FRENCH PONDER NEXT STEPS ON LEBANON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006843 SIPDIS NSC FOR SINGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/16/2016 TAGS: FR KDEM PGOV PREL SY SUBJECT: FRENCH PONDER NEXT STEPS ON LEBANON Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: While the French MFA's NEA and IO equivalents are convinced of the need to support PM Siniora, implement UNSCR 1701, and ensure UNIFIL's credibility, they have not yet ironed out differences in their thinking on potential next steps -- and may be seriously overestimating the potential for movement on the future of the Sheba'a Farms. End summary. Disconnects Within the Quai d'Orsay -------------- ¶2. (C) Poloff met October 16 with the MFA's Martin Guillard (NEA/ELA office director equivalent),Lebanon Desk Officer Remy Bouallegue, Syria Desk Officer Jean-Christophe Auge, and later with Selena Grenet, who handles Syria-Lebanon in the MFA's IO equivalent. Poloff asked about reports that the French, who had initially floated but later backed away from the idea of standing up a sanctions committee to enforce the arms embargo in UNSCR 1701, were preparing to move forward with the idea. Guillard cautioned that the MFA is "still thinking about it" and said that while ANEMO (NEA's French counterpart) supports the idea, his IO counterparts are not yet in agreement. He added that President Chirac's office has not yet endorsed the idea either, although he did not foresee any objections from the Elysee. Grenet subsequently clarified that her directorate's hesitancy reflected its perception that USUN was reluctant to see a sanctions committee established; if the U.S. view has shifted, France would likely join a consensus. However, she readily admitted that whereas the USG would expect any sanctions committee to be as strong as possible, the French doubt the Russians and Chinese would accept a committee with a strong, coercive mandate. Consequently, the French would prefer to see a committee that, while not toothless, "would not be too strong or offensive." She added that Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora is "quite reluctant" to accept a sanctions committee because he fears an overly aggressive committee would prove counterproductive and weaken the GOL. Air-UNIFIL? -------------- ¶3. (S) Turning to the question of Israeli overflights of Lebanon, Poloff asked about French thinking on adding an aerial surveillance component to UNIFIL. Guillard acknowledged that the idea has been discussed within ANEMO and at the Ministry of Defense, but said that the MFA has not yet formulated an official position, nor has the idea been blessed by the Elysee. He added that the French were somewhat reluctant to add an aerial border surveillance dimension to UNIFIL for fear that the UN peacekeepers would be tarred as foreign intelligence agents. Moreover, the French would want to ensure that any imagery shared with the GOI would not be used to facilitate a new round of Israeli air strikes in Lebanon. (Grenet, in contrast, recoiled in horror at the prospect of what she described as "an expansion of UNIFIL's mandate" and said France preferred to keep any intel sharing with the GOI in bilateral as opposed to multilateral channels.) Sheba'a Farms -------------- ¶4. (C) With respect to the Sheba'a Farms, Poloff sought the latest French thinking with respect to placing the Farms under UN-trusteeship or allowing the UN to unilaterally demarcate the Syrian-Lebanese border in such a way as to attribute the farms to Lebanon. Specifically, he asked whether the French had floated these ideas with the Israelis and, if so, how the Israelis reacted. With a wry laugh, Guillard noted that FM Douste-Blazy personally broached the subject with FM Livni during the recent Israel-Hizballah conflict but did not get very far. Nevertheless, Guillard claimed the Israelis "might be interested and might eventually make a gesture" on Sheba'a Farms, but he acknowledged they would first need "many" security guarantees. "This is all purely hypothetical -- we have not discussed it in detail with the Israelis," Guillard admitted. ¶5. (C) With respect to demarcating the Lebanese-Syrian border, Guillard said as there was only one precedent (NFI) for a unilateral redrawing of the border by the UN, such an action would "raise questions," and the UN General Secretariat was "clearly reluctant" to proceed. Moreover, SIPDIS the idea would need clear support in advance from all the concerned parties -- especially Lebanon, Syria, and Israel -- if it were to be effective. He added, with vigorous agreement from Bouallegue and Auge, that a re-demarcation of the border was a "single-shot gun" and the international community would not get a second chance to resolve the Sheba'a impasse through cartography. He also observed that the French are open to the idea of absorbing UNTSO into UNIFIL as a means of leveraging the UN's assets and mandates. (Guillard noted that he personally was prepared to bet that Syria would spike either an informal UN trusteeship or a redrawing of the border by reasserting a claim to the Sheba'a Farms the moment Israeli troops withdrew and UN or Lebanese forces took their place.) ¶6. (C) Grenet, in contrast, seemed much more enthused about the possibility of allowing the UN to unilaterally redefine the Lebanese-Syrian border, and noted that the UN Secretariat has already asked its cartographer to start working on the question. She seemed convinced that the next report (expected this week) by Terje Roed-Larsen, the Secretary General's Special Envoy for the implementation of UNSCR 1559, would endorse such a solution, and that once a notional revision of the border had been blessed by the UN's legal department it would be possible to approach the Israelis. She conceded that persuading the Israelis that a concession on the Sheba'a Farms was not tantamount to a victory for Hizballah might prove "difficult." Like Guillard, Grenet emphasized that we would only get one shot at redrawing the border, adding: "In principle, this is an important card to play but we need to use it at the right time." But unlike Guillard, who worried that the Syrians would thwart this maneuver by refusing to relinquish their claim to Sheba'a, Grenet opined that it would be much easier to pressure Damascus into signing away its claim to the Farms once a UN force is in place. She concluded by saying the MFA would refine its thinking on sequencing once Larsen releases his report. ¶7. (C) Comment: While our MFA interlocutors are sincere in their desire to make implementation of UNSCR 1701 a success, they seem to have convinced themselves that the Sheba'a Farms issue offers the path of least resistance for progress in the near term. We are somewhat concerned by their apparent lack of detailed discussion with the Israelis, and suspect that the French have underestimated the difficulty of obtaining Israeli buy-in on this issue. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON