Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS6938
2006-10-20 16:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRENCH PRAGMATIC ON LEBANON, PEACE PROCESS

Tags:  FR PGOV PREL SY 
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Lucia A Keegan 10/23/2006 10:35:10 AM From DB/Inbox: Lucia A Keegan

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 06938

SIPDIS
cxparis:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: UNESCO ORA SCI FCS DCM STRASBOU ECON DAO AMB
 PAO AGR ODC

DISSEMINATION: POLOUT
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: POL/MC:JROSENBLATT
DRAFTED: POL:RWALLER
CLEARED: POL/D:BTURNER

VZCZCFRI426
OO RUEHC RUEHXK RUEHZL RUCNDT
DE RUEHFR #6938/01 2931644
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201644Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2390
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0940
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006938 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
TAGS: FR PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: FRENCH PRAGMATIC ON LEBANON, PEACE PROCESS


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006938 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016 TAGS: FR PGOV PREL SY SUBJECT: FRENCH PRAGMATIC ON LEBANON, PEACE PROCESS Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: An authoritative contact at the French MFA advocated a gradual elimination of Israeli overflights of Lebanon, evinced interest in promoting Nabih Berri as an alternative to Hizballah, and provided an update on French thinking about an international conference on the Middle East -- which the MFA sees as gaining little traction. End summary. Lebanon: General Satisfaction -------------- ¶2. (C) Poloff met Oct. 19 with Herve Besancenot, the MFA DAS-equivalent for the Levant, who expressed satisfaction that, generally speaking, implementation of UNSCR 1701 is moving forward. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have deployed in the south, UNIFIL has been strengthened, and the arms embargo -- though far from being fully enforced along the Lebanese-Syrian border -- is tighter than in the past thanks to UNIFIL's maritime presence. "Who would've thought six months ago that we would be where we are today?" mused Besancenot. ¶3. (C) Nonetheless, much work remained to be done. Quickly reviewing the Quai's litany of arguments on the need to end Israel's "provocative" overflights of Lebanon (i.e., overflights violate Lebanon's sovereignty and the spirit of UNSCR 1701, weaken public confidence in UNIFIL and in PM Siniora, serve Hizballah's interests by providing a pretext for avoiding disarmament, and may eventually provide a pretext for a resumption of violence),Besancenot then struck a more pragmatic note. Acknowledging Israel's legitimate security concerns, he said overflights would have to be phased out progressively, "even if that's not what the Lebanese want to hear." To begin with, he suggested that Israel could: 1) cease overflights of Beirut; 2) use drones rather than F-16s for reconnaissance flights over southern Lebanon; 3) make greater use of satellite imagery to meet its reconnaissance needs. With respect to the possibility of adding an aerial dimension to UNIFIL's mandate (i.e., "Air-UNIFIL"),Besancenot said the idea was worth considering but said he foresaw technical and political objections. "It still needs a lot of thought," he concluded. ¶4. (C) Besancenot disparaged an Italian-led EU initiative to position border monitors on either side of the Syrian-Lebanese border. "It's difficult to imagine that the &
#x000A;Syrians, who have already refused to allow UNIFIL to monitor the border from the Lebanese side, would accept a European presence on both sides," said Besancenot. Moreover, "when we pressed the Italians for specifics, they said there would not be any European monitors, just technical cooperation with the Syrians," he said derisively, adding: "Technical cooperation is all well and good, but what we need is a political decision by the Syrian leadership." He said the MFA was "saddened" that so many of their EU colleagues were persuaded of the need to talk to Syria. Reeling off the names of EU and UN leaders who have met with Syrian leaders in recent months, Besancenot caustically observed that their meetings had produced "nothing." Lebanon's Internal Politics -------------- ¶5. (C) Noting that PM Siniora is under pressure from Hizballah and from Michel Aoun to enlarge his cabinet, Besancenot opined that letting Aoun into the government would guarantee gridlock -- especially on anything related to the Brammertz investigation. It was therefore essential to help Siniora fend off those pressures without steering him into a direct confrontation with Hizballah. Deploring the fact that there were no obvious alternatives to Aoun's leadership within the Christian community, Besancenot seemed intrigued by the possibility of backing Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri as an alternative to Hizballah. While acknowledging that France had "second thoughts" about Berri on a personal level, Besancenot nevertheless noted that Berri "can be useful" and had played a helpful role in recent months as an intermediary between PM Siniora and Hizballah's Sheikh Nasrallah. "Even though Nasrallah looks like a victor to the Arab world right now, the reality on the ground is very different. Hizballah has suffered significantly, both politically and militarily, and is being criticized even within Lebanese Shia circles," he said. Indeed, Besancenot said a possible silver lining to the deplacement of nearly one million Shiites during the course of this summer's fighting was that those Shiites who fled their homes were exposed to a different way of life inside their own country. "Many of them were amazed to see that their was an alternative to living under Hizballah's control," said Besancenot. Reviving the Peace Process -------------- ¶6. (C) Turning to Israeli-Palestinian relations, Besancenot said the Quai still believed a national unity government was a good idea, although he admitted that Hamas' refusal to accept the Quartet principles had led to an impasse. He assessed that PA President Abbas was, characteristically, having difficulty being decisive, while Fatah remained torn by internal rivalries. The French still saw Prime Minister Haniyeh as a pragmatist, albeit one who has no control over Hamas's armed wing or over Khalid Mishal. The Quai did not think the Palestinians were likely to find a way forward if left to their own devices, and fear that a referendum on whether to recognize Israel might actually fail, which would be disastrous. Consequently, an outside impetus was needed -- such as President Chirac,s proposal for an international conference on the Middle East. ¶7. (C) Besancenot said that the French envisioned the conference as an intermediary point between Phase I and Phase II of the Roadmap, and intended for it to take place within the context of the Quartet. However, they did not see it as being bound by the Roadmap, and clearly hoped to use other points of reference including the Clinton Parameters, the Prisoner's Agreement, and the 2002 Beirut initiative to map out the minimal guarantees both the Arabs and Israelis would need on issues such as the status of Jerusalem and the right of return for Palestinian refugees. Unfortunately, Chirac,s proposal had not found traction with either the Palestinians or the Israelis, although PA President Mahmoud Abbas expressed polite interest in it. That fact, combined with the French perception that conditions had deteriorated as a result of Hamas, refusal to enter into a government of national unity, meant the French had no plans at the moment to try to schedule the conference. (Comment: We believe the French proposal is going nowhere, although in deference to Chirac the MFA will have to wait a decent amount of time before admitting as much.) Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm HOFMANN

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