EUR DAS BRYZA MEETS FRENCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 006179 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016 TAGS: PREL FR GG NATO EUN KDEM SUBJECT: EUR DAS BRYZA MEETS FRENCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR ON GEORGIA, NATO ID REF: PARIS 5423 Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a September 12 meeting with EUR/DAS Matt Bryza and EUR/CARC Director Rood, French Political Director Laboulaye expressed relief over U.S. efforts to persuade Georgian President Saakashvili to avoid being overly provocative toward Russia at the UNGA. To give Saakashvili an added incentive, Laboulaye suggested that NATO ministers in New York decide informally on NATO Intensified Dialogue for Georgia only after hearing Saakashvili's speech, with a formal NAC decision soon to follow. Laboulaye agreed with the U.S. not to oppose a GUAM resolution being placed on the agenda, while conditioning support for the resolution itself on Armenia's concurrence. ¶2. (C) Separately, Bryza and PDAS-equivalent for Continental Europe Smessow discussed in more detail the outlines of Saakashvili's likely remarks, as well as Georgia's broader and delicate challenge of dealing with the South Ossetians' refusal to negotiate without unduly provoking the Russians. Bryza made clear the U.S. position on the need for Georgia to proceed with a "competitive" rather than confrontational approach to the Russians, but defended the Georgians' need to assert their sovereignty over their entire territory. He called for an incremental approach, with the support and coordination of the international community, to put pressure on Russia gradually to diminish its presence, and to impress upon the Russians that there was also a cost for blocking progress. End Summary. ¶3. (SBU) Visiting EUR DAS Matt Bryza and EUR/CARC Director Elizabeth Rood met September 12 with French outgoing Political Director Stanislaus de Laboulaye to discuss NATO Intensified Dialogue (ID) for Georgia. Separately, they held a broader discussion of Georgia with PDAS-equivalent for Continental Europe Serge Smessow (who will soon go to Yerevan as the French Ambassador),DAS-equivalent for Russia and the former Soviet Union Aurelia Bouchez and desk-officer for the Caucasus Marie DuMoulin (notetaker). PolMinCouns and Deputy PolCouns (notetaker) joined Bryza and Rood. Political Director Laboulaye on NATO ID, GUAM -------------- ¶4. (C) Bryza reviewed briefly for Laboulaye the U.S. strategy of encouraging Georgia to adopt a competitive rather than a confrontational strategy for advancing its interests, making full use of multilateral mechanisms as a way of garnering the support of the international community and demonstrating to Russia that there would be costs associated with preserving the status quo. He made clear that the U.S. was encouraging Saakashvili to avoid being unduly provocative in his UNGA speech, and that the Georgians were being given to understand that unilateral recourse to the use of force would likely trigger an overwhelming Russian response and leave them isolated vis-a-vis the international community. Laboulaye said he was very relieved to hear Bryza's message to the Georgians, saying that France had earlier worried that the U.S. might allow Georgia go too far. Now, he said, he felt "reassured" about the U.S. position. He agreed the threat of an overwhelming Russian response was real, and hoped the Georgians understood that as well. ¶5. (C) Turning to NATO Intensified Dialogue, Bryza suggested that it should be possible for the NAC to decide on ID in principle in advance of UNGA, then have it blessed by ministers on September 21. Laboulaye doubted that there would be a NAC immediately before the UNGA and said that it made sense for Ministers to listen to Saakashvili's speech, meet with Georgians and come to an informal decision in New York that would subsequently be blessed formally by the NAC. Bryza underscored the importance of avoiding a difficult, potentially even contentious discussion in New York that could be embarrassing to NATO and/or the Georgians. Laboulaye agreed that this should be avoided if at all possible, but reiterated that it was only reasonable to listen to Saakashvili first, assess the situation and take a decision if appropriate, and then have the NAC follow up. This would offer the additional advantage of providing an incentive for Saakashvili to avoid overly provocative remarks at UNGA. (Note: At no time did Laboulaye suggest -- verbally or through his body language -- that France would not support ID for Georgia.) ¶6. (C) Laboulaye asked wither the GUAM group intended to go forward with an UNGA resolution, noting that this issue had divided the West the last time round. Bryza responded that PARIS 00006179 002 OF 003 the U.S. had told Armenia it would not support a GUAM draft that was not also supported by Armenia, but that it would not oppose inscribing a GUAM resolution on the agenda. Laboulaye characterized the U.S. approach as reasonable. Smessow and Bouchez on Georgia-Russia -------------- ¶7. (C) During the discussion that preceded the meeting with Laboulaye, Smessow expressed concern that Saakashvili intended to denounce Russian participation in the CIS peacekeeping force (PKF). France and other EU members were concerned that this could have an impact on the UNOMIG presence, possibly even leading to a worsening of the situation as compared to the current -- admittedly unsatisfactory -- status quo. He worried that Georgia was at a crossroads and expressed the hope that a crisis could be averted, which would also serve as a precedent for Moldova/Transnistria. ¶8. (C) Bryza agreed that the status quo was not satisfactory, while noting the catch-22 Georgia faced in trying to change it. If it did nothing, South Ossetia would continue to separate itself from Georgia; yet it also needed to avoid being overly provocative, lest that trigger an overwhelming Russian response and aggravate European fears that Georgia is being too provocative. The U.S. approach, he said, was focused on encouraging the Georgians to channel their energies in constructive directions. That said, he reminded Smessow, the Georgians were right in their desire to establish their sovereignty over their entire territory, just as they had a right to decide whether Russian troops should be allowed on their soil. U.S., French and even Russian foreign policy implicitly recognized Georgia's right to do so by virtue of our policies of supporting Georgia's territorial integrity. ¶9. (C) Smessow agreed, but expressed the hope that change, for example in the mandate for the CIS PKF, could occur incrementally. Bryza assured Smessow that the U.S. was working hard with the Georgians to encourage them to pursue multiple goals within an overall strategic framework, for which UNGA was only one way-station at the end of an initial phase. Based on his consultations with Georgian officials, Bryza said he believed that Saakashvili's speech would be generally positive in tone, avoid demands, and stress Georgia's desire to become a NATO ally and its determination to behave like one. Smessow responded that Bryza's characterization corresponded with what the French Embassy in Tbilisi was hearing. ¶10. (C) Stating that the UNGA could mark a turning point for Georgia, for better or for worse, Bryza underscored U.S. efforts to convince Saakashvili to avoid confrontation. He believed that the Georgians understood the U.S. message, and were now thinking in terms of how to move forward on confidence-building measures, demilitarization, and economic rehabilitation even without South Ossetian cooperation. The problem was that there had not been progress toward a political settlement and the existing negotiation mechanisms were not working, nor did the CIS PKF appear able to prevent incidents from occurring. He hoped that reconfiguring the Joint Consultative Commission (JCC) format, for instance by introducing international observers, and a Georgian pledge of non-use of force in Ossetia and Abkhazia, might offer possibilities for moving forward. He concluded that it would be important for Saakashvili to define categories for positive action while expressing his dissatisfaction with the status quo. ¶11. (C) Bouchez agreed on the need to achieve a delicate balance, which she hoped the Russians would understand and respect. Her concern was that Russia would seize on any negative elements to relaunch unproductive debate. She hoped Saakashvili understood that anything he said might be used against him. Smessow underscored that Georgia needed to appear credible, and show that it could honor its commitments, for example on demilitarization; this was also necessary as a platform from which to criticize the Russians and the Ossetians. Bryza reminded Smessow that Georgia's recourse to unilateral implementation of some commitments was the direct consequence of the South Ossetians' refusal to do their part and was in fact a positive reflection of Georgia's commitment to a peaceful settlement. Rood added that the Ossetians' had refused proposals to which even the Russians had agreed. That said, she noted Russian resistance to changing the status quo on negotiation modalities at the same time that it was pursuing changes to the status quo on the ground. This made it difficult for Georgia to continue to PARIS 00006179 003 OF 003 proceed peacefully. ¶12. (C) Smessow and Bouchez asked whether the Russians could be brought around to accepting some changes in the status quo, either in the JCC or the PKF. Bryza noted the importance of constructive evolution, saying it would be important for example to complement the CIS PKF before trying to replace it (Bryza underscored this distinction); the objective should be to create a multinational force in which Russia would not have a preponderant role. DuMoulin tried to suggest that the Georgians were abandoning negotiations for unilateralism. Bryza pointed out forcefully that, given the South Ossetians' refusal even to negotiate, the U.S. had encouraged the Georgians to implement what they could even in the absence of reciprocal steps by the South Ossetians. The key was to gain the understanding of their situation from the international community. ¶13. (C) Smessow agreed that the situation was difficult, although he repeated that crisis would lead nowhere and was to be avoided. Bryza agreed, adding that the real key was to convince the Russians that the price of blocking progress was higher than moving forward. That said, the U.S. had been clear with Georgian officials that unilateral implementation could not include recourse to force. This would evoke with certainty a Russian response, using overwhelming force, which could put an end at once to Georgia's military and its Euroatlantic aspirations. If Georgia provoked the Russians, it could find itself abandoned by the international community. ¶14. (C) Bouchez speculated that Russia needed to be persuaded that moving forward, however incrementally, was the best way to minimize the risk of the situation spinning out of control in the region. Perhaps there were ways to move forward -- through changes in the negotiating format, political gestures, or economic rehabilitation -- that would not be perceived by Russia as inimical to its interests. While such measures were "very modest," perhaps they could be explored. Bryza agreed on the need to get negotiations started and to use institutions such as the OSCE (he cited the U.S. food-for-thought paper) to get across to the Russians that some Georgian claims were justified; perhaps there was also something that could be done in the G-8 framework, and allies should also consider coordinating on how they would respond to Saakashvili at UNGA. Bryza repeated that the Russians needed to see there was a political cost for obstructionism, while assuring them that they would continue to have a role in any solution. At the same time, Georgia needed to avoid provocative actions or overly harsh rhetoric, which also had benefits such as NATO ID. ¶15. (C) Bouchez noted a global hardening in the Russian position and agreed that it would be important not to call into question Russia's presence in the region; to do so would be a casus belli. She argued that upcoming Russian elections would also likely stiffen Russian obstructionism, and that it would therefore be necessary to offer the Russians face-saving ways to move forward. She wondered if it would be possible to broaden the format of discussions, for example through use of the steering group for the donors' process. Bryza responded that Georgia needed to think through a strategy for complementary approaches, while accepting at the same time the reality of the Russian presence. ¶16. (C) Bouchez worried that Georgian provocations could endanger the UN fact-finding mission. Bryza responded that Georgia was more focused on the greater dangers of a real crisis or the loss of NATO ID, and felt they needed to speak up about their situation in international fora. Smessow said he understood the need, but worried about a confrontational approach that would not advance Georgian interests. Bryza responded that the U.S. was working hard with the Georgians to get them to distinguish between confrontation and competition. While they needed to use international fora and international pressure to press their advantage competitively where they could, the U.S. was doing its best to steer them away from confrontation, in particular the use of force. ¶17. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message. 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