HEAD OF AFGHAN PARLIAMENT USES VISIT TO FRANCE TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006542 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2016 TAGS: PREL AF FR SUBJECT: HEAD OF AFGHAN PARLIAMENT USES VISIT TO FRANCE TO CRITICIZE KARZAI, COURT EUROPEAN SUPPORT Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with Prime Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy during his first visit to France as speaker of the Afghan Parliament, Yunus Qanooni offered a pessimistic assessment of security, poppy cultivation and Afghan-Pakistan relations. Although Qanooni reportedly offered nothing new of substance, the French MFA viewed the visit, which coincided with the Karzai-Musharraf-Bush summit in Washington, as a deliberate effort of Qanooni's to distance himself from President Karzai's alleged softer line on Pakistan and to present himself as a politician of international stature, capable of engaging with Europe. The MFA drew the conclusion that Qanooni chose France as the destination for his first official visit outside Afghanistan to emphasize his eagerness for greater European involvement in Afghanistan. End summary. ¶2. (C) Poloff met September 28 with MFA Afghanistan desk officer Pierre Fourier to discuss the September 22 meeting of Yunus Qanooni, speaker of the Afghan Parliament and former presidential candidate, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Douste-Blazy. During the meeting, which lasted an hour and a half rather than the scheduled 30 minutes, Qanooni outlined his views on reconstruction, the deterioration of security along the Afghan-Pakistani border, the rise in poppy cultivation and its links to the Taliban, and the failed summit between Karzai and Musharraf in Kabul on September 6. ¶3. (C) Fourier informed us that Qanooni told Douste-Blazy that he viewed Pakistan, a country he told the French was "duplicitous," as the greatest threat to Afghan security and sovereignty. Qanooni described Pakistani President Musharraf as playing the "good student" by placating the U.S. with empty promises to act aggressively against Taliban forces operating from within Pakistan. To support his contention, Qanooni cited the September 5 peace deal between Musharraf and tribal leaders in North Waziristan, a Pakistani border province reputed to shelter Taliban fighters, under which Musharraf agreed to withdraw all Pakistani troops in exchange for the promise (reportedly viewed as unenforceable by Qanooni) that Taliban fighters would cease attacks on both sides of the border and expel foreign fighters. 
 ¶4. (C) Fourier said Qanooni criticized Karzai for failing to condemn the "toothless pact" and offered a highly critical assessment of Karzai's bilateral diplomacy with Pakistan. During a summit in Kabul on September 6, Karzai had allegedly taken a wait-and-see attitude to the Waziristan pact, and thereby wasted "an historic opportunity" to negotiate with Musharraf as an equal and to insist on a Pakistani commitment to staunch the flow of Taliban fighters across the border. Qanooni called Karzai's reticence a "strategic error" that would give rise to more instability along the border. Fourier observed that although Qanooni did not propose any alternative course of action, he implied that he would stand more decisively against Pakistan than Karzai. ¶5. (C) According to Fourier, Qanooni related to the French that the Taliban no longer possessed the financial resources, training capabilities or widespread support at the local level to launch a major, decisive attack on either Kabul or ISAF forces. However, the Taliban's adoption of hit and run tactics and their ability to operate across the border with impunity strengthened their capacity to dig in and offer long-term resistance. ¶6. (C) Qanooni painted a gloomy portrait of a country en route to becoming a narco-state, Fourier said. Qanooni characterized terrorism and drugs as different aspects of the same problem, and said that as long as the central government did not operate effectively in the south and east, both problems would only intensify. ¶7. (C) Fourier said the MFA had not found anything substantively new in Qanooni's remarks--although Fourier said Douste-Blazy appreciated Qanooni's candor and grasp of the issues. Fourier also noted that Qanooni had not expressly asked for additional troops or reconstruction funds, nor had he openly criticized the U.S. (Comment: The French are undoubtedly aware of Qanooni's longstanding opposition to the U.S.). That Qanooni chose to visit France at the same time that Musharraf and Karzai were scheduled to meet with President Bush in Washington, however, had led the MFA to view his timing as a message that Qanooni would welcome greater European involvement in Afghanistan, through partnerships and institutional cooperation if not necessarily troop deployments. (Comment: Embassy Kabul would be in a PARIS 00006542 002 OF 002 better position to judge, but another interpretation would be that Qanooni was merely looking for an audience he thought might be more open to his criticism of Karzai or a way to raise his own political profile vis-a-vis Karzai. End Comment). ¶8. (C) Fournier said that Douste-Blazy and other French participants left the meeting with the impression that Qanooni was a "reliable" but aggressive politician, one inclined toward outspoken but measured criticism of the GOA and virulent opposition to Pakistan, and one likely to play a critical role in future Afghan politics. Douste-Blazy reportedly told colleagues following the meeting that if Qanooni's intent was indeed to reinforce his stature as a politician of consequence that could act on an international stage, then he had succeeded. However, Fournier noted that Qanooni had not evinced any presidential ambitions and did not seem to be polishing his diplomatic credentials for a second presidential run in the future. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON