Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS5734
2006-08-25 17:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
GOF ON KAZAKHSTAN'S OSCE 2009 CHAIRMANSHIP BID
how-toVZCZCXYZ0023 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHFR #5734 2371716 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 251716Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0729 INFO RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0658 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 6305 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 5811 RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 1206 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6216 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 2393 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0237 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 7932 RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE IMMEDIATE 3156
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 005734
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2016
TAGS: PREL KZ KDEM PGOV PHUM OSCE FR
SUBJECT: GOF ON KAZAKHSTAN'S OSCE 2009 CHAIRMANSHIP BID
REF: STATE 139361
Classified By: CDA JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) and (d)`
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 005734
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2016
TAGS: PREL KZ KDEM PGOV PHUM OSCE FR
SUBJECT: GOF ON KAZAKHSTAN'S OSCE 2009 CHAIRMANSHIP BID
REF: STATE 139361
Classified By: CDA JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) and (d)`
1. (C) A/Political Counselor delivered reftel demarche August
25 to MFA DAS Equivalent for Russia, the Caucasus, and
Central Asia, Aurelia Bouchez, who was eager to discuss the
U.S. position on Kazakhstan's candidacy for the 2009 OSCE
Chairmanship. Drawing on reftel points, A/Polcouns
highlighted Kazakhstan's disappointing lack of action on the
steps the U.S. had recommended to meet the democratic
standards required of chairmanship, our attempts to persuade
Kazakhstan to delay its candidacy until at least 2011, and
our hope that other like-minded OSCE member states would
discreetly attempt to steer Kazakhstan in the same direction.
2. (C) Bouchez said that France had no fixed position on the
issue, but would be discussing it with European partners in
the coming days. A common position in the EU would be ideal,
but the German position had already complicated such efforts.
She said the GOF wanted to avoid sending a negative message
to the Kazakhstani government as the UK had done, but at the
same time agreed that more progress was required, especially
in light of recent events. On substance, France shared
completely the U.S. judgment that exercising the chairmanship
required a minimum of credibility. The U.S. proposal to
Kazakhstan to delay its candidacy until at least 2011 was
welcome, she added, so long as the Americans presented it in
terms of a possibility and not a guarantee. We affirmed that
this was the case. She hoped that OSCE member states would
not close the door on chairmanship, and offer a constructive
response.
3. (C) For the moment, Bouchez noted, the GOF had not been
approached by Kazakhstan on the issue and would avoid
discussing it. President Chirac met with President
Nazarbayev on the margins of the G-8 in St. Petersburg but
neither raised the issue; other high-level contacts were not
on the schedule. Bouchez commented that President Chirac had
a particularly good relationship with Nazarbayev, and that
France's final decision on the issue would likely lie in the
Presidency.
4. (C) COMMENT: France highly values its important commercial
relationship with Kazakhstan; something to which President
Chirac is particularly sensitive. We would expect France to
take neither a leading role in opposing the Kazakhstani bid,
nor in pushing for a positive response. The GOF sees
Kazakhstan moving in the wrong direction democratically, but
is reluctant to make this a central issue in their bilateral
relationship. It is worth noting that President Chirac was
one of the first leaders in the world to congratulate
Nazarbayev after his landslide (read: flawed) re-election; he
did this in spite of strong advice to the contrary from the
MFA. END COMMENT
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Rosenblatt
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2016
TAGS: PREL KZ KDEM PGOV PHUM OSCE FR
SUBJECT: GOF ON KAZAKHSTAN'S OSCE 2009 CHAIRMANSHIP BID
REF: STATE 139361
Classified By: CDA JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) and (d)`
1. (C) A/Political Counselor delivered reftel demarche August
25 to MFA DAS Equivalent for Russia, the Caucasus, and
Central Asia, Aurelia Bouchez, who was eager to discuss the
U.S. position on Kazakhstan's candidacy for the 2009 OSCE
Chairmanship. Drawing on reftel points, A/Polcouns
highlighted Kazakhstan's disappointing lack of action on the
steps the U.S. had recommended to meet the democratic
standards required of chairmanship, our attempts to persuade
Kazakhstan to delay its candidacy until at least 2011, and
our hope that other like-minded OSCE member states would
discreetly attempt to steer Kazakhstan in the same direction.
2. (C) Bouchez said that France had no fixed position on the
issue, but would be discussing it with European partners in
the coming days. A common position in the EU would be ideal,
but the German position had already complicated such efforts.
She said the GOF wanted to avoid sending a negative message
to the Kazakhstani government as the UK had done, but at the
same time agreed that more progress was required, especially
in light of recent events. On substance, France shared
completely the U.S. judgment that exercising the chairmanship
required a minimum of credibility. The U.S. proposal to
Kazakhstan to delay its candidacy until at least 2011 was
welcome, she added, so long as the Americans presented it in
terms of a possibility and not a guarantee. We affirmed that
this was the case. She hoped that OSCE member states would
not close the door on chairmanship, and offer a constructive
response.
3. (C) For the moment, Bouchez noted, the GOF had not been
approached by Kazakhstan on the issue and would avoid
discussing it. President Chirac met with President
Nazarbayev on the margins of the G-8 in St. Petersburg but
neither raised the issue; other high-level contacts were not
on the schedule. Bouchez commented that President Chirac had
a particularly good relationship with Nazarbayev, and that
France's final decision on the issue would likely lie in the
Presidency.
4. (C) COMMENT: France highly values its important commercial
relationship with Kazakhstan; something to which President
Chirac is particularly sensitive. We would expect France to
take neither a leading role in opposing the Kazakhstani bid,
nor in pushing for a positive response. The GOF sees
Kazakhstan moving in the wrong direction democratically, but
is reluctant to make this a central issue in their bilateral
relationship. It is worth noting that President Chirac was
one of the first leaders in the world to congratulate
Nazarbayev after his landslide (read: flawed) re-election; he
did this in spite of strong advice to the contrary from the
MFA. END COMMENT
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Rosenblatt