C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006178

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC CD TO IV FR
SUBJECT: MFA COMMENTS ON COTE D'IVOIRE, TOGO AND CHAD


Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt. Reas
ons 1.4b,d


1. Summary: MFA AF DAS-Equivalent Bruno Foucher on
September 12 said President Chirac would call attention to
the financial cost of French support for Operation Licorne in
Cote d'Ivoire in upcoming UN meetings and indicate the
possibility of an adjustment to French force deployment if
the peace process remains in gridlock. Regarding the
September visits of the Togolese and Chadian Presidents to
France, Foucher said there were no major developments,
however he voiced satisfaction that Faure had gained
legitimacy as head of state and that Deby had also managed to
consolidate his position. End Summary.

Cote d'Ivoire: Status Quo Not Worth the Price Tag
-------------- --------------


2. (C) MFA AF DAS-Equivalent Bruno Foucher told Africa
Watcher on September 12 that French President Chirac would
aim next week at the UN to underscore French dissatisfaction
at the high fiscal burden posed by continuing French military
presence through Operation Licorne in support of the UN
Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI). The Licorne deployment
has cost France about one billion euro since the crisis
erupted in 2002, according to Foucher. Chirac, he indicated,
hoped to capitalize on a joint UNSC-African Union Peace and
Security Council (PSC) meeting in New York on September 19 in
order to jump-start the reconciliation process in Cote
d'Ivoire. But without real headway towards a political
resolution, France would look to draw down the costly Licorne
force and could envisage alteration of the Licorne and UNOCI
mandates when next reviewed by the UN Security Council (UNSC)
in December 2006, according to Foucher.


3. (C) Foucher offered a positive assessment of the
September 8 Communique of the International Working Group in
Abidjan, positing that it had adumbrated a path forward for
Cote d'Ivoire after the parties inevitably miss the target of
elections in October 2006. Foucher said the international
strategy now should entail: i) reinforcement of the

Prime
Minister's authority; ii) ending the implicit duality between
the powers of the President and Prime Minister; and iii)
establishing a High Level Consultative Committee that would,
in effect, be a means to remove difficult parties from the
government while advancing dialog. Foucher said France would
look favorably on allowing Gbagbo to maintain his
presidential title as a ceremonial function without actual
governing authority.

Togo: Faure Gains Credibility as Head of State
-------------- --


4. (C) Foucher was highly satisfied by developments on Togo.
President Faure's September visits to France and to the
European Union had been a success. Faure's meeting with EU
Commission President Barroso was especially pivotal, for it
accorded Faure legitimacy as head of state. Contrary to
media reports, Faure's talks with the French had not covered
the supposedly imminent nomination of a Prime Minister,
Foucher claimed. One cause for concern, according to
Foucher, was Faure's unilateral announcement to schedule
legislative elections for 8 June 2007. This was a misstep,
inviting opposition indignation, because Faure was supposed
to coordinate a joint announcement with the opposition,
Foucher said. Another turning point for Togo watchers could
be Faure's November 2006 trip to Germany, Foucher suggested.


Deby in Paris
--------------


5. (C) Foucher said Chadian President Idriss Deby had
visited France in September in a personal capacity. Deby
nonetheless had meetings with President Chirac, FM
Douste-Blazy, Minister-Delegate for Cooperation Girardin,
Minister of Defense Alliot-Marie and Minister of Interior
Sarkozy. Deby's position was noticeably stronger than six
months ago, he declared. Foucher called attention to the
thousand or so Chadian rebels who had just crossed the border
with Sudan to return to Chad. He speculated that these
rebels were mostly of the Tama ethnicity and they had been
left in the lurch by Sudanese President Bashir, who had
discontinued his support. Deby was making headway in
bringing Zaghawa rebels back into the fold, thanks to
increased availability of funds, giving Deby greater

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negotiating latitude. Foucher nonetheless discounted the
notion that Bashir had ended his designs on destabilizing
Chad. Foucher further mentioned that a cabinet reshuffle in
Chad was in the works,


6. (C) Comment: Given Deby's close ties to Chirac, it is
unlikely that the Chadian President would call on Minister of
Interior Sarkozy without Chirac's consent. Foucher, who is
awaiting his transfer to Chad as the next French ambassador,
insisted that French policy in the region would not change
should Sarkozy succeed Chirac as French President in 2007.
Foucher's comment runs contrary to the received wisdom that
current French policy on Chad is based on Chirac's personal
ties to Deby. While Sarkozy is seeking to expand his own
African base, he cannot expect and perhaps would not even
wish for Chirac's unrivaled network of friendships built over
decades of contact with Africa. Significant changes in
French African policy remain likely once Chirac steps down as
President, regardless of his successor.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
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