, which will increase to approximately 1400 in August 2006, when France assumes command of the Kabul region of ISAF. During December 2004-August 2005, France held the rotating command of ISAF. France also contributed to NATO Humanitarian Relief Operations in Bagh, Pakistan. ¶11. (SBU) The French have consistently expressed their support for NATO's transformation, and are contributing substantial resources to the NATO Response Force: the French military has identified forces that at initial stages will amount to 40 per cent of ground units, 30 per cent of air assets, and 20 per cent of naval capabilities, and has proposed contributing EUROCORPS to the NRF at a later stage. France has restructured some of its own forces with land, air and sea High Readiness Response force fully compatible with the NATO Response Force. It has offered headquarter slots in Lille for fellow NATO members. ¶12. (SBU) Interest in being part of NATO transformation has not diminished the deep commitment of the GoF to fostering European security and defense arrangements. Many in the GoF envision that transatlantic security relations of the future will increasingly include bilateral U.S.-EU cooperation. Throughout 2004 and 2005, the French vigorously pursued their goal of establishing independent European defense structures and supporting increased EU missions. France supported an EU assistance mission to Darfur in the Sudan, to support the African Union's intervention. France continues to push its EU partners for completion of a separate EU planning headquarters, a small but independent EU operational planning unit, as well as an EU cell at SHAPE. EU operations may also continue to be planned at national headquarters. Additionally, France has been a key player in setting up and funding the European Defense procurement agency (EDA),designed to coordinate defense procurement among EU allies, and which became operational in 2005 with a small staff numbering some 80 persons and a budget of 20 million euros. ¶13. (U) In January 2006, the European gendarmerie force was formally inaugurated in Vicenza, Italy. The concept dates back to October 2003, when French Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie proposed the creation of the European gendarmerie consisting of some 800 gendarmes from Spain, Italy, Portugal and the Netherlands to take on police training and other police functions as part of the EU's response to crises. French Training and Participation in Joint Exercises -------------- -------------- ¶14. (U) In the European AOR, in cooperation with the US Commander Naval Forces Europe, the French Navy participated in 3 Non-NATO exercises and 6 NATO exercises in 2004 including a Proliferation Security Initiative exercise, a NATO anti-submarine exercise, a Multi-lateral Livex, PFP exercise BALTOPS 04, and a NATO Joint fleet training exercise (a major NRF event sponsored by NATO). ¶15. (U) In 2005, France participated in 6 Non-NATO exercises and 13 NATO exercises. The French Navy participated in RECAMP IV, JMC 05-1 and 05-2, a multilateral FTX helping qualify the Italian maritime High Readiness Force (HRF),two multilateral anti-submarine exercises, Trident D'Or (the exercise to qualify the French maritime HRF, a LIVEX Mine Warfare Exercise in the North Sea, FRUKUS (CPX/FTX with French, Russian, U.S., and U.K. navy participation, Sorbet Royale (a LIVEX Submarine Rescue Exercise),Bright Star (a multi-national, multi-warfare LIVEX executing in Egypt),Loyal Midas (a multilateral FTX to qualify a stand-by Maritime Component Commander for a future NRF rotation. ¶16. (U) Overall objectives for Navy training in 2005 were: 100 days at sea per ship, 13 exercises, four of which were Amphibious exercises, three of which were mine warfare exercises, two deployments of the Charles de Gaulle CVBG, participation in one major NATO exercise, participation in one major EU exercise and five Joint exercises. ¶17. (U) The French air force continues to seek opportunities to exercise and train with the US. During 2005, the French air force participated in Exercise Bright Star in Egypt, and Exercise Air Warrior in the US. France also continues to offer the US opportunities to use their training ranges and training airspace associated with Corsica in the Mediterranean Sea. French Support for Space Launch Activities -------------- ¶18. (U) France supported multiple space launch activities from their facilities in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the south of France. The French government approved a US request to use the islands of Reunion and Nuka Hiva for telemetry tracking missions supporting NASA space launches. Additionally, the French support US space shuttle launches with access to the French Air Base in Istres France as an alternate shuttle landing site. Defense Trade and Industrial Cooperation -------------- ¶19. (U) Source priorities in order of importance for French defense acquisition remain France, EU, and all others (to include the U.S.). National pride and limited budgets govern this order. The French defense industry continues to provide the greatest depth and breadth of any western European country. While its technology is sometimes peer-level with the U.S., it is actually superior in specific niche areas (e.g., thermal imaging and optics). The single most limiting factor is defense spending. ¶20. (U) In the past year, the French Ministry of Defense continued its pursuit of revitalization of forces. Despite competing government interests, the budget of the Defense Ministry remained untouched (the Interior was the only other ministry spared from budget cuts). Highlights for 2005-2006 spending include: a second aircraft carrier; introduction of the Rafale fighter aircraft; the European Multi-Mission Frigate (FREMM); Network-Centric command and control systems; Tigre and NH-90 helicopters; transport aircraft; third and fourth strategic missile submarines; and cruise missile development. Only minor increases in research and development, as compared to previous years, were approved. ¶21. (U) Foreign Military Sales from the US increased from FY03 to FY04 (USD 45.6M to USD 66.9M),while direct commercial sales decreased (USD 18.9M to USD 12.7M.) Pending US sales include the Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment (ALRE) for the second French aircraft carrier, and a cruise missile simulator. FMS training funds were expended as in previous years, with the majority centered on carrier aviation training and support. ¶22. (U) Service-specific Data Exchange Agreements (DEAs) remained essentially stable, yet significantly, renegotiation of four Navy DEAs was concluded, extending their expiration dates to 2010. Discussions continue regarding remaining DEAs and four newly proposed agreements. Foreign Comparative Testing programs continue to show interest in French technologies, with recent focus on underwater GPS, perimeter defense, shipboard self- defense, and bomb casing design. Benchmarking studies have been conducted on ship design and manpower reduction. ¶23. (U) U.S. defense acquisition and sales interests in France are significant and include (by service): for the Air Force, C-130J, KC-130J, C-17 sales and French AWACS upgrade; for the Army and USMC, Sophie, 120mm rifled mortars, Active Protection System armor for ground vehicles, and hybrid electric vehicles; for the Navy, ALRE sale, unmanned submerged/underwater vehicles, and maritime domain awareness, and network-centric enabled operations. All services are focused on any technology that can assist in the efforts of the IED Task Force. ¶24. (U) Privatization of the defense sector has continued, albeit at a slow pace. Although the GoF still maintains so-called "golden shares" in several firms, globalization has eroded their total control in this arena. For example, the recently privatized shipbuilding firm DCN has again partnered with Thales in planning the second French aircraft carrier, and was recently awarded a contract by the French Navy for total lifetime maintenance support for their fleet warships and major combat systems. ¶25. (U) The anticipated absorption of OCCAR (the Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation) into the European Defense Agency has stalled, although OCCAR did play a role in guiding the French and Italian defense ministries to select the General Electric engines for the European Multi-Mission Frigate (FREMM) in late 2005. ¶26. (U) The EU's European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) goal is to coordinate financing processes and to get European defense industry involved in identifying and filling gaps. There is also a recent effort to engage university research labs through funding made available from private industries. Further privatization and increased competitiveness of the French defense sector should support these trends. ¶27. (U) Tangential but significant issues to defense cooperation include continued pursuit of a Declaration of Principles (DoP) on armaments and end-use controls required by the U.S. on jointly produced systems, which prevent French sales to third parties without USG approval (viewed with concern by French government and private industry alike though France requires similar guarantees from their customers for French products). On the other hand, U.S. Presidential intervention in rejecting the so-called "buy American" provisions in the recent U.S. defense bill was well received. ¶28. (U) Recent overtures on the part of both the U.S. and French governments have led to an increase in official bilateral defense discussions and activity. The impending change of government in 2007 will have a significant impact on whether or not this trend continues. While France's 2005 vote against the EU referendum was seen as a setback to both the French government and to the EU's future, its full effect remains to be seen. As noted above, there are signs of consolidation of efforts among EU institutions, specifically in the defense arena. Economic realities and collective resolve should eventually determine whether these trends continue. The Future of French Defense Spending -------------- ¶29. (U) Future French Defense budgets must conform to a new inter-governmental finance law known by the acronym LOLF (Organic Law of the Finance Law). In this new framework, the funding made available to the Ministry of Defense abandons the traditional budget distributions by 'Titles' and instead is presented as 'missions and programs'. The most significant of these is the mission to 'Put into action the National Defense Policy'. Two of its supporting programs are 'Prepare the Force' and 'Equip the Force'. In all, the Defense Ministry budget will be organized around four missions and nine supporting programs. In an effort to improve the coherence of the defense budget, the LOLF ties budgetary allocations to performance. Also, for the first budget cycle under this new system, the Chiefs of Staff of the services have less influence on service budgets. Their role is now to assure the coherence of the budget rather than the direction of it. In a May 21, 2005 Presidential decree, the Chiefs of the Armed Services are now subordinate to the Chief of Defense (CHOD). The CHOD now controls all budgets and procurement financing. Service budgets now must pass through the CHOD before they go to the Minister's office for approval. (For more information on defense spending and the LOLF see paragraphs 111-113.) ¶30. (U) The 2006 defense budget represents a 2.2% increase over the 2005 fiscal year. In spite of the Defense Minister's ability to protect the defense budget from cuts, there continue to be difficulties for the French military in the future. These difficulties stem primarily from three areas: first, the inflationary pressures of the price of energy; second, cost overruns/delays in procurement; and third, increased maintenance costs. Most of the planning for the current five-year budget requests was predicated on the cost of a barrel of oil at half the current price. This increase will translate into fewer flying hours, fewer training days, and fewer days at sea in the next few years. Procurement of several current military systems is behind the original schedule or experiencing technical problems. These delays include the Tigre helicopter, Rafale fighter aircraft, A-400M transport aircraft, and the new command ship (BPC). The final expense increase will be the result of maintaining the older systems in the French military until sufficient numbers can replace them. Transforming Military Capabilities -------------- ¶31. (U) In spite of not being part of the integrated military command structure of NATO, in January, 2004 France received two general officer billets within the command: one at Atlantic Command Operations (SHAPE) and one at Atlantic Command Transformation (Norfolk). The French have assigned 110 military personnel to the two headquarters, representing 2.04% of overall NATO staff posts. The French have also agreed to increase their contribution to Alliance military budgets from 4.9% to 7.4%. Nonetheless, despite disclaimers to the contrary, the French have given mixed signals over the past two years on their vision of the future NATO. These views have ranged from a desire for closer integration with NATO to generally limiting the scope of NATO's operations or in favor of an EU defense force. ¶32. (U) France has been a leading proponent to advance a "battle-group" concept to create rotational 1500-man size forces for use in Chapter VII mandates by the European Union. Based on the EU Operation ARTEMIS model (the French led deployment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003) the force would be capable of responding to a crisis within 15 days and be sustainable for 30 days minimum, 120 days maximum. Full operational capability is scheduled for ¶2007. The French insist that these battle groups would be compatible with NATO NRF rotations, with either taking the lead on the basis of a mutually-agreed decision. Africa has been mentioned as a primary venue for the battle- groups. ¶33. (U) The French Army is investing in UAVs, the Improved Infantry Armored Vehicle (VBCI),advanced communications equipment, counter-fire radars, and lighter equipment for armored units. They are beginning the process of digitization of the Army's battlefield systems and purchasing an individual soldier system - the Felin, the French Army's equivalent to the U.S. Army's Land Warrior system. These initiatives will enhance French abilities to interoperate with US forces and systems. ¶34. (U) The French Navy has stood up and qualified the HRF (M) headquarters staff, the naval component headquarters of France's NRF, in Toulon in 2004 and 2005. This force will deploy to the Gulf of Oman and Indian Ocean in 2006. Additionally, the Admiral, Naval Action Force (ALFAN) in Toulon has continued to develop over 2004 and 2005. This command is now roughly equivalent to the U.S. Fleet Forces Command and has responsibilities for training, certifying, and equipping French naval forces. In an effort to improve intelligence support to the French Navy, the French stood up a French intelligence command called Centre de Renseignment Martime (CRMar). ¶35. (U) In the context of trying to become more efficient and capable of joint and international operations, the French Air Force is in the process of a major reorganization. In November 2003, a project team of senior staff officers, outgoing base commanders and civilian consultants was created and given the mission to develop a plan to create a better Air Force. The project team started its work in September 2004 and unveiled the plan in October ¶2005. The ideas will be progressively implemented beginning in 2006. This ambitious reorganization project, named Air 2010, aims in particular at removing duplication and creating synergy. It will serve to optimize the air base network while preserving existing capabilities. In summary, the Air Force will replace the twelve current commands with four large functional 'poles.' The Operations Pole will be in charge of current operations in France and abroad. The Forces pole will be charged with leading the preparation and training of the whole of the combat forces. The Support Pole will bring together within the same staff all the maintenance, logistics, and life support. The Personnel Pole will join together all the personnel training and staff management functions. ¶36. (U) The French military is actively exploring ways to increase interoperability with the U.S. with respect to the global information grid and uses of information on the modern battlefield. As of late 2005, the French MOD has directed increased contact between French military officials and U.S. military officials in an effort to ensure the French capability to interoperate with the U.S. is maintained and improved. This French initiative is aimed at keeping up with the U.S. lead in information technology, particularly targeting data and friendly force tracking. The French desperately want to preserve the ability to conduct combat operations with the U.S. in every domain - air, land, and sea. Recent Contingency Operations, Military Assistance, Humanitarian Relief Operations, Peacekeeping, Capacity Building, Counterproliferation and Nuclear Threat Reduction. -------------- -------------- ¶37. (U) The French continue to show their support for operations in Afghanistan. In 2006, they are planning to augment their forces to support the increased responsibilities of the Kabul regional command in addition to the military assets already in place in support of ISAF and OEF (see paragraphs 53-56 for more detail). Furthermore, the French continue to be actively involved in the fight against terrorism through the OEF Task Force 150 and in the US Counter-Drug effort (see paragraphs 59-60 for more detail.) ¶38. (U) The French Army has been training the Afghan National Army within the overall U.S.-led program since its inception and the French have consistently expressed a desire to be part of NATO's transformation and interoperability initiatives as evidenced by their significant national contributions to the NATO Response Force (NRF) (see paragraphs 66-67 for more detail). ¶39. (U) In the Balkans, French forces remain among the largest contributors to operations in Kosovo and French participation in the former NATO SFOR mission in Bosnia continued under the EU Force, Operation Althea. The French continue to maintain a small French military presence in Macedonia. They also provide a small presence force in Georgia. (See paragraphs 70-71 for more detail).